Menoken v. Burrows

656 F.Supp.3d 98

Cassandra M. MENOKEN, Plaintiff, v. Charlotte A. BURROWS, Chair,United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, et al., Defendants.

No. 16-cv-2480 (DLF)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

Signed February 2, 2023

Cassandra Michelle Menoken, Washington, DC, Gary T. Brown, Gary T. Brown & Associates, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Douglas C. Dreier, U.S. Department of Justice U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendant Charlotte A. Burrows.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH, United States District Judge

Cassandra Menoken brings this action against her former employer, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and its Chair asserting that they improperly denied her reasonable accommodations and interfered with her rights, in violation of the Rehabilitation Act, and subjected her to a hostile work environment, in violation of Title VII. Before the Court is the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Dkt. 42. For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the motion in part and deny it in part.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Cassandra Menoken worked as a legal advisor for the EEOC since at least 1982 until her recent retirement in 2019. Defs.' Statement of Undisputed Facts ¶¶ 1-2, Dkt. 42-2; Pl.'s Resps. to Statement of Undisputed Facts (Corrected) ¶¶ 1-2, Dkt. 51-1.¹ In 1994, she brought a discrimination complaint against the Office of Personnel Management regarding its method for determining Administrative Law Judge appointments. Pl.'s Resps. ¶ 3. Between 1994 and 2018, the EEOC heard her appeals from this discrimination complaint and various grievances related to the complaint. First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 63-87, Dkt. 7; see also Defs.' Mem. at 3-6, Dkt. 42-1.

Separately, in 2012, Menoken submitted to the EEOC requests for various reasonable accommodations for her work as an employee. Pl.'s Resps. ¶¶ 4-5. The EEOC eventually denied her requests in a letter dated April 5, 2013. Id. ¶ 11. Starting in January 2, 2013, Menoken also took a period of leave for 1.5 years. Id. ¶ 15. She eventually retired from the EEOC effective January 31, 2019. Id. ¶ 34.

On December 20, 2016, Menoken filed a complaint against the Chair of the EEOC and the EEOC alleging that they subjected her to a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII, refused to provide her a reasonable accommodation and interfered with her rights under the Rehabilitation Act, and unlawfully monitored and made public her confidential medical information in violation of the Rehabilitation Act. Compl. at 16-17, Dkt. 1. She then filed a first amended complaint stating the same claims. First Am. Compl., Dkt. 7. Judge Rosemary M. Collyer granted the Chair's Motion to Dismiss the entirety of the first amended complaint and dismissed Menoken's Title VII claim without prejudice and Rehabilitation Act claims with prejudice. Mem. Op. at 22, Dkt. 13. Judge Collyer also denied Menoken's motion for reconsideration. Mem. Op. at 1, Dkt. 23. She found, among other things, no reason to revisit her ruling on Menoken's Rehabilitation Act claim for unlawful interference because, she concluded, an interference claim should be treated as an anti-retaliation claim. See id. at 8.

On appeal, this Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part Judge Collyer's order. Menoken v. Dhillon, 975 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2020). It reversed her dismissal of Menoken's Title VII claim because the Chair's allegedly retaliatory acts in 2013 were sufficiently linked and severe to support a hostile work environment claim. Id. at 6-7. As to Menoken's Rehabilitation Act claims, the Circuit reversed Judge Collyer's dismissal of Menoken's claim for refusal to grant a reasonable accommodation because the court improperly relied on extra-complaint evidence "as definitive proof that the only accommodation Menoken sought was an uncertain and indefinite amount of paid leave." Id. at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, the Circuit clarified, the Rehabilitation Act permits plaintiffs to bring an independent claim for unlawful interference distinct from a claim for retaliation. Id. at 9. It found that the allegations in Menoken's first amended complaint, taken as a whole, sufficiently stated such an interference claim. Id. at 11. Finally, the Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Menoken's medical inquiries and confidentiality claims. Id. at 13.

Following the Circuit's ruling, the case was reassigned to the undersigned. On remand, this Court granted Menoken's Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint. Minute Order of December 15, 2021. Menoken's second amended complaint incorporated the factual allegations in her first amended complaint but restated her legal claims in accordance with the Circuit's ruling. Second Am. Compl. at 8-9, Dkt 39. The operative complaint now contains Rehabilitation Act claims for unlawful refusal to provide a reasonable accommodation and interference and Title VII claims for a retaliatory hostile work environment. Id. The Chair has moved for summary judgment on all of Menoken's claims.² Defs.' Mem. at 1-2.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 56, summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A "material" fact is one that could affect the outcome of the lawsuit. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006). A dispute is "genuine" if a reasonable jury could determine that the evidence warrants a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 895. In reviewing the record, the court "must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000).

A party "opposing summary judgment" must "substantiate [its allegations] with evidence" that "a reasonable jury could credit in support of each essential element of [its] claims." Grimes v. District of Columbia, 794 F.3d 83, 94 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if the opposing party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Rehabilitation Act

1. Refusal to grant reasonable accommodation

The Rehabilitation Act requires employers to "mak[e] reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an . . . employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). To prove a violation of this provision, a plaintiff must show that: "(i) she was disabled within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act; (ii) her employer had notice of her disability; (iii) she was able to perform the essential functions of her job with or without reasonable accommodation; and (iv) her employer denied her request for a reasonable accommodation of that disability." Solomon v. Vilsack, 763 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (cleaned up).

Menoken alleges that the Chair improperly denied her 2012 request for a reasonable accommodation.³ First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 92, 99. According to a confirmation of request for reasonable accommodation dated September 11, 2012, Menoken formally sought "[p]aid leave for 6 months or until such time as [her] discrimination complaints are adjudicated (whichever is longer)." Ex. 1 at 2, Dkt. 8-3. According to Menoken, during accommodations discussions she also sought reassignment to the position of director of the Washington Field Office, Ex. 1, Menoken 2022 Dep. at 64, Dkt. 42-4, and permission to "work independently on a special project until [her] OPM appeals were adjudicated," Ex. E, Menoken Decl. ¶ 49, Dkt. 45-6.

The Court will grant summary judgment in favor of the Chair on this claim because Menoken has not established that she could perform the essential functions of her job with a reasonable accommodation, as none of the three accommodations she proposed were reasonable. "The Rehabilitation Act covers requests for only those accommodations that are 'reasonable.' " Scarborough v. Natsios, 190 F. Supp. 2d 5, 25 (D.D.C. 2002). "An employer need not provide an accommodation . . . if the employee could not perform the essential functions of h[er] job even with such an accommodation." Adams v. District of Columbia, 50 F. Supp. 3d 47, 53-54 (D.D.C. 2014).

First, Menoken made a request for indefinite paid leave. Even though her request included six months as a minimum duration, Menoken also asked that the leave extend as long as it would take for the EEOC to adjudicate her discrimination complaints. Indeed, the doctor's letter in support of Menoken's request suggested an even more indefinite end date: "[o]nce recovery is achieved." Ex. 2 at 395-96, Dkt. 8-4. Such a request is not a request for a reasonable accommodation because "[c]oming to work regularly is an essential function of performing one's duties." Holmes-Martin v. Leavitt, 569 F. Supp. 2d 184, 201 (D.D.C. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sampson v. Citibank, FSB, 53 F. Supp. 2d 13, 18 (D.D.C. 1999) (finding request for leave to be indefinite despite the plaintiff's "dispute[ ] whether, in fact, indefinite leave was what was being requested" because doctor's letter was open-ended about how long recovery would take), aff'd without opinion, 221 F.3d 196 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

Second, the director position that Menoken sought was filled at the time by Acting Director Mindy Weinstein,...