Midkiff v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.

571 F.Supp.3d 660

Kristy MIDKIFF, Plaintiff,

v.The PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, Defendant.

CAUSE NO. 1:19-CV-1192-LY

United States District Court, W.D. Texas, Austin Division.

Signed November 12, 2021

Amar B. Raval, Berg Plummer Johnson & Raval, LLP, Houston, TX, Ryan Hideki Opgenorth, Terrence J. Coleman, Azin Jalali, Pillsbury & Coleman LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Plaintiff.

Ian H. Morrison, Julie M. Kamps, Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES, LITIGATION EXPENSES, AND POST-JUDGMENT INTEREST

LEE YEAKEL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the court are Plaintiff Kristy Midkiff's Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (Doc. #88), Defendant Prudential Insurance Company of America's Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Fees and Costs (Doc. #92), and Plaintiff's Reply in Support of her Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs (Doc. #95). The motion, response, and reply were referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) ; Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 ; Loc. R. W. D. Tex. Appx. C, 1. The magistrate judge filed a Report and Recommendation on September 30, 2021 (Doc. #97), recommending that the court grant Midkiff's motion and award Midkiff $303,916.00 in attorney's fees, $6,733.78 in litigation expenses, and post-judgment interest.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may serve and file specific, written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge within 14 days after being served with a copy of the Report and Recommendation, and thereby secure a de novo review by the district court. The Prudential Insurance Company of America ("Prudential") filed objections on October 14, 2021 (Doc. #98), Midkiff filed a response on October 28, 2021 (Doc. #99), and Prudential filed a reply on November 4, 2021 (Doc. #100).¹ In light of Prudential's objections, the court has undertaken a de novo review of the entire case file and finds that the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation should be approved and accepted by the court for substantially the reasons stated therein.

Prudential's objections raise arguments that the magistrate judge thoroughly addressed in the Report and Recommendation. Having reviewed the magistrate judge's analysis and the record in this case, this court agrees with the recommendation that Midkiff recover $303,916.00 in attorney's fees, $6,733.78 in litigation expenses, and post-judgment interest. Therefore, the court will overrule Prudential's objections.

12 The United States Code authorizes courts to award post-judgment interest on "any money judgment in a civil case recovered in a district court." 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has interpreted the term "money judgment" to include attorney's fees and costs. See Copper Liquor, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 701 F.2d 542, 545 (5th Cir. 1983), overruled in part on other grounds by J.T. Gibbons, Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 790 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1986). The court must calculate post-judgment interest from the date of the judgment on the merits, which is May 6, 2021 for this cause (Doc. #86). See Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom, 50 F.3d 319, 332 (5th Cir. 1995). The applicable rate as published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is 0.05% per annum. See 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) ("Such interest shall be calculated from the date of the entry of the judgment, at a rate equal to the weekly average 1-year constant maturity Treasury yield, as published by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for the calendar week preceding the date of the judgment.").

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant's Opposed Motion for Leave to File Reply in Support of Objections to Report and Recommendation filed November 4, 2021 (Doc. #100) is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Objection to Report and Recommendation filed October 14, 2021 (Doc. #98) is OVERRULED.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the United States Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (Doc. #97) filed in this cause is hereby APPROVED and ACCEPTED by the court.

IT IS FINALLY ORDERED that Plaintiff Kristy Midkiff's Motion for Attorneys’ Fees and Costs filed May 20, 2021 (Doc. #88) is GRANTED. Midkiff shall recover $303,916.00 in attorney's fees, $6,733.78 in litigation expenses, and post-judgment interest at the rate of 0.05% per annum.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

DUSTIN M. HOWELL, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

TO: THE HONORABLE LEE YEAKEL UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the undersigned is Plaintiff Kristy Midkiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees and Costs. Dkt. 88. After reviewing the filings, the relevant case law, and the parties’ respective responses, and replies, the undersigned issues the following report and recommendation.

I. BACKGROUND

Midkiff brought this case against Defendant Prudential Insurance Company of America in March 2019, arguing that Prudential wrongly denied her long-term disability and life-insurance benefits in violation of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 - 1461. After a bench trial in November 2020, the District Court issued its findings of fact and conclusions of law reversing Prudential's denial of life-insurance and long-term disability benefits. Dkt. 79, at 16.

Midkiff then filed for entry of bill of costs and a motion for attorney's fees. Dkts. 87,¹ 88. In her motion for attorney's fees, Midkiff seeks $303,916.00 in attorney's fees and $6,733.78 in costs to "help ensure that plaintiffs, like Midkiff, can continue to find competent counsel." Dkt. 88, at 9; Dkt. 95, at 5. Prudential responded to Midkiff's motion, and Midkiff filed a reply. Dkts. 92, 95. Prudential does not dispute that Midkiff is entitled to fees, but rather argues that the amount requested by Midkiff "is outside the bounds of recovery allowed by law" and should be reduced to $78,096.73. Dkt. 92 at 8-9. In her reply, Midkiff argues that Prudential's challenges to her fee motion "reflects its ongoing determination to strong-arm the very individual whose interests it is supposed to protect." Dkt. 95, at 5.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

ERISA expressly permits a federal court, in its discretion, to award reasonable attorney's fees and costs to either party in a case brought pursuant to ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) ; Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co. , 560 U.S. 242, 256, 130 S.Ct. 2149, 176 L.Ed.2d 998 (2010). Prudential concedes that Midkiff has prevailed on the merits of this case, and is entitled fees. Dkt. 92, at 8. Having found that Midkiff is eligible for a fee award under § 1132(g)(1), the undersigned calculates the lodestar fee by multiplying the reasonable number of hours expended on the case by the reasonable hourly rates for the participating lawyers, and then determines whether case-specific circumstances warrant adjustment of the lodestar fee. Perez v. Bruister , Nos. 3:13cv1001-DPJ-FKB, 3:13cv1081-DPJ-FKB, 2015 WL 5712883, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 29, 2015), aff'd , 653 F. App'x 811 (5th Cir. 2016). There is a "strong presumption that the lodestar figure—the product of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate—represents a ‘reasonable’ fee." Pennsylvania v. Delaware Valley Citizens’ Council for Clean Air , 478 U.S. 546, 565, 106 S.Ct. 3088, 92 L.Ed.2d 439 (1986). The burden is on the party moving for attorney's fees to establish that their requested fees are reasonable. La. Power & Light Co. v. Kellstrom , 50 F.3d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).

III. DISCUSSION

After modifying her initial request, Midkiff moves for $303,916.00 in attorney's fees and $6,733.78 in costs to account for fees accumulated since Midkiff filed her motion in May 2021. Dkts. 88, 95. In support of her motion, Midkiff provided affidavits with summaries of counsels’ experience, a bill summary with time entries for each attorney and paralegal who worked on the matter on behalf of Midkiff, and affidavits from other attorneys in the Northern District of California confirming the reasonableness of counsel's requested hourly rates. Dkts. 88-1-88-6. In its response, Prudential argues that Midkiff's counsel's hourly rates are unreasonable and the total number of hours is excessive. Dkt. 92, at 10-25. The undersigned will address each of Prudential's objections to Midkiff's request for attorney's fees in turn.

First, Prudential argues that Midkiff erroneously tied her attorneys’ hourly fees to prevailing rates in the Northern District of California, where this case was initially filed and where her counsel is located, rather than those in the Western District of Texas. Dkt. 92, at 10-14. As such, Prudential's argument goes, Midkiff's requested rates are excessive and unreasonable compared to rates charged by attorneys of similar skill levels and experience in the Western District of Texas. Id. at 14-18. Midkiff responds that her complaint was properly filed in the Northern District of California, and only transferred to this district because Prudential moved for the transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Dkt. 95, at 6-9. Because her case was properly filed in the Northern District of California and she has established that her requested hourly rates are reasonable in that district, Midkiff argues that her requested fees should not be reduced on this basis. Id.

Generally, the "relevant market for purposes of determining the prevailing rate to be paid in a fee award is the community in which the district court sits." Tollett v. City of Kemah , 285 F.3d 357, 368 (5th Cir. 2002). An out-of-district counsel's " ‘home’ rates should be considered as a starting point for calculating" the reasonable hourly billing rate where "abundant and uncontradicted evidence prove[s] the necessity of [the movant's] turning to out-of-district counsel." McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc. , 649 F.3d...