Methelus v. Sch. Bd. of Collier Cnty.

243 F.Supp.3d 1266

Lesly METHELUS, Rosalba Ortiz, Zoila Lorenzo, Ange Marie Joseph, Emile Antoine and Lucenie Hilaire Durosier, on behalf of Y.M., a minor, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.The SCHOOL BOARD OF COLLIER COUNTY, FLORIDA and Kamela Patton, Defendants.

Case No: 2:16–cv–379–FtM–38MRM

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, FORT MYERS DIVISION.

Signed March 17, 2017

Jessica Zagier Wallace, Tania Galloni, Southern Poverty Law Center, Miami, FL, Michelle R. Lapointe, Southern Poverty Law, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiffs.

James Donald Fox, Roetzel & Andress, LPA, Jonathan D. Fishbane, Collier County School District, Naples, FL, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER¹

SHERI POLSTER CHAPPELL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants School Board of Collier County, Florida and Kamela Patton's Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 37). Plaintiffs filed a timely response in opposition. (Doc. 39). In addition, the United States filed a Statement of Interest (Doc. 38), to which Defendants responded (Doc. 58), and Plaintiffs replied (Doc. 59). For the following reasons, Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND²

Plaintiffs are the parents and guardians of foreign-born, English Language Learner ("ELL") children ("Plaintiff Children") who were allegedly denied access to a free public education in Collier County, Florida. (Doc. 30). According to Plaintiffs, the School Board and Superintendent Patton violated Plaintiff Children's rights, and those of hundreds of similarly situated ELL children, through a policy and practice of excluding such foreign-born children from public high school. (I at ¶ 148; Doc. 39 at 1).

The story of each Plaintiff Child is similar. At ages 15, 16, or 17, they came to the United States from Haiti or Guatemala and attempted to enroll in Collier County high schools for the 2015–2016 academic year.³ (Doc. 30 at ¶¶ 66–67, 70, 73–74, 77–78, 85–89, 93–94). Each went with a parent or guardian to Immokalee High School, Golden Gate High School, and/or Lely High School to enroll, but none were accepted. (Id. at ¶¶ 66–67, 70–71, 73–74, 77–78, 80, 85–89, 93–94). School officials gave like reasons for denying enrollment—age, lack of English proficiency, insufficient academic credits, and/or ineligible to attend high school. (Id. at ¶¶ 67, 71, 74, 80, 87, 89, 94). Regardless of the reason, none of Plaintiff Children were assessed for English language proficiency or academic achievement before being denied enrollment. (Id. at ¶ 97). Pertinent here, none filed declarations of their intent to terminate school enrollment. (Id. ). Defendants also maintained no records of unsuccessful enrollment attempts by recently-arrived, foreign-born ELL students ages fifteen and older. (Id. at ¶ 48).

The School Board's Policy 5112.01, which governs the maximum age for which a person can participate in regular high school, played a central role in Plaintiff Children's enrollment denial. (Doc. 30–2). That policy states,

[i]n order to provide reasonable consistency of maturity levels among students in the regular high school program, no person shall be permitted to attend the regular high school program after attaining the age of nineteen (19). Those who attain the age of nineteen (19) during a school year may complete that school year. Persons who are seventeen (17) years old or older and who, by earning eight (8) credits per academic year, cannot meet graduation requirements, including grade point average (GPA), prior to the end of the school year during which they attain the age of nineteen (19), shall not be permitted to attend the regular high school program beyond the end of the academic year in which they attain the age of seventeen (17). Such persons shall be afforded an opportunity to pursue a high school diploma through the Adult High School or General Educational Development (GED) programs of the District.

(Id. ). This policy went into effect in August 2013. (Id. ).

Three Plaintiff Children—G.O., K.V. and N.A.—were denied enrollment outright and not directed to any other educational program. (Doc. 30 at ¶¶ 52, 71–72, 80–81, 87–90). Family or friends told them about Adult English for Speakers of Other Languages ("Adult ESOL") programs at Immokalee Technical Center ("iTech"), Barron Collier High School, and Lorenzo Walker Technical College, which had a $30.00 per semester enrollment fee. (Id. at ¶¶ 60, 72, 81, 83, 90). For the other three Plaintiff Children—Y.M., M.D., and T.J.H.—school officials directed them to iTech. (Id. at ¶¶ 52, 67, 74, 94). Neither iTech nor Lorenzo Walker allegedly provided credits toward a high school diploma, taught Florida's core curriculum, and provided access to math, science, social studies, or computer literacy. (Id. at ¶¶ 19, 51, 56–58). The programs also did not conform to the requirements of Defendants' District Plan for Services to English Language Learners ("District ELL Plan") (Doc. 30–1), which sets forth policies and procedures for providing instruction to ELL students (Doc. 30 at ¶¶ 32–40, 51, 56).

Because of being denied access to public school, Plaintiffs bring this class action under the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974 ("EEOA"), Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VI"), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, and Florida Educational Equity Act ("FEEA"). The Amended Complaint (Doc. 30) is the operative pleading, which Defendants now move to dismiss.

LEGAL STANDARD

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the sufficiency of a complaint under the federal pleading rules. A claim fails this inspection if it asserts a legal theory that is not cognizable as a matter of law, or because its factual account is implausible. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 & 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). When deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court presumes all well-pled factual allegations to be true, resolves all reasonable doubts and inferences in the plaintiff's favor, and views the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

The federal pleading requirements are far from trivial. Although "detailed factual allegations" are not required, the rules "demand ... more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citing Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). A plaintiff must allege enough facts to raise his claims beyond the level of speculation, "nudging the[m] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. A plaintiff must do more than offer labels, conclusions, and "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. The court will not accept as true bald assertions, conclusions, or legal conclusions "couched" as facts. Id. at 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ; Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

For claims to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, therefore, the plaintiff's allegations "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). A claim is facially plausibly where the facts alleged permit the court to reasonably infer that defendant's alleged misconduct was unlawful. See Id.

DISCUSSION

Before addressing the merits of Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, a review of Florida's education system is helpful to frame the arguments before the Court.

A. Florida's free public education system

The Florida Constitution guarantees a free public school education to all children residing within its borders.⁴ Fla. Const. art. IX, § 1 (a). It states that "[t]he education of children is a fundamental value of the people of the State. It is, therefore, a paramount duty of the state to make adequate provision for the education of all children in the State." Id. ; see also Scavella v. Sch. Bd. of Dade Cty. , 363 So.2d 1095, 1098 (Fla. 1978) ("The clear implication is that all Florida residents have the right to attend this public school system for free."). This constitutional guarantee is reflected in Florida's education statute, which requires public schools to provide thirteen (13) consecutive years of free education:

[a]s required by s. 1 Art. IX of the State Constitution, the Florida K–20 education system shall include the uniform system of free public K–12 schools. These public K–12 schools shall provide 13 consecutive years of instruction, beginning with kindergarten, and shall also provide such instruction for students with ... limited English proficienc[y].

Fla. Stat. § 1000.01(4) ; see also id. § 1002.20(1) ("[A]ll K–12 public school students are entitled to a uniform, safe, secure, efficient, and high quality education.").

School attendance is compulsory for children between the ages of six and fifteen. See id. § 1003.21(1)(a)(1).⁵ A student may dropout at age sixteen, but only if he "files a formal declaration of intent to terminate school enrollment with the district school board." id. § 1003.21(1)(a)(2)(c). Although Florida carves out an exception to allow students to withdraw from school, it still compels those students who have reached age sixteen and not graduated to attend school until the formal declaration is filed. See id.

Florida also guarantees free public education to all students regardless of their national origin. See Fla. Stat. § 1000.05(2)(c). No person may be "excluded from participating in, denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any public K–20 education program" by a public school receiving federal or state financial assistance. Id. § 1000.05(2)(a). School officials must identify and assess suspected ELL students to determine whether, and to what extent, they require...