Meziere v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

362 So.3d 555

Judy MEZIERE v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE CO., et al.

21-430

Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Third Circuit.

February 9, 2022

Rehearing Denied March 23, 2022

Edwin Dunahoe, Dunahoe Law Firm, 402 Second Street, Natchitoches, Louisiana 71457, (318) 352-1999, COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Judy Meziere

James R. Nieset, Jr., Colin T. Ryan, Porteous, Hainkel & Johnson, L.L.P., 704 Carondelet Street, New Orleans, Louisiana 70130-3774, (504) 581-3838, COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Travelers Indemnity Company

Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Jonathan W. Perry, and Sharon Darville Wilson, Judges.

PERRY, Judge.

In this uninsured motorist case, Judy Meziere ("Meziere") appeals from a judgment of the trial court which granted summary judgment in favor of Travelers Indemnity Company ("Travelers") on the grounds that Coca-Cola Bottling Company ("Coca-Cola"), Meziere's employer, validly rejected uninsured motorist coverage on an automobile policy issued to it. We reverse and remand.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 10, 2015, Meziere was rear-ended by a vehicle operated by Nicholas McCart ("McCart") as she proceeded westerly on University Parkway in Natchitoches. Initially, Meziere sued State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, McCart's automobile liability insurer, and Geico General Insurance Company, her uninsured motorist carrier. Subsequently, Meziere, alleging that she was in the course and scope of her employment with Coca-Cola, amended her petition to add Travelers as a party defendant; Travelers was the alleged liability and uninsured motorist carrier of Coca-Cola.

After Travelers answered Meziere's petition for damages and conducted discovery, it filed a motion for summary judgment, urging, among other things, ¹ that its policy did not provide uninsured motorist coverage because Coca-Cola had validly rejected such coverage on UM rejection forms in 2014 and 2015. Meziere opposed Travelers's motion for summary judgment, contending that Coca-Cola had not validly rejected uninsured motorist coverage on either the 2014 UM rejection form or that of 2015 because neither form met the requirements set by the Louisiana Commissioner of Insurance.

After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court granted Travelers's motion for summary judgment and issued written reasons which state in part:

Because the 2014 and 2015 subject waivers meet the requirements of La.R.S. 22:1295, ... meets all of the requirements of Duncan [v. U.S.A.A. Ins. Co. , 06-363 (La. 11/29/06), 950 So.2d 544 ], and as such contains all essential information to accurately identify the applicable policy at issue, this court finds they are valid and enforceable. The purpose of requiring the UM waiver to be clear and unmistakable is to establish that the insured knowingly waived coverage under a particular policy. In this case, the forms executed by [Coca-Cola] herein complies with the formal requirements of law in that there is a clear rejection of UM coverage, the forms are signed and dated by the legal representative with his name printed thereunder.

Thus, the trial court deemed the uninsured motorist coverage had been validly rejected and dismissed Meziere's suit against Travelers. This appeal followed.

Meziere submits that the trial court legally erred when it ruled that Coca-Cola had properly and validly rejected uninsured motorist coverage on the Travelers's policy of insurance.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Summary Judgment

A motion for summary judgment should be granted only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions, together with any affidavits admitted for purposes of the motion for summary judgment, show there is no genuine issue of material fact and that mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(A)(3). On a motion for summary judgment, if the issue before the court is one on which the party bringing the motion will bear the burden of proof at trial, the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact is on the party bringing the motion. La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(D)(1) ; Hart v. Mabou , 21-28 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/23/21), 323 So.3d 939, writ denied , 21-1479 (La. 12/21/21), 329 So.3d 826. On appeal, in determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, appellate courts review evidence de novo under the same criteria that governs the trial court's determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate. Id .

An insurer seeking to avoid coverage through summary judgment bears the burden of proving that some provision or exclusion applies to preclude coverage.

Halphen v. Borja , 06-1465 (La.App. 1 Cir. 5/4/07), 961 So.2d 1201, writ denied , 07-1198 (La. 9/21/07), 964 So.2d 338. "The issue of whether an insurance policy, as a matter of law, provides or precludes coverage is a dispute that can be resolved properly within the framework of a motion for summary judgment." Green v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 07-94, p. 3 (La.App. 1 Cir. 11/2/07), 978 So.2d 912, 914, writ denied , 08-074 (La. 3/7/08), 977 So.2d 917. "Summary judgment declaring a lack of coverage under an insurance policy may not be rendered unless there is no reasonable interpretation of the policy, when applied to the undisputed material facts shown by the evidence supporting the motion, under which coverage could be afforded." Reynolds v. Select Prop., Ltd. , 93-1480 (La. 4/11/94), 634 So.2d 1180, 1183.

Rejection of UM Coverage

Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:1295(1)(a)(i) provides that no policy of automobile liability insurance "shall be delivered or issued for delivery in this state" without UM coverage. However, UM coverage "is not applicable when any insured named in the policy either rejects coverage, selects lower limits, or selects economic-only coverage in the manner provided in [ La.R.S. 22:1295(1)(a)(ii) ]." Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:1295(1)(a)(ii) further provides that the "rejection, selection of lower limits, or selection of economic-only [UM] coverage shall be made only on a form prescribed by the commissioner of insurance" and that "[a] properly completed and signed form creates a rebuttable presumption that the insured knowingly rejected [UM] coverage[.]" In addition, La.R.S. 22:1295(1)(a)(ii) provides that the form signed by the insured

which initially rejects coverage, selects lower limits, or selects economic-only coverage shall remain valid for the life of the policy and shall not require the completion of a new selection form when a renewal, reinstatement, substitute, or amended policy is issued to the same named insured by the same insurer[;]"... An insured may change the original [UM] selection or rejection on a policy at any time during the life of the policy by submitting a new [UM] selection form to the insurer on the form prescribed by the commissioner of insurance.

Under La.R.S. 22:1295, UM coverage is an implied amendment to any automobile liability policy, even when not expressly addressed, as UM coverage will be read into the policy unless validly rejected. See Duncan , 950 So.2d 544. The object of UM insurance is to provide full recovery for automobile accident victims who suffer damages caused by a tortfeasor who is not covered by adequate liability insurance. Id. The UM statute is to be liberally construed, and thus, exceptions to coverage are to be interpreted strictly. Any exclusion from coverage in an insurance policy must be clear and unmistakable, and the insurer bears the burden of proving any insured named in the policy rejected in writing the coverage equal to bodily injury coverage or selected lower limits. Id .

Therefore, on the motion for summary judgment, it was Travelers's burden of proof to establish that it had a properly completed and signed UM coverage selection form, as prescribed by the commissioner of insurance, in which the named insured in the policy knowingly rejected such coverage. To meet that burden, Travelers relied upon UM election forms which John Costanzo, the authorized representative of Coca-Cola, signed and initialed on November 20, 2014, and another in conjunction with a renewal of the policy on December 3, 2015; in each of those documents Coca-Cola rejected UM coverage.

In opposition to Travelers's motion for summary judgment, Meziere makes two assertions. First, she contends that Travelers utilized a form on November 20, 2014, other than that mandated by the Louisiana Commissioner of Insurance. Secondly, she further argues that although Travelers utilized the mandated form when the policy was renewed on December 3, 2015, it failed to complete the form; in particular, she points out that the lower box of the mandated form failed to contain either the individual company name, the group name, or the insurer's logo.

Addressing Meziere's arguments, Travelers contends that notwithstanding any deficiencies in the UM rejection forms it utilized, Meziere ignores that the tasks prescribed for properly completing a UM waiver recognized in Duncan were met in the present case. ² Meziere counters that Travelers's reliance on Duncan is misplaced because Louisiana Department of Insurance ("LDOI") Bulletin No. 08-02 mandated that as of January 1, 2010, all UM selection/rejections for new policies "shall be executed on the revised UM form issued with LDOI Bulletin No. 08-02." Thus, Meziere contends that LDOI Bulletin No. 08-02 modified Duncan to this extent.

Commenting on Duncan and its impact on UM waivers, this court in Stone v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. , 18-547, 18-763, pp. 2-3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/7/19), 269 So.3d 961, 963 stated:

Whole forests have been felled to publish the myriad cases discussing whether UM waivers are valid. In Duncan ... , the Louisiana Supreme Court conducted an exhaustive examination of the legislature's struggles to address the toll this issue has taken on the legal and physical environment of the State; and this case will not restate that effort. The key point in

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