Meza v. Martinez

JOSEPH RENE MEZA, Petitioner, v. MARTINEZ, Warden, Respondent.

Case No. CV 20-2343-MCS (SP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

February 16, 2021

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER SUMMARILY DISMISSING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

I.INTRODUCTION

On March 11, 2020, petitioner Joseph Rene Meza filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus ("Petition") in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner is incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary in Victorville, California, where he is serving a 55-year sentence imposed by the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas in 2001 following his convictions for bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)) and possession of a firearm in furtherance of the crime (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)).

Petitioner contests the legality of his detention by arguing that, due to changes in the law, § 924(c) is unconstitutionally vague and he would only be facing a 15-year sentence today, and therefore his sentence should be reduced. On March 30, 2020, this Court issued an Order directing petitioner to show cause why the Petition should not be recharacterized as a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion and dismissed as filed in the wrong jurisdiction, as an improper successive § 2255 motion, and as time-barred ("OSC").

On April 29, 2020, petitioner responded to the OSC ("Response"). In his Response, petitioner argues this Court has jurisdiction to consider the Petition under § 2241 pursuant to § 2255's savings clause. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). In the alternative, petitioner argues the Petition should be recharacterized as one under 18 U.S.C. § 3582, he should be given 30 days to amend the Petition, or the Petition should be dismissed without prejudice.

For the reasons that follow, this Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the Petition, and transfer to another court would not be in the interest of justice because the Petition is impermissibly successive and time-barred. Consequently, the Court summarily dismisses the Petition with prejudice.

II.PROCEDURAL HISTORY¹

On October 17, 2000, petitioner pleaded guilty to three counts of bank robbery (18 U.S.C. § 2113(a)) and proceeded to trial on his charges for unlawful use of a firearm in connection with a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)) in case number 4:00-CR-121 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Petitioner was found guilty of three § 924(c) counts. OnFebruary 9, 2001, petitioner was sentenced to an aggregate term of 768 months in prison. Petitioner appealed the judgment, and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed it on December 19, 2001.

Petitioner filed his first motion collaterally attacking his convictions and sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 on March 17, 2003, in the Northern District of Texas. That motion was denied on April 29, 2003.

On September 30, 2013, petitioner filed a second § 2255 motion in the Northern District of Texas, which was denied on October 15, 2013. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration on November 18, 2013, which was denied on December 2, 2013.

On July 18, 2016, petitioner filed a third § 2255 motion in the Northern District of Texas. It too was denied, on July 20, 2016.

Nearly four years later, on March 11, 2020, petitioner filed the instant § 2241 Petition in this Court. On March 30, 2020, the Court issued an OSC directing petitioner to show cause why the Petition should not be recharacterized as a § 2255 motion and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, as improperly successive, and as time-barred. On April 29, 2020, petitioner filed his Response to the OSC.

III.DISCUSSION

Section 2255 allows a federal prisoner claiming that his sentence was imposed "in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States" to "move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Petitioner here contests the legality of his detention by arguing 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) is unconstitutionally vague as set forth in U.S. v. Davis, 588 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 204 L. Ed. 2d 757 (2019), Johnson v. U.S., 576 U.S. 591, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 192 L. Ed. 2d 569 (2015), and Sessions v. Dimaya,584 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 200 L. Ed. 2d 549 (2018). Pet. at 3, 6; Response at 3.² Petitioner contends he would only have been sentenced to 15 years today and his sentence should be reduced. Pet. at 3; Response at 6. But petitioner raises this challenge to his sentence not in a § 2255 motion filed in the district of conviction, but rather in a habeas petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the district of his current incarceration.

In his Response to the Court's OSC, petitioner primarily argues that this Court may exercise jurisdiction over the Petition under § 2255(e), but in the alternative, petitioner requests that his Petition be recharacterized as a request for resentencing under 18 U.S.C. § 3582 if the Court is not inclined to grant habeas relief. A motion for reduction of a sentence is "beyond the scope of a habeas petition." Garcia v. U.S., 2012 WL 3217707, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2012) (citation omitted). Furthermore, even if the Court recharacterized the instant Petition, petitioner has provided no explanation of why his sentence warrants modification under § 3582. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) (listing limited circumstances in which a court may modify a sentence). Accordingly, since there is no basis for the Court to recharacterize the Petition as brought under § 3582, the Court turns to its jurisdiction over the Petition as filed, and whether it should be recharacterized as a § 2255 motion.

"Generally, motions to contest the legality of a sentence must be filed under § 2255 in the sentencing court, while petitions that challenge the manner, location, or conditions of a sentence's execution must be brought pursuant to § 2241 in the custodial court." Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864 (9th Cir. 2000) (per curiam); see Lorentsen v. Hood, 223 F.3d 950, 953 (9th Cir. 2000) ("In general, § 2255 provides the exclusive procedural mechanism by which a federal prisonermay test the legality of detention."). A prisoner may not bring a second or successive § 2255 motion in district court without first seeking and obtaining certification from "a panel of the appropriate court of appeals." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h); Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 955 (9th Cir. 2008). Only the sentencing court has jurisdiction over a § 2255 motion. Hernandez, 204 F.3d at 864; Tripati v. Henman, 843 F.2d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1988).

The Petition here is plainly a challenge to the legality of petitioner's convictions and sentence. Thus, the relief petitioner seeks here can only be obtained by way of a § 2255 motion filed in the Northern District of Texas. As noted above, petitioner has previously filed three § 2255 motions in the Northern District of Texas, and there is no indication petitioner has received permission from the Fifth or Ninth Circuits to bring a second or successive § 2255 motion.

There is an exception - a "savings clause" or "escape hatch" - to the general rule that claims such as those petitioner raises here must be brought in a § 2255 motion. See Harrison, 519 F.3d at 956; Hernandez, 204 F.3d at 864 n.2. A federal prisoner may file a habeas petition under § 2241 to challenge the legality of a sentence when the prisoner's remedy under § 2255 is "inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). In his Response to the Court's March 30, 2020 OSC, petitioner contends he falls under the savings clause.

A. The Petition Does Not Qualify for § 2255(e)'s Savings Clause

The exception under § 2255(e) is "narrow" and will not apply "merely because § 2255's gatekeeping provisions," such as the statute of limitations or the limitation on successive petitions, now prevent the courts from considering a § 2255 motion. Ivy v. Pontesso, 328 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Lorentsen, 223 F.3d at 953 (ban on unauthorized successive petitions does not per se make § 2255 "inadequate or ineffective"); Moore v. Reno, 185 F.3d 1054, 1055(9th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (§ 2255 not inadequate or ineffective simply because the district court dismissed the § 2255 motion as successive and court of appeals did not authorize a successive motion). A petition meets the savings clause criteria of § 2255(e) "when a petitioner (1) makes a claim of actual innocence, and (2) has not had an unobstructed procedural shot at presenting that claim." Harrison, 519 F.3d at 959 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Petitioner here does not satisfy either of these criteria.

In his Response to the Court's March 30, 2020 OSC, petitioner contends he is actually innocent, but then states he has had an unobstructed procedural shot at presenting his claim. Response at 2. Even if petitioner meant to say the opposite - that he has not had an unobstructed procedural shot - petitioner still would not qualify for § 2255(e)'s savings clause.

Petitioner's claim of actual innocence goes solely to his § 924(c) convictions. Petitioner acknowledges he committed the robberies, but appears to claim innocence of his convictions for using a firearm in connection with a crime of violence, arguing robbery armed with a pellet gun cannot constitute a crime of violence and § 924(c)'s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague. See Pet. at 3, 6; Response at 3-4. The Court assumes petitioner is raising a claim of actual innocence and can meet the first element to qualify for § 2255(e)'s savings clause.

But petitioner cannot meet the second element. Petitioner fails to demonstrate he never had an "unobstructed procedural shot" to raise his claims on appeal or in a § 2255 motion. See Harrison, 519 F.3d at 960. In making this determination, the court considers "(1) whether the legal basis for petitioner's claim did not arise until after he had exhausted his direct appeal and first § 2255 motion; and (2) whether the law changed in any way relevant to petiti...