Middleton v. City of Chicago

578 F.3d 655

Charles C. MIDDLETON, Sr., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 08-2806.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued April 14, 2009.

Decided August 24, 2009.

Denise M. Mercherson (argued), Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Christopher S. Norborg (argued), Office of the Corporation Counsel, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before KANNE, ROVNER, and WOOD, Circuit Judges.

KANNE, Circuit Judge.

Charles Middleton served in the United States Air Force from 1960 until he was honorably discharged in December 1989. Almost four years later, in 1993, he applied for two positions with the City of Chicago. Despite interviewing for both positions, Middleton received neither. The City informed him in November 1994 that he had not been selected for the first job, and he never heard back about the other.

Nearly thirteen years later, on July 26, 2007, Middleton sued the City, claiming that it refused to hire him because of his military service in violation of the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 (USERRA), Pub.L. No. 103-353, 108 Stat. 3149 (codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. § 4301 et seq.). On June 23, 2008, the district court held that Middleton's USERRA claim was barred by the four-year "catch all" statute of limitations provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a), and it granted the City's motion to dismiss his fourth amended complaint. Middleton filed his notice of appeal on July 18.

Approximately three months later, on October 10, 2008, Congress enacted the Veterans' Benefits Improvement Act (VBIA), Pub.L. No. 110-389, 122 Stat. 4145 (codified in scattered sections of 38 U.S.C.). Relevant to this appeal, the VBIA contained a provision stating that no limitations period applies to USERRA claims: "If any person seeks to file a complaint or claim with the Secretary [of Labor], the Merit Systems Protection Board, or a Federal or State court under this chapter alleging a violation of this chapter, there shall be no limit on the period for filing the complaint or claim." VBIA § 311, 38 U.S.C. § 4327(b).

Middleton's appeal raises two issues: (1) whether § 1658's four-year statute of limitations barred his claim; and (2) even if it did, whether the VBIA's recent amendment retroactively revives this lawsuit. We review de novo the district court's order granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss based on the statute of limitations. Dominguez v. Hendley, 545 F.3d 585, 588 (7th Cir.2008). We accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint, see Cole v. U.S. Capital, 389 F.3d 719, 724 (7th Cir.2004), meaning that, for purposes of this appeal, we must assume that the City refused to hire Middleton because of his prior military service. Middleton's complaint does not allege that the City engaged in improper conduct after November 1994, and if the four-year statute of limitations applies and is unaffected by the VBIA, his claim is barred.

I. Applicability of 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a) to USERRA Claims

Middleton first argues that the four-year statute of limitations found in 28 U.S.C. § 1658 did not apply to his USERRA claim against the City. The district court disagreed and held that Middleton's claim was indeed time-barred. We agree with the district court.

On December 1, 1990, Congress enacted § 1658 in response to criticism regarding the lack of a uniform federal statute of limitations. See Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 377-80, 124 S.Ct. 1836, 158 L.Ed.2d 645 (2004). Among other purposes, Congress sought to minimize the federal courts' practice of borrowing statutes of limitations from the states. See id. The result was a "catch all" statute of limitations for federal claims:

Except as otherwise provided by law, a civil action arising under an Act of Congress enacted after the date of the enactment of this section may not be commenced later than 4 years after the cause of action accrues.

28 U.S.C. § 1658(a). This text makes clear that any action "arising under" a federal statute enacted after December 1, 1990, is subject to § 1658. See id.; Jones, 541 U.S. at 380, 124 S.Ct. 1836.

Nearly four years later, on October 13, 1994, Congress passed USERRA. The statute did not include an express statute of limitations. Congress's only reference to a limitations period was that "[n]o State statute of limitations shall apply to any proceeding under this chapter." USERRA § 2, 38 U.S.C. § 4323(c)(6) (1994). USERRA did not mention the federal statute of limitations in § 1658, nor did it expressly provide that claims under the new law were exempt from any limitations period altogether.

At first blush, the answer to our question appears fairly straightforward. After all, when interpreting a statute, we must begin with its text and assume "that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the legislative purpose." Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 252, 124 S.Ct. 1756, 158 L.Ed.2d 529 (2004) (quotations omitted). Unless Congress expressed a clear intention to the contrary, a statute's language is conclusive. Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004) ("It is well established that `when the statute's language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition required by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.'" (quoting Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6, 120 S.Ct. 1942, 147 L.Ed.2d 1 (2000))). Simply applying the language of § 1658(a) to USERRA indicates that the latter was subject to the former: this is a civil action; USERRA is an act of Congress; it was enacted well after § 1658(a); and it did not "otherwise provide" for a different limitations period.

As with many legal issues, however, clear solutions are easily clouded. Middleton offers two arguments in an attempt to salvage his thirteen-year-old USERRA claim. First, he avers that USERRA was not "enacted after" § 1658, as the Supreme Court defined that phrase in Jones, 541 U.S. 369, 124 S.Ct. 1836, 158 L.Ed.2d 645. Second, he claims that USERRA's legislative history and the Department of Labor's interpretation of the law indicate that Congress never meant for a statute of limitations to apply. In the end, the clouds clear, and we find nothing that overcomes the plain meaning of the statutory text.

A. USERRA Created a New Cause of Action

We must first determine whether a cause of action under USERRA "aris[es] under an Act of Congress enacted after" December 1, 1990. 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a). Although Congress passed USERRA in 1994, it was the latest in a series of federal laws seeking to protect the ability of our veterans to obtain employment upon returning to civilian life. According to Middleton, USERRA did not establish a new cause of action in 1994, but instead amended its predecessor statute, commonly referred to as the Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act of 1974 (VRRA). See Pub.L. No. 93-508, § 404(a), 88 Stat. 1578, 1594 (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 2021 et seq.) (recodified at 38 U.S.C. § 4301 et seq. by the Veterans' Benefits Act of 1992, Pub.L. No. 102-568, § 506, 106 Stat. 4320, 4340), amended by USERRA. Because the VRRA predated § 1658, Middleton argues that the federal statute of limitations does not apply.

In Jones, the Supreme Court held that "a cause of action `aris[es] under an Act of Congress enacted' after December 1, 1990—and therefore is governed by § 1658's 4-year statute of limitations-if the plaintiff's claim against the defendant was made possible by a post-1990 enactment." 541 U.S. at 382, 124 S.Ct. 1836 (alteration in original). This principle governs even if the new law amended a preexisting law; Congress often creates new causes of action by amending existing statutes, and § 1658(a) is not limited "to entirely new sections of the United States Code." Id. at 381, 124 S.Ct. 1836. "What matters is the substantive effect of an enactment—the creation of new rights of action and corresponding liabilities—not the format in which it appears in the Code." Id. As the Court directed, we must determine "whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of the relevant statute as it stood prior to December 1, 1990, or whether her claims necessarily depend on a subsequent amendment." Id. at 384, 124 S.Ct. 1836.

To answer that question, we return to the VRRA, which Congress passed in 1974. The VRRA provided veterans with certain rights and protections upon their return to the workforce, and it barred employment discrimination based on a reservist's military service. See Pub.L. No. 93-508, sec. 404, § 2021(a)(B), (b)(3), 88 Stat. 1578, 1595-96 (1974). The only remedy available under the VRRA was injunctive relief and recovery of lost wages and benefits. Id. sec. 404, § 2022.

In 1994, Congress replaced the VRRA with USERRA "to clarify, simplify, and, where necessary, strengthen the existing veterans' employment and reemployment rights provisions." H.R.Rep. No. 103-65(I), at 18 (1993) (emphasis added), as reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2449, 2451; see also S.Rep. No. 103-158, at 33 (1993) (noting that USERRA "would restructure, clarify, and improve" the VRRA (emphasis added)). Among other improvements, if an employer engaged in willful discrimination, USERRA permitted a plaintiff to seek liquidated damages, a form of relief unavailable under the VRRA. See USERRA sec. 2, § 4324(c)(1)(A)(iii). With that new provision, Congress converted what had been an equitable claim into a legal one, which brought along the corresponding right to a jury trial. See Maher v. City of Chi., 463 F.Supp.2d 837, 844 (N.D.Ill.2006) (holding that liquidated damages under USERRA are punitive and therefore subject to trial by jury); cf. Calderon v. Witvoet, 999 F.2d 1101, 1109 (7th Cir.1993) (holding that actions seeking liquidated damages under a different statute are "suits at common law" for purposes of the Seventh Amendment's...