Meuse v. Nat'l P.I. Servs.

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GERALD MEUSE, Plaintiff, v. NATIONAL P.I. SERVICES, LLC, and JOHN DOES 1-10, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 21-cv-11533-ADB

United States District Court, D. Massachusetts

July 7, 2022

MEMORANDUM & ORDER

ALLISON D. BURROUGHS, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

Gerald Meuse (“Plaintiff”) alleges that National P.I Services (“Defendant”), a consumer reporting agency (“CRA”) that prepares background screening reports at the request of different companies, violated various provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (“FCRA”), and Massachusetts General Laws ch. 151B, § 4(9) by providing reports that contained prohibited details about Plaintiff's criminal record.

Presently before the Court are Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint, [ECF No. 6], and Plaintiff's motion for leave to file an amended complaint, [ECF No. 14]. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part and Plaintiff's motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The following facts are taken from the complaint, [Compl.], the factual allegations of which are assumed to be true when considering a motion to dismiss. Ruivo v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 766 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 2014). As it may on a motion to dismiss, the Court has also considered “documents incorporated by reference in [the complaint], matters of public record, and other matters susceptible to judicial notice.” Giragosian v. Ryan, 547 F.3d 59, 65 (1st Cir. 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting In re Colonial Mortg. Bankers Corp., 324 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 2003)).

In September 2019, Plaintiff applied for a firefighter position with the City of Everett Fire Department (the “Fire Department”) in Everett, Massachusetts. [Compl. ¶ 26]. As part of the application process, the Fire Department procured a background screening report (the “Report”) about Plaintiff from Defendant. [Id. ¶ 27]. In the Report, Defendant disclosed that in November 2011 Plaintiff was arrested and charged by the Norfolk Virginia Police with assaulting his former girlfriend (“Ms. Mays”) and violating a restraining order, and also that the charges were later dropped. [Compl. ¶ 28; ECF No. 17-1 at 6; ECF No. 13 at 14]. The Report also stated that when Defendant's investigator asked Plaintiff if he had been arrested by the Norfolk Police or “put hands on” Ms. Mays, he denied both. [ECF No. 13 at 18]. Because the charges against Plaintiff were ultimately dismissed, the incident did not result in a conviction. See [ECF No. 13 at 6].

Due at least in part to the criminal history contained in the Report, the Fire Department bypassed Plaintiff for the firefighter position. [Compl. ¶ 29]. Plaintiff appealed the hiring decision to the Civil Service Commission of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (“CSC”) in March 2021. [ECF No. 7 at 2; ECF No. 12 at 14]. The CSC appeal is still under advisement. [ECF No. 7 at 2; ECF No. 12 at 14]. Plaintiff alleges that, regardless of the outcome of the CSC appeal, he has incurred economic losses as well as emotional distress and damage to his reputation as a result of the information improperly disclosed in the Report. [Compl. ¶ 30; ECF No. 12 at 14].

B. Procedural History

On September 19, 2021, Plaintiff filed a three-count complaint alleging violations of (1) 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (Count I); (2) 15 U.S.C. § 1681k(b) (Count II); and (3) 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(a)(2) (Count III). [Compl. ¶¶ 31-43]. On November 15, 2021, Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim and lack of standing. [ECF No. 6]. Plaintiff opposed this motion and filed a notice of supplemental authorities on December 9, 2021. [ECF Nos. 12, 13].

Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint on February 14, 2022, [ECF No. 14], which Defendant opposed on February 28, 2022, [ECF No. 17]. Plaintiff filed a reply in support of his motion, [ECF No. 20], and then an amended reply, which attached a copy of his criminal record, [ECF No. 21].

II. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS FOR SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION

A. Legal Standard

Defendant argues that Plaintiff lacks standing both because he has not alleged an injuryin-fact and because his claims are not ripe. [ECF No. 7 at 3-5]. A motion to dismiss for lack of constitutional standing is properly brought as a challenge to the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). See Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 70 (1st Cir. 2012). Because ripeness and standing raise the issue of the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court addresses them first. See Morales Feliciano v. Rullan, 303 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2002) (“[T]he preferred-and often the obligatory-practice is that a court, when confronted with a colorable challenge to its subject-matter jurisdiction, should resolve that question before weighing the merits of a pending action.”).

The party asserting federal jurisdiction has the burden of demonstrating its existence. Viqueira v. First Bank, 140 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1998). Dismissal is appropriate only when the facts alleged in the complaint, taken as true and with the benefit of all reasonable inferences, do not support a finding of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Fothergill v. United States, 566 F.3d 248, 251 (1st Cir. 2009).

1. Article III Standing

The Constitution gives the judiciary power to hear only “Cases” and “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. This requirement has been interpreted to mean that courts may decide only “cases and controversies of the sort traditionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998). A plaintiff's standing to sue is “part of the common understanding of what it takes to make a justiciable case.” Id. Correspondingly, “the absence of standing sounds the death knell for a case.” Microsystems Software, Inc. v. Scandinavia Online AB, 226 F.3d 35, 39 (1st Cir. 2000). The standing determination is “claim-specific,” meaning that an individual plaintiff “must have standing to bring each and every claim that [he or] she asserts.” Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 71 (1st Cir. 2012).

Article III standing requires that three conditions be satisfied. “First and foremost, there must be alleged (and ultimately proved) an ‘injury in fact.'” Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 103 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)). The injury “must be concrete in both a qualitative and temporal sense,” “distinct and palpable” as opposed to “abstract,” and “actual or imminent” as opposed to “conjectural or hypothetical.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Second, standing requires causation, defined as a “fairly traceable connection between the plaintiff's injury and the complained-of conduct of the defendant.” Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 103. Finally, for standing there must be “redressability-a likelihood that the requested relief will redress the alleged injury.” Id.

2. Ripeness

Though a distinct concept, “the doctrine of ripeness has roots in both the Article III case or controversy requirement and in prudential considerations.” Mangual v. Rotger-Sabat, 317 F.3d 45, 59 (1st Cir. 2003). The ripeness analysis considers two factors: “‘the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.'” Roman Catholic Bishop of Springfield v. City of Springfield, 724 F.3d 78, 89 (1st Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). The First Circuit “generally require[s] both prongs to be satisfied in order for a claim to be considered ripe.” Id. A claim is unripe if it is dependent on “contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.” Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81 (1985)).

B. Discussion

Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claims are not ripe, and thus that the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, because his CSC appeal is pending and because he has not alleged an injury-in-fact. [ECF No. 7 at 3-5]. Defendant further argues that Plaintiff's claims will not be ready for disposition until after the CSC denies his appeal. [ECF No. 7 at 4-5]. The Court disagrees. While potential damages may be impacted by the outcome of the CSC appeal, Plaintiff has adequately alleged that an injury-in-fact, namely delayed employment and reputational harm, has already occurred.

Regarding the former, Plaintiff alleged that the Fire Department declined to hire him as a firefighter “based on the obsolete criminal history contained in the Report[.]” [Compl. ¶ 29].

Drawing all inferences in favor of the Plaintiff, the Court interprets this as an allegation of delayed employment, which is a recognized form of injury. See Smith v. LexisNexis Screening Solutions, Inc., 837 F.3d 604, 612 (2016) (affirming award of damages for delayed employment). Plaintiff further alleges that the Report's improper inclusion of his criminal history caused him reputational harm because it led the Fire Department to conclude that he “was not a suitable candidate[.]” [Compl. ¶ 29]. Reputational damage has also been recognized as a legitimate form of injury. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S.Ct. 2190, 2200 (2021) (recognizing reputational harm as a concrete harm). Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff's claims do not hinge on “contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all,” Texas, 523 U.S. at 300, and, accordingly, are ripe.

Defendant also contends that Plaintiff cannot establish Article III standing because he has not suffered any injury-in-fact. [ECF No. 7 at 4-5]. The Court again disagrees. Even without the final...