Mercedes-Benz Fin. v. 1188 Stratford Ave.

312 A.3d 16

348 Conn. 796

MERCEDES-BENZ FINANCIAL

v.1188 STRATFORD AVENUE, LLC, et al.

(SC 20754)

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued November 15, 2023

Officially Released April 16, 2024

Daniel D. Skuret III, with whom was Patrick D. Skuret, for the appellants (defendants).

Gary J. Greene, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Robinson, C. J., and McDonald, D’Auria, Mullins, Ecker, Alexander and Dannehy, Js.^*

D’AURIA, J.

In this certified appeal, the defendants, Amello Dizenzo and his company, 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC (company), appeal from the Appellate Court’s judgment affirming the trial court’s denial of their motion to open the judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Mercedes-Benz Financial. On appeal, the defendants claim that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court had not abused its discretion by denying their motion to open as untimely and with no basis, even though the defendants timely filed their motion. We agree and, therefore, reverse the Appellate Court’s judgment.

The Appellate Court’s opinion aptly recites the facts and procedural history required to resolve this appeal; see Mercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC, 213 Conn. App. 739, 280 A.3d 120 (2022); which we summarize along with other undisputed facts in the record. In 2012, the defendants entered into a motor vehicle lease agreement (agreement) with a dealership in Fairfield for a 2013 Mercedes-Benz (vehicle). Dizenzo signed the agreement on his company’s behalf and also in his individual capacity as guarantor. The agreement provided that the defendants would make monthly lease payments to the plaintiff.

In February, 2017, the plaintiff brought the underlying breach of contract action against the defendants, alleging that they had stopped making the lease payments due under the agreement, Neither defendant filed an appearance. The plaintiff moved to default the defendants for failure to appear, which the trial court clerk granted. The plaintiff then moved for judgment and for an order of weekly payments. On May 13, 2019, the court granted the motion and rendered judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $11,734.61, and awarded the plaintiff postjudgment interest at the annual rate of 8 percent pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a. The court further ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiff $35 each week. The plaintiff sent a notice of this judgment to the defendants.

Less than four months after the court rendered judgment for the plaintiff, the defendants, on July 29, 2019, moved to open the judgment pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 52-212.¹ The defendants contended that the "vehicle continuously [had] serious defects with [it] which made operating it dangerous" and that the required repairs would have taken several months to complete. The defendants declared the lease void and left the vehicle with the dealer because the vehicle could not function properly. As a result, the defendants claimed that they had to expend additional funds to secure a replacement vehicle. The defendants further asserted that, "when they were sued in 2017, [they] mistakenly thought this matter was resolved, and [they] did not hear anything else until June of 2019 when [they] received notice of judgment." The defendants further claimed that they "ha[d] good defenses to the plaintiff’s claim based on breach of warranties and misrepresentations and [would] file a counterclaim .. when the judgment is [opened]." The defendants supported their motion with Dizenzo’s affidavit, in which he repeated these claims essentially verbatim.

The plaintiff objected to the motion to open, claiming that the defendants had neither alleged nor demonstrated good cause as to why the court should open the judgment and had failed to offer any valid defenses or affirmative claims against the plaintiff’s cause of action. The plaintiff further contended that the defendants "should not be permitted to sit on their rights for over two years during the pendency of this case and now attempt to open the judgment."

Pursuant to the defendants’ request, the court conducted a hearing for the parties to present oral arguments on the motion. The court initially questioned whether the defendants had timely filed the motion to open within four months from when judgment was rendered, as § 52-212 requires. The courtroom clerk and the defendants’ counsel accurately reported to the court that the July 29, 2019 motion to open was filed within four months of the court’s rendering judgment on May 13, 2019, and the court responded: "So, we are barely in time." The defendants’ counsel then explained the basis for the motion. Specifically, he contended that the defendants had taken no action in response to this lawsuit because the plaintiff accepted the vehicle’s return, the plaintiff had informed them that this action was not going to go forward, and the plaintiff waited two years to attempt to collect the judgment against the defendants. The defendants’ counsel further argued that the defendants were seeking to open the judgment to conduct discovery and to file a counterclaim against the plaintiff based on problems with the vehicle. The plaintiff’s counsel denied the defendants’ version of events, contending that the defendants’ prospective claims and defenses would be time barred because the lease agreement was signed in 2012, and their problems with the vehicle were immaterial because the plaintiff was only the "financing entity," not the car dealer. When the court expressed concern that Dizenzo’s affidavit might not suffice to support the motion to open, the defendants’ counsel requested a one week continuance to present evidence at an evidentiary hearing to support the motion. The court did not expressly rule on the defendants’ request for a hearing. Rather, at the end of hearing, the court orally denied the motion on the grounds that "[i]t’s untimely and it has no basis." The same day, the court issued a written order denying the motion, stating: "Motion is untimely with no basis."

The defendants appealed to the Appellate Court, claiming, among other things, that, because their motion to open had been timely filed, the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion. Mercedes-Benz Financial v. 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC, supra, 213 Conn. App. at 748, 750, 280 A.3d 120. The plaintiff agreed that the trial court incorrectly had determined that the defendants’ motion was untimely but argued that, in denying the motion, the court nevertheless properly exercised its discretion because the defendants had failed to satisfy the two part test to determine the timeliness of motions to open under § 52-212 (a). Id., at 748–49, 280 A.3d 120.

In a split decision, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the mo- tion to open. Id., at 740, 755, 280 A.3d 120. The majority acknowledged that the trial court incorrectly had determined that the motion to open was untimely. Id., at 750, 280 A.3d 120. The majority nevertheless held that the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying the motion to open on the additional ground that the motion " ‘ha[d] no basis’ id.; because the motion to open and Dizenzo’s affidavit failed to establish the second prong of the § 52-212 (a) test, namely, that the defendants’ failure to appear and raise a defense was excused by reasonable cause. Id., at 753, 280 A.3d 120. Specifically, the majority concluded that the defendants’ mistaken belief that the matter was resolved did not suffice to establish "reasonable cause" to excuse their failure to take any action in response to the pending action. Id. Judge Prescott dissented, contending that the trial court’s improper timeliness determination likely tainted its decision on the merits of the motion to open and that it was unclear which standard the trial court had applied when it concluded that the motion had no basis. Id., at 755–56, 280 A.3d 120. In Judge Prescott’s view, the defendants "are entitled to have that motion adjudicated by a trial court that is not laboring under the misapprehension that the motion was late." Id., at 756, 280 A.3d 120. This certified appeal followed.²

[1–3] "Whether proceeding under the common law or a statute, the action of a trial court in granting or [denying a motion] to open a judgment is, generally, within the judicial discretion of such court, and its action will not be disturbed on appeal unless it clearly appears that the trial court has abused its discretion." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Rothermel, 339 Conn. 366, 381, 260 A.3d 1187 (2021). "In determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, this court must make every reasonable presumption in favor of its action. … The manner in which [this] discretion is exercised will not be disturbed [as] long as the court could reasonably conclude as it did." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Conroy v. Idlibi, 343 Conn. 201, 204, 272 A.3d 1121 (2022).

[4–10] "The court’s discretion, however, is not unfettered …." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Harris v. Neale, 197 Conn. App. 147, 157, 231 A.3d 357 (2020); see also Cook v. Lawlor, 139 Conn. 68, 71, 90 A.2d 164 (1952). "[D]iscretion imports something more than leeway in decisionmaking. … It means a legal discretion, to be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice. … [T]he court’s discretion should be exercised mindful of the policy preference to bring about a trial on the merits of a dispute whenever possible and to secure for the litigant his day in court." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Costello v. Goldstein & Peck, P.C., 321 Conn. 244, 255–56, 137 A.3d 748 (2016). Sound discretion "requires a knowledge and understanding of the material circumstances surrounding the matter …" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Krevis v. Bridgeport, 262 Conn. 813, 819, 817 A.2d...