Mercer v. Amalgamated Transit Union Div. 689, AFL-CIO

LINDA MERCER, Plaintiff, v. AMALGAMATED TRANSIT UNION DIVISION 689, AFL-CIO, et al., Defendants.

No. GJH-21-3274

United States District Court, D. Maryland, Southern Division

February 24, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION

GEORGE J. HAZEL, United States District Judge.

Plaintiff Linda Mercer brings this civil action against Defendant Amalgamated Transit Union International (“ATU International”); and Defendants Amalgamated Transit Union Division 689 (“Local 689”); Raymond Jackson, current Local 689 president; and Jackie Jeter former Local 689 president (collectively, “Local Defendants”), for sex discrimination that prevented her from running for a position with Local 689. ECF No. 1. Pending before the Court are two Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendant ATU International, ECF No. 13, and by the Local Defendants (Local 689, Jackson, and Jeter), ECF No. 14. No hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2021). For the following reasons, Defendant ATU International's motion is granted, and Local Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. BACKGROUND^[1]

Plaintiff Mercer, a woman, has been a bus operator with the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (“WMATA”) since 2002. ECF No. 1 ¶ 10. She has also, at all times during her employment, been a union member in good standing with Local 689. Id. at ¶ 11. In or around October 2017, Mercer sustained an injury that rendered her unable to work as a bus operator, and as a result, WMATA placed her on the “124 List”-a list of employees affected by a disability that prevents them from fulfilling their job duties. Id. ¶ 16. During this period she continued to pay her union dues and thus remained a member in good standing. Id. ¶ 17. In November 2018, Local 689 held nominations for the December 2018 union election, and Plaintiff was nominated for one of two shop steward positions at the WMATA Metrobus Shepherd Parkway Division. Id. ¶ 20. Plaintiff had previously been elected to the position in 2015. Id. ¶ 21. On or around November 29, 2018, Defendant Jeter, then-president of Local 689, informed Plaintiff that she would not be permitted to run for shop steward because her dues were not current. Id. ¶ 22. On or around November 30, 2018, Plaintiff confirmed with the Local 689 treasurer that, contrary to Defendant Jeter's remarks, she was current with her dues, and thus was eligible to run for office as a member in good standing. Id. ¶ 23. Plaintiff, however, was prevented from running. Id. ¶ 24. On December 5, 2018, the union elections were held. Id. ¶ 25. Several weeks later, Local 689 held a union meeting where Plaintiff's inability to run in the election was discussed. Id. Defendant Jeter said at this time that Plaintiff was not permitted to run because she was on the 124 List for disabled employees. Id. Plaintiff alleges that this reasoning was “clearly pretextual” because at least two male members of Local 689 had been permitted to run for office in the December 2018 elections, despite being on the 124 List. Id. ¶¶ 26-29.

On or around December 6, 2018, Plaintiff sent a letter to the Local 689 Election Committee and Executive Board, challenging the election on the basis that she was blocked from running. Id. ¶ 31. Several weeks later, the Board denied her challenge. Id. ¶ 32. On or around January 8 and January 9, 2019, Plaintiff appealed directly to members of Local 689, at the chapter's meetings, to overturn the election results for denying her the ability to run, despite the fact that male union members on the 124 List were permitted to run. Id. ¶ 33. After discussions, Local 689 members voted to overturn the results of the December 2018 election, and a second election was scheduled for March 13, 2019, in which Plaintiff would be permitted to run. Id. ¶ 35.

Following the member vote, certain members of Local 689 filed an appeal of that vote with Defendant ATU International. Plaintiff alleges, on information and belief, that the appeal was written and filed by Defendant Jeter on behalf of the named members, although Jeter had since retired and was no longer serving as president of Local 689. Id. ¶¶ 37-39. Plaintiff asserts that Jeter appealed the decision despite the fact that “standard pattern and practice” dictates that the Local 689 president alone may appeal a decision of membership to ATU International. Id. ¶ 38. Plaintiff asserts she was not made aware of the appeal or given the opportunity to respond. Id. ¶ 41.

On or around March 12, 2019, the day before the rescheduled election was to take place, ATU International issued an opinion overturning the membership's vote to allow Plaintiff to run for shop steward.^[2] Id. 42. In a letter to Plaintiff, representatives from ATU International asserted that, in order to run for a union position, a member must be working at the Division where they were running for union office, and thus, Plaintiff's extended leave for disability “for some time” precluded her from running for shop steward. Id. As such, Plaintiff alleges that she was unable to run in the rescheduled election on March 13, 2019. Id. ¶¶ 43-44.

Plaintiff further asserts that on or around March 14, 2019, Defendant Jeter posted a video to Facebook publicly disclosing Plaintiff's disability status “in an attempt to justify the discriminatory treatment.” Id. ¶ 46. The video also purportedly contained public disclosure of Plaintiff's home address. Id. ¶ 48. Plaintiff alleges that in the wake of the video, she was “subject to ridicule regarding her disability” from union members. Id. ¶ 47.

On or around August 12, 2019, Plaintiff subsequently filed complaints of gender discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) for the alleged incidents in December 2018 and March 2019. Id. ¶ 49. She also appealed ATU International's March 2019 decision to ATU International's Convention, held in September 2019. Id. ¶ 51. The appeal was denied. Id. ¶ 52. On or around September 25, 2021, EEOC issued Plaintiff a Right to Sue Notice against Local 689 and ATU International. Id. ¶ 54.

On December 23, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Complaint, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”) for gender discrimination, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)(1), and unlawful retaliation, § 2000e-3(a), and violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) for disability discrimination and retaliation, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 12112. Plaintiff also brings claims for breach of contract, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligence or gross negligence.

On April 18, 2022, Defendant ATU International and Defendants Local 689, Jeter, and Jackson, each moved to dismiss the case. ECF No. 13; ECF No. 14. Plaintiff responded, and Defendants replied.^[3] See ECF No. 19; ECF No. 20; ECF No. 21; ECF No. 22.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Defendants first move to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), asserting that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Once a challenge is made to subject matter jurisdiction, Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction exists. See Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., a Div. of Standex Int'l Corp., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Ferdinand-Davenport v. Children's Guild, 742 F.Supp.2d 772, 777 (D. Md. 2010). The Court should grant a Rule 12(b)(1) motion “only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.” Evans, 166 F.3d at 647 (citation omitted). In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the Court may consider evidence outside the pleadings to help determine whether it has jurisdiction over the case before it without converting the motion to one for summary judgment, see id., but the court “must presume that the factual allegations in the complaint are true.” Cash v. United States, No. 12-cv-0563-WDQ, 2012 WL 6201123, at *3 (D. Md. Dec. 11, 2012) (citation omitted).

Defendants also move to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). A motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6) “test[s] the adequacy of a complaint.” Prelich v. Med. Res., Inc., 813 F.Supp.2d 654, 660 (D. Md. 2011) (citing German v. Fox, 267 Fed.Appx. 231, 233 (4th Cir. 2008)). Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim do “not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” Id. (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999)). To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is plausible when “the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

In evaluating the sufficiency of the plaintiff's claims, the Court accepts factual allegations in the complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 268 (1994); Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Davidson Cty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir. 2005). However, the complaint must contain more than “legal conclusions elements of a cause of action, and bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009). The Court should not grant a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim unless “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations.” GE Inv. Priv. Placement Partners II v. Parker, 247 F.3d 543, 548 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229,...