Milford Cas. Ins. Co. v. Meeks

488 F.Supp.3d 1353

MILFORD CASUALTY INS. CO., Plaintiff,

v.William Stacy MEEKS; Abdi Mahad; and BIH Express, Inc., Defendants.

CV 5:20-cv-36

United States District Court, S.D. Georgia, Waycross Division.

Signed September 4, 2020

Elizabeth G. Howard, William S. Allred, Barrickman, Allred & Young, LLC, Atlanta, GA, for Plaintiff.

Brent J. Savage, Jr., Savage & Turner, PC, Savannah, GA, Franklin Sean Simmons, Sean Simmons-Attorney at Law, Waycross, GA, for Defendants.

ORDER

LISA GODBEY WOOD, JUDGE

Before the Court is Plaintiff Milford Casualty Ins. Co.'s ("Milford") Motion for Summary Judgment, dkt. no. 16, wherein Milford seeks declaratory relief against Defendants William Stacy Meeks, Abdi Mahad, and BIH Express, Inc. ("BIH") (collectively "Defendants"). Defendants Mahad and BIH have not responded to Milford's motion, and the Court will therefore assume that they do not oppose it. See S.D. Ga. L.R. 7.5. Defendant Meeks, however, has responded, and the motion as it concerns Meeks has been fully briefed and is ripe for review. Separately before the Court is Defendant Meeks' Motion to Dismiss asking that this Court exercise its discretion not to hear Milford's action under the Declaratory Judgement Act because a parallel state action is pending. Dkt. No. 30. For the reasons below, Meeks Motion to Dismiss will be DENIED and Milford's Motion for Summary Judgment will be GRANTED .

BACKGROUND

For purposes of summary judgment, the Court will construe the facts in a light most favorable to Meeks. See S.E.C. v. Monterosso, 756 F.3d 1326, 1333 (11th Cir. 2014). In the early morning hours of December 18, 2016, Mahad was driving a tractor trailer on behalf of BIH when he lost control of the vehicle, which overturned and began to slide across the highway and into the lane of travel in which Defendant Meeks was driving. See Dkt. No. 14 ¶ 9; see also Dkt. No. 27 at 1; Dkt. No. 27-1; Dkt. No. 28 ¶ 1-3, 6. Meeks' vehicle collided into Mahad's truck, knocking Meeks unconscious. Dkt. No. 27 at 1–2. When Meeks awoke sometime later, he called 911 on his phone, and then walked to the overturned truck to check on Mahad. Id. at 2. According to Meeks, when he arrived at the truck, he saw Mahad standing up in the overturned cab with papers stuffed under his arm and looking through other papers scattered about the floor. Id. at 2. Mahad informed Meeks that he was okay, and Meeks walked away. Id.

Sometime thereafter, vehicles driven by non-parties Scott Buchanan and Roy Johnson also collided into Mahad's truck, injuring both. See Dkt. No. 27-5; see also Dkt. No. 27-6; Dkt. No. 27-4 at 14-15; Dkt. No. 35. However, the timing of those accidents is unsettled. Meeks testified in his deposition that he does not know how long he was unconscious after the accident nor does he know how long he remained in his car after he regained consciousness. Dkt. No. 27-4 at 13. He also does not know the amount of time that passed between his accident and the second collision, but he believed it was greater than five minutes. See id. at 15. He introduced a recording of his 911 call after the accident which, according to his interpretation, shows that six minutes and twelve seconds passed between his initial call and the second wreck involving Buchanan and that another one minute and twenty-five seconds passed between Buchanan's wreck and the final wreck involving Johnson. See Dkt. No. 27 at 3 (citing Dkt. No. 27-7).

BIH is the named insured under a motor carrier liability policy (the "Policy") that was issued in Kentucky and assumed by Milford. Dkt. No. 28 ¶¶ 10–11. The Policy obligates Milford to pay all applicable bodily injury or property damage claims "caused by an ‘accident’ and resulting from the ownership, maintenance, or use of covered ‘autos’." Id. ¶ 15 (quoting Dkt. No. 14-1 at 128). The term "Accident" is defined as "continuous or repeated exposure to the same conditions resulting in ‘bodily injury.’ " See Dkt. No. 28 ¶ 13 (quoting Dkt. No. 14-1 at 148).

The Policy also contains a "Limit of Insurance" provision that states, in pertinent part:

Regardless of the number of covered ‘autos’, ‘insureds’, premiums paid, claims made or vehicles involved in the ‘accident’, the most we will pay for the total of all damages ... combined resulting from any one ‘accident’ is the Limit of Insurance for Covered Autos Liability Coverage ... All ‘bodily injury’ [and] ‘property damage’ ... resulting from continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same conditions will be considered as a resulting from one ‘accident’."

Dkt. No. 14-1 at 136. The limit of insurance, as stated on the declarations page, is one million dollars per accident. See Dkt. No. 14-1 at 24.

At some point after the accident, Buchanan, Johnson, and Meeks asserted claims against BIH for injuries sustained in the accident. See Dkt. No. 28 ¶ 9. Though the parties seemingly dispute the nature and timing of the payout, it is undisputed that Milford paid at least one million dollars in settlement of the claims of one or more parties other than Meeks. See id.; see also Dkt. No. 33 at 2. In August 2018, Meeks filed an action in the Superior Court of Charlton County, Georgia, contending that BIH and Mahad were liable to him for his injuries; the Complaint also named Milford as a party under O.C.G.A. § 40-2-140.¹ Dkt. No. 18-1. While that action was pending, Milford filed the present action seeking a declaration under the Declaratory Judgment Act that it has exhausted its limits under the Policy and that it "owes no indemnity coverage" to Meeks nor has any obligation to provide a defense to any party in the underlying action. Dkt. No. 14. Milford thereafter filed the present motion for summary judgment, contending that it was entitled to judgment on this issue as a matter of law. Meeks opposes Milford's motion, contending that his collision with Mahad's truck was a separate "accident" under the Policy and therefore Milford's settlement with other parties did not exhaust coverage available to him. For the reasons below, Milford is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

I. Motion to Dismiss

In his Motion to Dismiss, Meeks argues that courts are vested with discretion under the Declaratory Judgment Act to decline to hear an action for declaratory relief and that because a separate parallel action is pending in state court, the Court should decline to hear Milford's action here. For two reasons, the Court rejects Meeks' request that the Court dismiss Milford's action.

First, Meeks' motion is untimely. After Milford filed its action in March 2020, Meeks and the other named Defendants failed to timely respond. In June, the Court entered an order granting Milford's Motion for Entry of Default against all Defendants. Dkt. No. 15. In July, Meeks moved to set aside the default, dkt. no. 18, which the Court granted at a hearing on July 21, 2020, providing Meeks until July 23, 2020 to file a responsive pleading, see dkt. no. 24. On July 23, Meeks filed an Answer to Milford's pleading, dkt. no. 26, and, on the following day, Meeks separately filed the present Motion to Dismiss, dkt. no. 30. Even assuming that Meeks' Motion to Dismiss was properly filed under Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F. 3d 1295, 1306 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding that pursuant to Rule 12, a motion to dismiss is inappropriate after an answer has been filed), his motion was plainly untimely pursuant to this Court's July 21, 2020 Order.

Furthermore, even if Meeks' motion had been timely, the Court finds that it would not be appropriate in this case to exercise its discretion to abstain from hearing Milford's action. In Ameritas Variable Life Insurance Company v. Roach, the Eleventh Circuit identified nine factors for courts to consider in determining whether to dismiss a pending declaratory judgment action in favor of a parallel state action:

(1) The strength of the state's interest in having the issues raised in the federal declaratory action decided in the state courts;

(2) whether the judgment in the federal declaratory action would settle the controversy; (3) whether the federal declaratory action would serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal relations at issue;

(4) whether the declaratory remedy is being used merely for the purpose of "procedural fencing"—that is, to provide an arena for a race for res judicata or to achieve a federal hearing in a case otherwise not removable;

(5) whether the use of a declaratory action would increase the friction between our federal and state courts and improperly encroach on state jurisdiction;

(6) whether there is an alternative remedy that is better or more effective;

(7) whether the underlying factual issues are important to an informed resolution of the case;

(8) whether the state trial court is in a better position to evaluate those factual issues than is the federal court;

(9) whether there is a close nexus between the underlying factual and legal issues and state law and/or public policy, or whether federal common or statutory law dictates a resolution of the declaratory judgment action.

411 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2005). Some of these factors are more pertinent to the instant action than others, and the Eleventh Circuit expressly noted that the above list is "neither absolute nor is any one factor controlling." Id. Rather the factors are to serve as "guideposts" in determining whether to exercise discretion to abstain. Id.

Here, the Court finds that the balance of the relevant factors weigh in favor of deciding the declaratory judgment action in this Court. Milford argues—and Meeks does not dispute—that because the Policy was issued and delivered in Kentucky, the law of that state should govern the Court's decision. Dkt. No. 16-1 at 6. Therefore, the Georgia Superior Court in which this action is pending has no greater interest—nor is it any more proficient—in interpreting Kentucky law than this Court. Accordingly, factors one, five, eight, and...