Middleton v. United Church of Christ Bd.

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WALTRINA MIDDLETON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST BOARD, et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 20-4141

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit

November 22, 2021

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

Before: BOGGS, MOORE, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges

BOGGS J., delivered the opinion of the court in which LARSEN, J. joined.

BOGGS CIRCUIT JUDGE.

The First Amendment's ministerial exception "ensures that the authority to select and control who will minister to the faithful-a matter 'strictly ecclesiastical'- is the church's alone." Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church &Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 194-95 (2012) (quoting Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 119 (1952)). Rev. Waltrina Middleton appeals the dismissal of her Title VII discrimination claim against her former employers of the United Church of Christ. Her claim is not based on her eventual firing or any other tangible employment action^[1] taken against her, but on the alleged anti-Black hostile work environment she endured when employed. The questions before this court are (1) if the ministerial exception bars some or all of Middleton's allegations from consideration and (2) if she has failed to allege a plausible claim for hostile-work-environment discrimination.

I. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

The jurisdiction of the district court was invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Middleton alleges a cause of action under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000. This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district court's dismissal of a Title VII claim de novo. See, e.g., Keys v. Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 608 (6th Cir. 2012).

II. Facts and Procedure

Middleton is an ordained minister of the United Church of Christ. In 2010, she was hired by the United Church of Christ's governing Board and Local Church Ministries to organize and plan national youth events. She was fired six years later. Middleton alleges the following as examples of a racist hostile work environment:

• In 2010, a UCC "constituent" told Middleton, "I thought you only got the job because you are young, black and from Trinity [United Church of Christ in Chicago]." Middleton reported this comment to her supervisor, but no action was taken.

• In 2013, Middleton expressed concern to her church human-resources director that the only candidates being considered to replace Middleton's supervisor were of "one cultural and gender and demographic group." Middleton's concerns were ignored and Ivy Beckwith, a white woman, was hired as her new supervisor.

• In February 2014, Beckwith told Middleton that she "understood 'exactly what [Middleton's] problem is, '" which was that Middleton is "a sassy, young, African American woman."

• In March 2014, Middleton complained to human resources that she had been subject to a hostile work environment by a UCC managerial employee because that employee "refus[ed] to communicate with" Middleton and spread "false information about a job assignment that [Middleton] had completed in the manner that [the managerial employee] requested."

• Less than a week later, Middleton met with Beckwith "and articulated her concerns about how personal biases and stereotypes among [UCC] managers 'create perceptions that are racist, sexist and discriminatory.'" Beckwith responded by telling Middleton that she did not like that Middleton had complained to human resources and told Middleton to get along with people holding racist, sexist, and discriminatory views because of the money they give to the UCC.

• On August 6, 2015, Beckwith "engaged in rude, unprofessional and insensitive conduct toward [Middleton] during a meeting regarding how [Middleton] had conducted herself at the 2015 General Synod." At the synod, Middleton had "lifted up social justice issues" related to "racism and sexual orientation" that "some groups were not comfortable with." When Middleton told Beckwith she wanted to go to human resources, Beckwith told her, "Go right ahead. You take everything else to HR."

• When Middleton contacted human resources requesting "urgent mediation" of her August 2015 conflict with Beckwith, mediation was not granted. The record is not clear if human resources ignored Middleton's request or made an affirmative decision not to grant mediation. Middleton also raised her concern with her Local Church Ministries executive officer but received no response.

• Around August 19, 2015, the UCC demoted Middleton. "Several [UCC leaders] lamented Dr. Middleton's demotion, calling it 'racist,' one more instance of 'the diminishing presence of black and brown people in leadership on the national level,' and 'an attempt to mute the voice of the one remaining black leadership voice.'" When the UCC hired a white woman as Middleton's replacement, a UCC minister expressed that "there appears to be a system defect [in the UCC] when it comes to African American staff persons" giving "evidence to the charge of institutional racism. This action appears to support that claim."

• On September 8, 2015, Middleton was demoted a second time to a temporary position scheduled to end in August 2016.

• In October 2015, the UCC abruptly ended the two-month sabbatical she had been granted after two weeks.

• In August 2016, Middleton "was denied advancement to the position of Team Leader for the Office of the Chief Administrative Officer" and the church hired a less-qualified white woman instead.

• In June 2016, ^[2] the UCC fired Middleton, months before her temporary position was set to end in August.

Middleton filed suit. To address the constitutional question, the district court relied on our unpublished opinion in Ogle v. Hocker, 279 Fed.Appx. 391 (6th Cir. 2008), which held that a minister's defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims were not barred from consideration by the First Amendment. The Ogle court reasoned that because the plaintiff minister's claims could "be resolved through application of secular standards without any impingement upon church doctrine or practice," dismissal was not appropriate. Ogle, 279 Fed.Appx. at 396. Accordingly, the district court held that the ministerial exception did not bar Middleton's claims from consideration. The district court ruled in favor of the UCC and granted its motion to dismiss, holding that Middleton failed to "allege severe or pervasive conduct, [and as such, ] her allegations do not support a plausible hostile work environment claim." The only claim on appeal is Middleton's hostile-work-environment claim.

III. Analysis

Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against an employee because of her "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); see Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)). To assert a cause of action under Title VII for a hostile work environment, a plaintiff must make direct or inferential allegations that:

(1) she belonged to a protected group, (2) she was subject to unwelcome harassment, (3) the harassment was based on [her protected status], (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment, and (5) the defendant knew or should have known about the harassment and failed to act.

Waldo v. Consumers Energy Co., 726 F.3d 802, 813 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Williams v. CSX Transp. Co., 643 F.3d 502, 511 (6th Cir. 2011)).

A hostile work environment exists when "the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment." Smith v. Rock-Tenn Servs., Inc., 813 F.3d 298, 309 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21).

Middleton argues that we should consider the church's tangible employment actions^[3] even though they are not the basis of her hostile-work-environment claim because "[t]hese discriminatory acts . . . are important allegations to be considered in evaluating the claim of a hostile work environment." In other words, while Middleton acknowledges that the ministerial exception bars a direct challenge to these adverse tangible employment actions, she argues that they should be considered to show that her other treatment (the basis of her claim) was motivated by racism. But the unanimous consensus among circuit courts that have addressed this issue is that the ministerial exception bars any judicial consideration of a church's tangible employment actions taken against a minister in a discrimination claim, regardless of its underlying basis. See, e.g., Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951, 969 (9th Cir. 2004) (stressing that "in both the sexual harassment and retaliation contexts, Elvig may not rely on protected ministerial decisions-the removal of certain duties, her suspension, her termination and the refusal to permit the circulation of her personal information form-as bases for the Defendants' liability under Title VII"); Skrzypczak v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Tulsa, 611 F.3d 1238, 1246 (10th Cir. 2010). We join that consensus today. Otherwise, the church would be required to respond that its tangible employment actions were motivated not by discriminatory animus, but by nondiscriminatory reasons relating to Middleton's fitness and qualifications as a minister. To resolve the dispute, the court would then be required to conduct a pretext inquiry to determine the church's true motivation.

This would involve an examination of the church's reasons for determining the fitness and qualifications of its ministers-a...