Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Jackson, CIVIL NO. 1:16-CV-0411-CG-M

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. STORMEY D. BURROUGHS JACKSON, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL NO. 1:16-CV-0411-CG-M

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION

May 31, 2018

ORDER

This is an interpleader action filed by Plaintiff Metropolitan Life Insurance Company ("MetLife") for a determination of the proper payee(s) of life insurance proceeds Plaintiff is holding as administrator of an ERISA-regulated employee benefit plan.

The motions addressed in this Order are:

1) the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Stormey Burroughs Jackson ("Jackson") (Docs. 62, 63 & 64), the Response of Defendants Marcia Burrell and Sherita Burrell (collectively "the Burrells") (Doc. 68), and Jackson's Reply (Doc. 71);

2) the Burrells' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docs. 65), Jackson's Response (Doc. 69), and the Burrells' Reply (Doc. 75).

3) Jackson's Motion to Strike portions of the affidavits of Marcia Burrell ("M. Burrell"), Sherita Burrell ("S. Burrell"), and Shirley Ross Brooks ("Brooks") (Doc. 72) as well as those portions of the Burrells' Response to Jackson's reliance on those affidavits, the Burrells' Opposition to the Motion to Strike (Doc. 81), and Jackson's Reply (Doc. 83).

I. Background

Edward L. Burrell ("Decedent") was a retiree from Fiat Chrysler Automobile US and a participant in the company's Basic Life Insurance Plan ("Plan"), an Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") regulated employee benefit plan. Decedent was the father of the Burrells and the alleged father of Jackson. MetLife's records show that on October 3, 2003, Jackson was designated the sole primary beneficiary with a 100% share of Decedent's life insurance benefits. (Doc. 1, p. 3 ¶ 13). Decedent died on November 8, 2015, leaving $59,500 of life insurance benefits payable to the proper beneficiary designated under the terms of the Plan. (Doc. 1, p. 4 ¶ 14-15). Jackson paid for decedent's funeral at Andrews Funeral Home and on November 13, 2015 assigned benefits due from the life insurance benefits to Andrews Funeral Home in the amount of $6,879.43. (Doc. 1, p. 4 ¶ 16).

On November 16, 2015, Marcia Burrell ("M. Burrell") contacted Interpleader Plaintiff Metropolitan Life Insurance Company ("MetLife") Claims Department and identified herself as a child of Decedent. (Doc. 1, p. 4-5 ¶ 18). M. Burrell was informed she was not listed as a beneficiary on Decedent's Plan. (Doc. 1, p. 5 ¶ 18). M. Burrell believed Decedent's October 3,2003 beneficiary designation was fraudulently completed. Id. On January 12, 2016, MetLife received Jackson's claim form for the Plan benefits. (Doc. 1, p. 4 ¶ 17).

On February 4, 2016, M. Burrell contacted MetLife Claims Department to dispute the beneficiary designation. (Doc. 1, p. 4-5 ¶ 18). MetLife received a letter from M. Burrell on February 9, 2016 and February 22, 2016 regarding the beneficiary designation. (Doc. 1, p. 5 ¶ 19). M. Burrell stated Jackson changed the beneficiary designation without Decedent's consent. Id. M. Burrell also listed her sister, S. Burrell, as Decedent's child. Id.

On March 29, 2016, MetLife received M. Burrell's claimant affidavit for the Plan benefits. (Doc. 1, p. 5 ¶ 20). M. Burrell signed under oath that she and S. Burrell are the sole children of Decedent. Id. MetLife received Jackson's claimant affidavit for the Plan benefits on April 15, 2016. (Doc. 1, p. 4 ¶ 17). MetLife is unable to determine whether a court would find Decedent's October 3, 2003 beneficiary designation as valid. (Doc. 1, p. 5 ¶ 21).

II. Procedural History

On August 4, 2016, MetLife filed a Complaint in Interpleader against Jackson, M. Burrell, S. Burrell, and Andrews in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama in the Southern Division (case no. 1:16-CV-00411). (Doc. 1). The Complaint asserts MetLife is unable todetermine the proper beneficiary under Decedent's benefits Plan without exposing MetLife to the danger of double liability. (Doc. 1, p. 6 ¶ 25). MetLife claims if Decedent's October 3, 2003 beneficiary designation is valid, the Plan benefits would be payable to Jackson and Andrews pursuant to the funeral home assignment. (Doc. 1, p. 5 ¶ 22). However, if the beneficiary designation is invalid, the Plan benefits would be payable to Decedent's children and potentially to Andrews, per the funeral home assignment, if Jackson was a beneficiary with the authority to assign Plan benefits. (Doc. 1, p. 6 ¶ 23).

On December 16, 2016, MetLife filed a Motion for Leave to Interplead Funds. (Doc. 32). MetLife sought to interplead $59,500.00 of ERISA regulated benefits under Decedent's Plan. Id. at p. 1. This Court granted MetLife's Motion for Leave to Interplead Funds on December 21, 2016. (Doc. 37). The funds were deposited into the Court Registry Interest ("CRIS") fund on December 27, 2016. (Doc. 39).

On July 27, 2017, Jackson filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and brief in support thereof on the grounds that there is a valid beneficiary form naming Jackson as sole primary beneficiary of the Plan benefits at issue in this action. (Doc. 64; Doc. 62). On July 28, 2017, the Burrells filed their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and brief in support thereof as to Jackson's paternity (Doc. 65). On August 24, 2017, the Burrells filed their Response to Jackson's Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 68). Along with other documentation, the Burrells included the affidavits of S. Burrell, M.Burrell, and Brooks as supporting evidence with their motion. (Doc. 68-6; Doc. 68-7; Doc. 68-8).

On August 25, 2017, Jackson filed her Response in Opposition to the Burrells' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Doc. 69). On September 7, 2017, Jackson filed her Reply Brief in Support of her Motion for Summary Judgment. (Doc. 71). Jackson also filed a Motion to Strike the Affidavits of M. Burrell, S. Burrell, and Brooks on September 7, 2017. (Doc. 72). On September 8, 2017, the Burrells filed their Reply to Jackson's Response to their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. (Doc. 75). The Burrells filed their Response in Opposition to Jackson's Motion to Strike on September 21, 2017 (Doc. 81), and Jackson filed her Reply thereto on September 25, 2017. (Doc. 83).

III. Jackson's Motion to Strike the Affidavits of Marcia Burrell, Sherita Burrell, and Shirley Ross Brooks.

A. Standard of Review for Affidavits in Support or Opposition of Summary Judgment

When a party presents affidavit(s) to support or oppose a motion for summary judgment, the affidavit "must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)(4). If the affidavit does not satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), "the court may: (1) give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact; (2) consider the fact undisputed for purposes ofthe motion; (3) grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials - including the facts considered undisputed - show that the movant is entitled to it; or (4) issue any other appropriate order." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e).

The Court has noted that when affidavits are considered for summary judgment, they "cannot be conclusory, and must contain information that can be reduced to admissible form at trial." Marable v. Marion Military Institute, 906 F. Supp.2d 1237, 1249 (S.D. Ala. 2012); See, e.g., Corwin v. Walt Disney Co., 475 F.3d 1239, 1249 (11th Cir.2007) ("Even on summary judgment, a court is not obligated to take as true testimony that is not based upon personal knowledge.") (citation omitted); Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir.2000) ("This court has consistently held that conclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative value.") (citation omitted); Rowell v. BellSouth Corp., 433 F.3d 794, 800 (11th Cir.2005) ("On motions for summary judgment, we may consider only that evidence which can be reduced to an admissible form."). Statements based only upon belief rather than personal knowledge must be disregarded. See Marable, 906 F.Supp.2d at 1250. Affidavits may not be "so riddled-through with irrelevant statements, conclusory assertions with no probative value, [and] inadmissible hearsay." Id.

"When an affidavit submitted in support of, or opposition to, a motion for summary judgment contains inadmissible evidence, the court may strikethe inadmissible portions of the affidavit and consider the rest." Id.; See Lee v. National Life Assur. Co., 632 F.2d 524, 529 (5th Cir. 1980).

B. Analysis

Jackson moves to strike portions of the affidavits of M. Burrell, S. Burrell, and Brooks because they contain conclusory allegations, speculation, and conjecture that lack any evidentiary foundation; they are immaterial or irrelevant; or they are hearsay. The Court examines each affidavit in turn.

C. Affidavit of Marcia Burrell (Doc. 68-7)

Jackson contends that portions of M. Burrell's affidavit should be stricken because they contain conclusory allegations, speculation, and conjecture that lack any evidentiary foundation; they are immaterial or irrelevant; and they are hearsay.

Specifically, Jackson contends a portion of M. Burrell's affidavit is immaterial or irrelevant. M. Burrell asserts the following in paragraph 2 of her affidavit:

I maintained a close relationship with my father until his death in 2015. On Father's Day in 2000, when I was only 18 years old, I rescued my father from a drug house. I was held at gunpoint and begged for my father's life. My father was forever grateful and called me every year on Father's Day to thank me for saving him. (Doc. 68-7 ¶ 2)

Federal Rule of Evidence 401 states, "Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action." FED. R. EVID. 401. However, this Court must not determine "the...