Middleton v. Nogan

DEMETRIUS MIDDLETON, Petitioner, v. PATRICK NOGAN, et al., Respondents.

Civil Action No. 16-5966 (CCC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

March 15, 2021

**NOT FOR PUBLICATION**

OPINION

CECCHI, District Judge:

Petitioner Demetrius Middleton files the instant Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (ECF No. 1) challenging a conviction and sentence imposed by the State of New Jersey for murder. Respondents filed a Response (ECF No. 15) and Petitioner did not file a reply. For the reasons stated below, the Court denies the Petition and denies a certificate of appealability.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

For the purposes of this Opinion, the Court recites only relevant facts taken from the state appellate court on direct appeal (ECF No. 15-2 at 5-8) and Petitioner's post-conviction relief ("PCR") proceeding (State v. Middleton, 2015 WL 10677205, at *3-4 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 15, 2016)). The story of this case began when Shazam Tahir and his brother, Ashmeer Tahir, obtained two kilograms of cocaine on September 26, 1997 which they decided to sell. Petitioner and his co-defendant Kasib Jones learned of this that same day, and allegedly wanted to rob the Tahirs of their cocaine. Although not entirely clear from the facts in the record, it appears that Petitioner and Jones, through an intermediary, made arrangements to buy the cocaine from the Tahirs.

On the evening of September 26, 1997, Petitioner and Jones arrived at Shazam's apartment, where the transaction took place. Ashmeer was present along with Hafiz Hosein, the Tahirs' cousin. Petitioner and Shazam then proceeded upstairs inside the apartment while Jones and Hosein waited in the foyer, and Ashmeer stayed on the porch, acting as a lookout. Ten to fifteen minutes later, a gunshot was fired upstairs, and Petitioner ran down the stairs holding a kilogram of cocaine. As Petitioner headed down the stairs, Jones pulled out a handgun, and at point-blank range, shot and killed Hosein. Ashmeer fled with Petitioner giving chase, but was able to escape and called the police. Meanwhile, Shazam was discovered lying dead from a gunshot wound in the kitchen by his wife, who also called the police.

When the police arrived, they discovered both Shazam and Hosein dead from close-range gunshot wounds to their heads. In the kitchen, they found the other kilogram of cocaine. They also recovered two empty shell casings from two separate guns, which evidence suggests both belonged to Petitioner. Based on Ashmeer's testimony, the ballistic reports, and other evidence found during the arrests, the State charged Petitioner with (1) conspiracy to commit robbery, (2) armed robbery, (3) felony murder, (4) knowing and purposeful murder, and (5) related gun charges. Petitioner was tried by a jury, which acquitted him of the conspiracy charge, as well as the robbery and murder charges for Hosein, but hung on the robbery and murder charges for Shazam. The State then dropped the robbery and felony murder charges, and proceeded to retry Petitioner only on the first-degree murder charge for Shazam and the gun charges.

Prior to the second trial, the parties engaged in plea negotiations. At some point, the State made a plea offer, which Petitioner rejected, and countered with a ten-year plea for aggravated manslaughter. Upon learning of the counteroffer, the trial court judge informed the parties that:

The only way I will take a plea, I am going to have trouble taking a plea, and I have heard all sorts of numbers thrown around, please understand, I don't know whether I have heard the number ten years thrown around, I don't know whether ten years is going to be acceptable to the prosecutor. It is not going to be acceptable to me. Anyone thinks they are going to get a ten-year-sentence in this case is not coming from me and I am the judge in this case, so I want everyone—I don't want people to think things are impossible in this case. I want everyone to deal with whatever is going to happen realistically, as far as I am concerned[.]

Middleton, 2015 WL 10677205, at *4. Although negotiations continued, no agreement was reached. Petitioner was tried by a jury in the second trial, who found him guilty of all remaining charges.¹

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2254, "a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). When a claim has been adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings, a writ for habeas corpus shall not issue unless the adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was basedon an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Parker v. Matthews, 132 S. Ct. 2148, 2151 (2012).

A state-court decision involves an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law if the state court (1) identifies the correct governing legal rule from the Supreme Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular case; or (2) unreasonably extends a legal principle from Supreme Court precedent to a new context where it should not apply or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should apply. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407 (2000). Federal courts must follow a highly deferential standard when evaluating, and thus give the benefit of the doubt to, state court decisions. See Felkner v. Jackson, 131 S. Ct. 1305, 1307 (2011); Eley v. Erickson, 712 F.3d 837, 845 (3d Cir. 2013). A state court decision is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts only if the state court's factual findings are objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). Moreover, a federal court must accord a presumption of correctness to a state court's factual findings, which a petitioner can rebut only by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e); see Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 339 (2006) (petitioner bears the burden of rebutting presumption by clear and convincing evidence); Duncan v. Morton, 256 F.3d 189, 196 (3d Cir. 2001) (factual determinations of state trial and appellate courts are presumed to be correct).

III. DISCUSSION

Petitioner raises five grounds for relief in the Petition: (1) trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to present a plea offer to Petitioner during plea negotiations before the second trial; (2) trial counsel erred when he failed to object, during the second trial, to the admission of evidence that was used during the first trial, related to charges that Petitioner was acquitted of; (3)trial counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to object to a witness testifying in restraints; (4) the trial court judge erred by refusing to give a lesser-included offense instruction to the jury; and (5) the trial court judge erred when he allowed the State to read into evidence the testimony of a witness from the first trial, when said witness recanted his testimony during the second trial. The Court addresses each of these grounds below.

A. Ground One

In this ground, Petitioner asserts that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance when he failed to present a plea offer to him during plea negotiations. The state court rejected this claim, finding:

[N]othing contained in defendant's petition or the two subsequent letters he penned to PCR counsel demonstrates that a plea offer was made after defendant's counter-offer of ten years was implicitly rejected by the judge. Defendant never mentioned a subsequent plea offer in his first letter; in the second, defendant claimed that a new offer was made, but notably he did not say what it was, or that he would have accepted it at the time, only that in 2007, after serving eight years of his sentence, he was "willing" to accept it. Defendant claimed trial counsel was "reluctant to communicate" with him in light of the judge's comments, but defendant obviously knew what the alleged offer was. In sum, we agree that defendant failed to demonstrate a prima facie IAC claim regarding the plea bargaining process.

Middleton, 2015 WL 10677205, at *5.

The Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused the "right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." U.S. Const. amend. VI. The right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel, and counsel can deprive a defendant of the right by failing to render adequate legal assistance. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). A claim that counsel's assistance was so defective as to require reversal of a conviction has two components, both of which must be satisfied. Id. at 687. First, the defendant must "show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 687-88. To meet this prong, a "convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective assistance must identify the acts or omissionsof counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment." Id. at 690. The court must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances at the time, the identified errors fell "below an objective standard of reasonableness." Hinton v. Alabama, 134 S. Ct. 1081, 1083 (2014) (citation omitted). To establish prejudice, the defendant must show that "there is a reasonable probability that the result of the [case] would have been different absent the deficient act or omission." Hinton, 134 S. Ct. at 1083.

The standard...