Mercedes-Benz Fin. v. 1188 Stratford Ave., LLC

213 Conn.App. 739

280 A.3d 120

MERCEDES-BENZ FINANCIAL

v.1188 STRATFORD AVENUE, LLC, et al.

AC 43463

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 9, 2022

Officially released July 19, 2022

Daniel D. Skuret III, Ansonia, with whom was Patrick D. Skuret, for the appellants (defendants).

Gary Greene, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Bright, C. J., and Prescott and Moll, Js.

BRIGHT, C. J.

The defendants, Aniello Dizenzo and his company, 1188 Stratford Avenue, LLC (company), appeal from the judgment of the trial court denying their motion to open the default judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Mercedes-Benz Financial. The defendants claim that the court abused its discretion by denying their (1) motion to open and (2) oral request to continue the hearing on the motion to allow the defendants to present testimony and evidence in support of it. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following relevant facts and procedural history. In 2012, Dizenzo, on behalf of his company, entered into a motor vehicle lease agreement (agreement) with a dealership in Fairfield for a 2013 Mercedes-Benz (vehicle). Dizenzo signed the agreement on behalf of his company and also in his individual capacity as guarantor. The dealership assigned its rights under the agreement to the plaintiff. In January, 2017, the plaintiff brought the underlying action against the defendants alleging that the defendants had failed to make the payments due under the agreement. The return date was February 28, 2017, but neither defendant filed an appearance.

On September 1, 2017, the trial court clerk granted the plaintiff's motion for default for failure to appear as to both defendants. On September 1, 2019, more than one year after the default had entered, the plaintiff filed a motion for judgment and order of weekly payments. On May 13, 2019, the court granted the motion, rendering judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $11,734.61 and awarding the plaintiff postjudgment interest at the annual rate of 8 percent pursuant to General Statutes § 37-3a.¹ The court ordered the defendants to make weekly payments in the amount of $35. On May 28, 2019, the plaintiff sent a notice of judgment to the defendants.

On July 29, 2019, the defendants filed a motion to open the judgment pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2019) § 52-212.² In that motion, the defendants asserted that the vehicle "had serious defects" and required repairs that would have taken several months to complete. As a result, the defendants told the dealership that, because the vehicle did not function properly, "the lease was void and they left the [vehicle] with the dealer[ship]." The defendants claimed that, although they were aware of the lawsuit in 2017, they "mistakenly thought [it] was resolved and did not hear anything else until June of 2019, when [they] received notice of judgment." They further claimed that they "ha[d] good defenses to the plaintiff's claim based upon breach of warranties and misrepresentations and w[ould] file a counterclaim ... when the judgment is set aside." Dizenzo repeated these claims in an affidavit, which was filed with the motion. The plaintiff filed an objection to the motion, claiming that the defendants failed to establish good cause for their failure to appear and that the "[d]efendants’ purported defenses and [counter]claims arise from the alleged acts of the dealership, not the plaintiff financing company."

On August 9, 2019, the defendants filed a caseflow request in which they requested oral argument "[t]o explain [the] motion to open judgment ... and the reasons why the court should grant it." On August 13, 2019, the defendants filed a notice of intention to appear and argue and request for oral argument, requesting "permission to appear and ... explain the defenses and the reasons why the court should grant the motion...." On September 16, 2019, the court held a hearing on the motion. At the hearing, the court initially thought that judgment had entered in 2017. After the courtroom clerk informed the court that judgment had entered on May 13, 2019, the following exchange occurred:

"The Court: May, June, July, August, September. We are more than four months?

"[The Defendants’ Counsel]: No. We ... filed within time, Your Honor. And you know I asked that this be heard back in August with—

"The Court: All right. So we are barely in time. Tell me; you were served properly, correct?

"[The Defendants’ Counsel]: I believe the defendants were served properly.

"The Court: Okay. So 2017.

"[The Defendants’ Counsel]: Yes.

"The Court: Versus 2019, with nothing happening—

"[The Defendants’ Counsel]: That's right. They didn't—

"The Court: —after being served.

"[The Defendants’ Counsel]: Well, it's not that nothing has happened, Your Honor. What, in effect, happened was he contacted [Mercedes-Benz] after that period of time and was told the fact that they weren't going to go forward.

"The Court: Is your client here to testify?

"[The Defendants’ Counsel]: Well, what I will do is—I thought this was oral argument. But if you want testimony, we can bring him in.

"The Court: No. No. This is your motion to open. Why should I rely on a pleading [or] a story that there was an agreement, supposedly, and that's why you didn't bother doing anything, when I don't even have an affidavit?

"[The Defendants’ Counsel]: You do have an affidavit.

"The Court: To that effect?

"[The Defendants’ Counsel]: You have an affidavit.

"The Court: Okay. All right. All right. But was the affidavit cross-examined? Do I have witnesses on the other side? Do we have time for a hearing? Do we have—are we ready for evidence?

"[The Defendants’ Counsel]: You know, Your Honor, I thought this was for oral argument, and I'm sorry. It's my fault. And what I will do is if Your Honor just continues the argument to next week, I'm sure what can happen is that we can bring him forward.

"The Court: And even if you bring him in—Counsel, do you agree there was an agreement not to do anything?

"[The Plaintiff's Counsel]: Absolutely not. And it flies in the face of their own affidavit. Their affidavit articulates that they didn't get the satisfaction they wanted. And they turned around and just left the car with a dealer and said we'll go elsewhere. I mean that's the fair reading of their affidavit.

"[The Defendants’ Counsel]: That's not the fair reading.

"[The Plaintiff's Counsel]: More importantly, these defenses, A, are probably time barred because the lease was entered into in November of 2012. And more importantly than that, how do you hold the financing entity culpable for defects in the product you used its money to buy? ... You go after the dealer. These are Lemon Law type of allegations. We had a lousy car. It didn't work. It had this problem; it had that problem. But Mercedes-Benz Financial had nothing to do with that. They were not the dealer of the car. They were not the owner of the car. They didn't sell the car or lease the car to the defendant[s]....

"[The Defendants’ Counsel]: That's not true.... I have a copy of the lease. May I show it to Your Honor?

"The Court: Tell me what it says.

"[The Defendants’ Counsel]: It says Mercedes-Benz Financial Services.

"The Court: Is the lessor?

"[The Defendants’ Counsel]: It says Mercedes-Benz Financial Services, and it's a first class lease. And basically, it's all over here about Mercedes-Benz Financial Services. And what had, in fact, happened was there's a breach of actual contract. There's a breach with regard to the warranties. It's a violation of the Lemon Law. And basically, he was told the fact that they weren't going to do anything with it. He left the car there because the car was not operable, and he didn't want to actually get anybody injured.

"You know it's a situation where all he wants to do is get his day in court. And he is sorry that this thing didn't actually—he didn't actually move faster with regard to this; that's all. It's very simple. And all we'd like to do is we would like to reopen the judgment; do some discovery with it; file a counterclaim.... This two year period of time is very important, actually, to the plaintiff as he is talking. But it is also very important to us because the fact that they did nothing, which is sort of—which shows the fact that when [Dizenzo] talked to them, they weren't going to go forward with regard to the file. Then all of a sudden, this happened.

"The Court: Has he got anything in writing, any communication at all, saying we're not going forward; we are not going to bother you? Anything at all aside from your word or his word? Everybody knows what an e-mail is. There isn't a human being in this country who doesn't know you put things in writing.

"[The Defendants’ Counsel]: Well, you are not talking with a person that uses e-mail all of the time, Your Honor. You're talking with a—

"The Court: That's you. How about your client?

"[The Defendants’ Counsel]: The client is the same way, and Attorney D.J. Skuret can attest to that. You know my client is around my age, so it's not like he's computer literate so that is not going to happen. All we are doing is we're looking for our day in court, Your Honor; that's all.

"[The Plaintiff's Counsel]: Your Honor, please.

"[The Defendants’ Counsel]: And Your Honor has been very fair with regard to the other people that have appeared before Your Honor today. All we are looking for is fairness in getting this set aside so we can go forward with regard to discovery.

"The Court: Your client is savvy enough to have himself an LLC. I bet you he knows what an e-mail is.

"[The Defendants’ Counsel]: I think he knows what an e-mail is, but I don't think he's savvy enough to have a—to do e-mail. So with regard to having an—

"The Court: He's got a corporation. Is he smart enough to set up a corporation?

"[The Defendants’ Counsel]: I don't think he set up any corporation. I—

"The Court: What's the LLC?

"[The Defendants’ Counsel]: The corporation is a limited liability company.

"The Court: I...