Middleton v. State

129 A.3d 962

Jed R. MIDDLETON

v.STATE of Maine.

Docket No. Sag–14–260.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued: May 13, 2015.

Decided: Dec. 24, 2015.

Thomas J. Connolly, Esq. (orally), Portland, for appellant Jed R. Middleton.

Geoffrey A. Rushlau, District Attorney, and Patricia A. Mador, Asst. Dist. Atty. (orally), Office of the District Attorney, Bath, for appellee State of Maine.

Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, and HJELM, JJ.

HJELM, J.

[¶ 1] In 2010, after a jury trial, Jed R. Middleton was convicted in the Superior Court (Sagadahoc County, Horton, J. ) of one count of gross sexual assault and fifteen counts of unlawful sexual contact. He later filed a petition for post-conviction review alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. Middleton claimed in part that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to seek a continuance of the sentencing hearing when Middleton was allegedly incompetent or, if he was competent, unable to exercise his right of allocution due to his emotional state. After a hearing, the court (Horton, J. ) concluded that Middleton had not proved a constitutional deprivation and denied his petition. On this appeal, we affirm the judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

[¶ 2] In its judgment, the post-conviction court made the following findings of fact, which are based on competent evidence in the record. See Heon v. State, 2007 ME 131, ¶ 5, 931 A.2d 1068.

[¶ 3] In January 2010 Middleton was indicted for one count of gross sexual assault (Class A), 17–A M.R.S.A. § 253(1)(B), (4) (Supp.1996),¹ and fifteen counts of unlawful sexual contact (Class C), 17–A M.R.S.A. § 255(1)(C), (2) (Supp.1993).² Middleton committed these offenses in the mid–1990s when the victim was between ages seven and eleven. Throughout the case, Middleton was represented by experienced defense counsel, Donald Lawson–Stopps. At the end of a three-day trial held in June 2010, a jury found Middleton guilty of all sixteen charges.

[¶ 4] Following trial, the court continued sentencing pending a psychological evaluation conducted by the State Forensic Service. The resulting report was filed, and in September 2010 the court held a sentencing hearing. At the hearing, Attorney Lawson–Stopps told the court that Middleton was "not in any emotional condition ... to even be able to address the [c]ourt." Attorney Lawson–Stopps did not request a continuance and proceeded to present a number of character witnesses, including Middleton's sister, who spoke of Middleton's positive contributions and loving relationships with friends and family members. None of the witnesses questioned Middleton's mental status. Attorney Lawson–Stopps then presented an argument that the court found to be well reasoned and supported by the law. When the court gave Middleton an opportunity to speak on his own behalf, Attorney Lawson–Stopps stated, "I'm not sure Mr. Middleton would be very coherent at this point."

[¶ 5] The court then sentenced Middleton on the charge of gross sexual assault to a prison term of twenty years, with all but eleven years suspended, and six years of probation. On each of the charges of unlawful sexual contact, the court imposed concurrent sentences of five years to be served concurrently with the twenty-year sentence. After pronouncing sentence, the court asked Middleton if he understood, and Middleton responded, "No, ... I don't understand a thing." Expressing appropriate concern about this response, the court recessed the hearing to allow Attorney Lawson–Stopps to consult with Middleton. Immediately after the recess, Attorney Lawson–Stopps assured the court that Middleton understood the sentence.³ Middleton, who was present with Attorney Lawson–Stopps, did not express disagreement with that statement. The court then concluded the hearing.

[¶ 6] After the judgment of conviction was entered, Middleton filed a motion for new trial, see M.R. Crim. P. 33 (Tower 2014),⁴ which the court denied; an application for leave to appeal sentence, see 15 M.R.S. § 2151 (2014) ; M.R.App. P. 20, which the Sentence Review Panel denied; and an appeal from the judgment itself, see 15 M.R.S. § 2115 (2014) ; M.R.App. P. 2, which we affirmed, see State v. Middleton, Mem–11–141 (Sept. 29, 2011).

[¶ 7] Soon before the statutory deadline, in October 2012, Middleton filed a petition for post-conviction review, see 15 M.R.S. §§ 2121 –2132 (2012),⁵ alleging that Attorney Lawson–Stopps's representation was ineffective during the pre-trial, trial, and sentencing phases of the case. Regarding the sentencing hearing, Middleton alleged that he was not competent and was unable to personally address the court due to his emotional condition, and that Attorney Lawson–Stopps's representation was therefore ineffective because he did not request a continuance.

[¶ 8] After holding a hearing in December 2013, the court issued a written decision denying Middleton's petition. Addressing the claims that focused on the sentencing hearing, the court credited Attorney Lawson–Stopps's testimony that although Middleton was emotional and anxious, he never believed at any time during the course of his representation that Middleton was incompetent. The court rejected contrary views expressed by Middleton and his sister, describing their post-conviction testimony as a "post hoc characterization" of Middleton's mental state. The court also noted that neither the presentence psychological report nor the character witnesses who spoke at the sentencing hearing made reference to "any present or previous lack of competence" on Middleton's part, and that in fact the witnesses spoke highly of Middleton and his accomplishments. Based on Attorney Lawson–Stopps's statement at the sentencing hearing that Middleton would not be coherent if he addressed the court, and Middleton's assertion that he did not understand his sentence, the court found that Middleton "certainly ... was overwhelmed emotionally and confused." The court found, however, that this did not "necessarily indicate[ ] lack of competence ... [or] ineffective assistance of counsel." In addition, the court stated that it was "by no means persuaded that [Middleton] would have helped his own cause had he addressed the court.... If [Middleton] was indeed too overwhelmed with emotion to speak before being sentenced, that may have been a good thing."

[¶ 9] Pursuant to 15 M.R.S. § 2131(1) (2014) and M.R.App. P. 19, Middleton sought a certificate of probable cause to appeal from the adverse judgment, and we gave Middleton leave to appeal on the single issue of "whether Middleton was prejudiced by his attorney's failure to ask for a continuance at sentencing."

II. DISCUSSION

[¶ 10] The sole question presented for review is whether the post-conviction court erred by concluding that Middleton was not deprived of effective assistance of counsel when Attorney Lawson–Stopps did not seek a continuance of the sentencing hearing, at which Middleton was so "overwhelmed emotionally and confused" that he could not address the court on his own behalf. Although Middleton's arguments implicate issues of competence and allocution, his ultimate claim is ineffective assistance of counsel. We must therefore consider the former issues through the lens of Middleton's ineffectiveness claim and focus on Lawson–Stopps's decisions rather than the issues of competence and allocution in isolation.

[¶ 11] "In appeals from judgments issued in post-conviction proceedings, we review questions of law de novo and apply a deferential standard of review to factual findings." Theriault v. State, 2015 ME 137, ¶ 12, 125 A.3d 1163. Because Middleton had the burden of proof on his ineffectiveness claim, he must demonstrate on this appeal that the evidence compels a contrary conclusion. See Heon, 2007 ME 131, ¶ 8, 931 A.2d 1068.

[¶ 12] A criminal defendant is constitutionally "entitled to effective assistance of counsel during the sentencing process." Francis v. State, 2007 ME 148, ¶ 4, 938 A.2d 10 (quotation marks omitted); see U.S. Const. amend. VI ; Me. Const. art. I, § 6. As we have recently reiterated, claims of ineffective assistance are governed by the two-part test outlined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). See Manley v. State, 2015 ME 117, ¶¶ 12, 18, 123 A.3d 219 ; see also Theriault, 2015 ME 137, ¶ 13, 125 A.3d 1163. Pursuant to that test, a petitioner bears the burden of proving both that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and that the deficient representation resulted in prejudice. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88, 104 S.Ct. 2052. We hold that the post-conviction court did not err by finding that defense counsel provided objectively reasonable assistance, and do not reach the issue of prejudice. See id. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (holding that a court need not "address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one").

[¶ 13] Judicial inquiry into the effectiveness of representation is "highly deferential." Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The post-conviction court must make

every effort ... to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.

Id. (quotation marks omitted). Applying this deferential standard, we consider in turn Middleton's arguments that Attorney Lawson–Stopps unreasonably infringed on Middleton's right to (1) be free from prosecution while legally incompetent, and (2) speak on his own behalf before the court imposed sentence.

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