Middlebrooks v. State

310 Ga. 748

854 S.E.2d 503

MIDDLEBROOKS

v.The STATE.

S21A0381

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: February 1, 2021

Holly Yelton Peace, Manning Peace, LLC, 153 Senoia Road, Peachtree City, Georgia 30269, Attorneys for the Appellant.

Patricia B. Attaway Burton, Deputy Attorney General, Paula Khristian Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Christopher M. Carr, Attorney General, Ashleigh Dene Headrick, Department of Law, 40 Capitol Square SW, Atlanta, Georgia 30334, Darius T. Pattillo, District Attorney, Sharon Lee Hopkins, A.D.A., James Luther Wright, III, District Attorney, Flint Circuit District Attorney's Office, 1 Courthouse Square, 3rd Floor, West Tower, McDonough, Georgia 30253, Attorneys for the Appellee.

Bethel, Justice.

Deshaun Middlebrooks appeals his convictions for malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Quintavious Barber and the aggravated assault of Keundre Chappell.¹ Middlebrooks contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to exclude evidence of gang activity and that he received constitutionally ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Because Middlebrooks’ conviction for the aggravated assault of Barber should have merged into the malice murder conviction, we vacate the conviction and sentence for that count. Otherwise, we affirm.

1. Evidence presented at trial showed that Barber was a member of the Bloods street gang – specifically, a subset called "Sex Money Murder" – and that Tory Jones and Middlebrooks were also members of that same subset. In January 2017, Barber sent out a message to some of his contacts indicating that he was looking to trade his rifle for two pistols. One person responded that he or she knew someone who would be interested in the exchange and provided Middlebrooks’ number. Another person messaged Barber to let him know that he or she and a fellow gang member each had a pistol to trade for the rifle. Barber then met with Jones and traded a rifle for the two pistols. However, after the trade, both Jones and Barber were dissatisfied. Barber told the contact who organized the exchange that he felt that they had tried to "slime" or "rob" him.

Barber eventually agreed to meet with Jones to get back the rifle he had traded. Barber reassured his concerned friend, Keundre Chappell, that the trade would be fine because Barber and Jones were members of the same gang. Additionally, a "big homie" (i.e., Middlebrooks) who was "over" other gang members, was coming. On January 25, Barber and Chappell met Jones and Middlebrooks in a parking lot for the trade. Middlebrooks exited his car and began speaking with Barber by the car's trunk. Jones also exited the car, greeted Barber, and returned to sit in the car. Chappell, who felt uneasy, backed away from the group to stand some distance away. Barber asked for his rifle that he had exchanged, and Middlebrooks told Jones to open the trunk. Jones replied that he could not find the trunk-release button, so Middlebrooks walked towards the driver's side door to open the trunk. As soon as the trunk opened, Middlebrooks started shooting at Barber and Chappell. Chappell was shot in his left hand and fell to the ground between two cars. Chappell saw Barber run past him, and he got up and started running behind him. Chappell and Barber ran to a nearby apartment, where Barber collapsed on the floor. Barber had been shot six times and died from his injuries. Middlebrooks later told Chappell's cousin, who shared his dorm in jail, that he shot Barber because Barber moved from a subset of the Eastside Bloods to Sex Money Murder, and because Barber, who was his subordinate in the gang, did not give him a gun.²

2. Prior to trial, Middlebrooks filed motions to exclude any evidence regarding his gang participation or activity as improper character evidence under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b), irrelevant, and highly prejudicial. The trial court denied Middlebrooks’ motions following a pre-trial hearing and ruled that the gang evidence was admissible because it was intrinsic to the crimes charged. Middlebrooks argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motions and that as a result, the trial was "riddled" with gang evidence and references to gang activity including during voir dire questioning, opening statements, witness examinations, and closing statements. As explained below, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting this evidence at trial.

(a) Middlebrooks argues that the gang evidence was not relevant because the State did not charge him with a violation of Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act, there was no evidence of ongoing gang activity, the State did not adequately prove that Middlebrooks was a gang member, and the evidence was unnecessary to prove motive. We disagree.

Evidence is admissible as intrinsic evidence when it is (1) an uncharged offense arising from the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense; (2) necessary to complete the story of the crime; or (3) inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Williams v. State , 302 Ga. 474, 485 (IV) (d), 807 S.E.2d 350 (2017). In applying these factors, this Court has previously noted that

evidence pertaining to the chain of events explaining the context, motive, and set-up of the crime is properly admitted if it is linked in time and circumstances with the charged crime, or forms an integral and natural part of an account of the crime, or is necessary to complete the story of the crime for the jury.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. "It is within the trial court's sound discretion to determine whether to admit such evidence, so we review a trial court's ruling admitting evidence as intrinsic for an abuse of that discretion." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Harris v. State , ––– Ga. ––––, 850 S.E.2d 77, 83 (2) (b) (2020).

Here, the State presented evidence from which the jury could conclude that Middlebrooks and Barber were active gang members in the same gang and that Middlebrooks was motivated to shoot Barber because of a perceived disrespect. The challenged gang evidence thus plainly pertained to the chain of events in the case and was linked in time and circumstance with the charged crimes, making the information necessary to complete the story for the jury. See Williams , 302 Ga. at 486 (IV) (d), 807 S.E.2d 350. See also Harris , 850 S.E.2d at 83 (2) (b) ("necessary" evidence is that which is "reasonably necessary" to help the jury understand the sequence of events, not that which is "strictly necessary"). Further, even in the absence of a gang-related charge, evidence of gang activity or affiliation may still be admissible to show motive. See Armstrong v. State , Case No. S20A1364, ––– Ga. ––––, 852 S.E.2d 824, 830 (2) (a), (Ga. Dec. 21, 2020). Accordingly, Middlebrooks’ arguments lack merit.

(b) Middlebrooks also argues that evidence of his gang involvement was more prejudicial than probative and was also inaccurate. Under OCGA § 24-4-403 ("Rule 403"), "[r]elevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice[.]" Although "evidence of gang membership can be highly prejudicial[,]" all inculpatory evidence is inherently prejudicial; "it is only when unfair prejudice substantially outweighs probative value that the rule permits exclusion." (Citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Anglin v. State , 302 Ga. 333, 337 (3), 806 S.E.2d 573 (2017). Intrinsic evidence must satisfy Rule 403. See Williams , 302 Ga. at 485 (IV) (d), 807 S.E.2d 350.

Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the probative value of the gang evidence in establishing the context and motive for the charged offenses was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Anglin , 302 Ga. at 337 (3), 806 S.E.2d 573 (probative value of evidence of defendant's alleged gang membership outweighed danger of unfair prejudice where evidence was relevant and probative of motive). Additionally, any alleged inaccuracies or objections raised on appeal by Middlebrooks with respect to the credibility of the gang evidence went not to the evidence's admissibility but rather its weight, which is for the jury to resolve. See Davis v. State , 272 Ga. 327, 330 (4), 528 S.E.2d 800 (2000) (discrepancy in witness testimony went to weight and credibility of evidence rather than its admissibility). Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence Middlebrooks complains about on appeal.

3. Middlebrooks next argues that he received constitutionally ineffective assistance because his trial counsel should have retained an expert on gangs to advance the defense's theory that the shooting was not actually gang-related and that Chappell was the aggressor in the shooting. Middlebrooks argues that his trial counsel was not prepared to defend Middlebrooks or to explain the gang evidence because trial counsel failed to retain such an expert. We disagree.

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient and that the deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the defendant. See Strickland v. Washington , 466 U. S. 668, 687-696, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ; Wesley v. State , 286 Ga. 355, 356 (3), 689 S.E.2d 280 (2010). To satisfy the deficiency prong, a defendant must demonstrate that his attorney "performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in light of prevailing professional norms." Romer v. State , 293 Ga. 339, 344 (3), 745 S.E.2d 637 (2013) ; ...