Migliori v. Lehigh Cnty. Bd. of Elections

668 F.Supp.3d 337

Linda MIGLIORI, Francis J. Fox,Richard E. Richards, Kenneth Ringer, and Sergio Rivas, Plaintiffs, v. LEHIGH COUNTY BOARD OF ELECTIONS, Defendant.

No. 5:22-cv-00397

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

Signed April 4, 2023

Stephen A. Loney, Jr., Marian K. Schneider, Witold J. Walczak, ACLU of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, Richard Tsai Ting, ACLUF of Pennsylvania, Pittsburgh, PA, for Plaintiffs.

Joshua S. Mazin, RepkaMazin, LLC, Easton, PA, Lucas John Repka, Repka Law Offices, Nazareth, PA, for Defendant.

Zachary Michael Wallen, Chalmers, Adams, Backer & Kaufman, LLC, Pittsburgh, PA, for Amici Bryan Cutler, Kerry Benninghoff, Senator Jake Corman, Kim Ward.

Michael J. Fischer, PA Office of General Counsel, Harrisburg, PA, for Amicus Commonwealth Of Pennsylvania Office of Attorney General 1600 Arch St. Suite 300 Philadelphia, PA 19103 United Sta 2155602171.

OPINION

Joseph F. Leeson, Jr., United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

The issue presented before the Court is whether Plaintiffs, who received their requested relief pursuant to a court injunction but whose appeal was ultimately dismissed as moot as a result, are considered the "prevailing party" entitled to reasonable attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. This question is particularly unique in this case where Plaintiffs are seeking attorney's fees for their district court litigation, even though this Court initially granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant before being reversed on appeal by the Third Circuit. To briefly summarize, the Third Circuit mandated this Court to issue an Order directing the Board to count Plaintiffs' mail-in ballots. The ballots were counted, and thereafter, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and ordered the Third Circuit to dismiss the appeal as moot, and the Third Circuit's favorable decision was summarily vacated by the Supreme Court. Therefore, although Plaintiffs mail-in ballots were counted, their favorable decision from the Third Circuit is no longer binding law.

Because this issue is one of first impression in this District, and one that this Court cannot find any persuasive authority directly on point, this Court has engaged in a thorough review of civil rights' attorney's fees awarded in the mootness context across various jurisdictions. Ultimately, and for the reasons further explained below, this Court finds that Plaintiffs are the prevailing party for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs Linda Migliori, Francis J. Fox, Richard E. Richards, Kenneth Ringer, and Sergio Rivas, a bipartisan group of voters, initiated this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking to compel Defendant Lehigh Board of Elections ("the Board") to count Plaintiffs' mail-in ballots from the November 2021 election, which were set aside for their failure to handwrite a date on the return envelope. See Compl., ECF No. 1, pp. 20-21.¹ Plaintiffs argued that disqualifying the ballots would violate their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution, as well as violate the Materiality Provision of the Civil Rights Act, 52 U.S.C. § 10101(a)(2)(B). Id. at 13, 15, 18. This Court disagreed, granted summary judgment in favor of the Board, and held that the handwritten date requirement under Pennsylvania law did not pose an undue burden on Plaintiffs' constitutional right to vote and that Plaintiffs lacked capacity to bring suit under § 10101. See Summ. Jdgmt. Op. and Order, ECF Nos. 49, 50. On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed this Court, holding that Plaintiffs had capacity to bring suit and that disqualifying the mail-in ballots in this case would violate the Materiality Provision of § 10101. Migliori v. Cohen, 36 F. 4th 153 (3d Cir. 2022), ECF No. 60. The Third Circuit remanded the case to this Court with instructions to order the Board to count the ballots. Id. at 164. See Order, ECF No. 59.

After the Third Circuit issued its decision, David Ritter, the intervenor Defendant,² filed an emergency application in the Supreme Court, asking the Court to stay the Third Circuit's decision pending further appeal. Justice Alito initially entered a temporary administrative stay, see Ritter v. Migliori, — U.S. —, — S.Ct. —, 213 L. Ed. 2d 1013 (2022), but the full Supreme Court ultimately denied the application for an emergency stay. Ritter v. Migliori, — U.S. —, 142 S. Ct. 1824, 1824, 213 L.Ed.2d 1034 (2022). As a result, the Third Circuit's decision went into effect, id., and this Court issued an order directing the Board to count Plaintiffs' mail-in ballots. See Order, ECF No. 59. The Board complied by counting Plaintiffs' ballots and certifying the election results.

After the election results had been certified, Ritter filed a petition for writ of certiorari, asking the Supreme Court to vacate the Third Circuit's decision and dismiss the case as moot. Brief for Petitioner, Ritter v. Migliori, 143 S. Ct. 297 (2022) (No. 22-30), 2022 U.S. S. CT. BRIEFS LEXIS 2152, at *7-8. Ritter argued that the case must be dismissed as moot because, although he initially intended to seek a merits review of the Third Circuit's unfavorable decision, the Supreme Court could no longer review the merits of the case given that the election had ended and the results were certified. Id. The Board filed a response adopting Ritter's argument. Response in Support of the Petition, 143 S. Ct. 297 (2022) (No. 22-30), 2022 U.S. S. CT. BRIEFS LEXIS 2530. On October 11, 2022, the Supreme Court granted Ritter's petition and vacated the Third Circuit's judgment on mootness grounds. Ritter v. Migliori, — U.S. —, 143 S. Ct. 297, 214 L.Ed.2d 129 (2022). The Supreme Court did not issue an opinion or address the merits of the Third Circuit's decision but remanded and instructed the Third Circuit to dismiss the case as moot. Id. As a result, the Third Circuit recalled its prior mandate.

Now Plaintiffs bring a Motion for Attorney's Fees, arguing that despite the vacatur and dismissal of their appeal as moot, they are still entitled to reasonable attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 for their district court litigation. See Mot., ECF No. 65. The Board disagrees, arguing that Plaintiffs have not achieved "prevailing party" status in order to entitle them to attorney's fees. See Resp., ECF No. 71. Ultimately, this Court finds that Plaintiffs are the "prevailing party" under § 1988 but defers reaching a final decision on the Motion.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Award of Attorney's Fees for "Prevailing Parties" under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 - Review of Applicable Law

Pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of 1976, prevailing parties in § 1983 actions are statutorily entitled to recover a reasonable attorney's fee. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) ("In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of [section 1983 of this title,] . . . the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee[.]"). Although the language of the statute is discretionary, courts ordinarily award prevailing plaintiffs attorney's fees "unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (internal marks and citation omitted).

Though the term "prevailing party" is not statutorily defined, the classic example of a prevailing party is one who receives a favorable final judgment on the merits. Importantly, however, "[a] litigant's prevailing party status 'does not turn on the magnitude of the relief obtained[,]' " Mitchell v. City of Philadelphia, No. 99-6306, 2010 WL 1370863, *3, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32984, *9 (E.D. Pa. April 5, 2010) (quoting Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 114, 113 S.Ct. 566, 121 L.Ed.2d 494 (1992)), and even partial relief may entitle civil rights plaintiffs to a fee award. See Ashley v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 794 F. 2d 128, 131, 134 (3d Cir. 1986) ("[I]n Hensley v. Eckerhart, . . . the Supreme Court observed that the prevailing party standard is a 'generous formulation' that entitles even those civil rights plaintiffs who obtain only partial relief to an award of attorney's fees."). Instead, the relevant standard for determining whether a plaintiff has prevailed is "when actual relief on the merits of his claim materially alters the legal relationship between the parties by modifying the defendant's behavior in a way that directly benefits the plaintiff." See e.g., Farrar, 506 U.S. at 112-13, 113 S.Ct. 566 (holding that even a nominal damage recovery suffices to make the plaintiff a prevailing party because the legal relationship between the parties was altered when the defendant was forced to pay the plaintiff); Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 761, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987) (discussing the meaning of "prevailing party" and holding that a relevant consideration is whether the defendant has changed his behavior such that the plaintiff has received the sought-out benefit of the lawsuit); Holmes ex rel. Holmes v. Millcreek Twp. Sch. Dist., 205 F. 3d 583, 593 (3d Cir. 2000) ("To qualify as a 'prevailing party' . . . a litigant must demonstrate that he obtained relief on a significant claim in the litigation, that such relief effected a material alteration in his legal relationship with the defendant and that the alteration is not merely technical or de minimis in nature.").

Consequently, a plaintiff may have "prevailed" even "without having obtained a favorable final judgment following a full trial on the merits[,]" see Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754, 756-57, 100 S.Ct. 1987, 64 L.Ed.2d 670 (1980) (internal marks and citations omitted), so long as the plaintiff has received "at least some [judicially sanctioned] relief on the merits of his claim[.]" See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 603-05, 121 S.Ct. 1835, 149 L.Ed.2d 855 (2001) (requiring "judicial imprimatur" on the change in the parties' legal relationship...