Miller v. Bd. of Educ. for Montgomery Cnty.

WINSTON MILLER, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF EDUCATION FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY, Defendant.

Case No. TJS-19-3067

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

December 11, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pending before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss ("Motion") filed by Defendant Board of Education for Montgomery County (the "Board").¹ ECF No. 25. ECF No. 25. Having considered the submissions of the parties (ECF Nos. 25, 26 & 27), I find that a hearing is unnecessary. See Loc. R. 105.6. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion will be granted.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 21, 2019, Plaintiff Winston Miller ("Mr. Miller") filed a Complaint alleging that Defendant Montgomery County Public Schools ("MCPS") discriminated against him on the basis of his age and race, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. ("ADEA") and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"). ECF No. 1. On May 1, 2020, the Court granted MCPS's motion to dismiss Mr. Miller's Complaint because "the correct name of the entity that can be legally sued underMaryland law is the Board of Education for Montgomery County," not MCPS. ECF No. 22 at 3. The Court also dismissed Mr. Miller's Complaint because it failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Id. at 3-5. The Court gave Mr. Miller leave to "file an amended complaint that names the proper defendant (the Board of Education for Montgomery County) and contains sufficient factual allegations to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Id. at 5.

Mr. Miller filed his Amended Complaint on May 29, 2020. ECF No. 24. The Amended Complaint asserts five claims against the Board. In Count I, Mr. Miller alleges that the Board "engaged in intentional age discrimination . . . including, but not limited to, failure to promote," in violation of the ADEA. Id. ¶¶ 33-37. In Count II, he alleges that the Board "engaged in intentional race discrimination . . . including, but not limited to, failure to promote," in violation of Title VII and Maryland state law. Id. ¶¶ 38-46. In Count III, he alleges that he was subjected to "continued harassment . . . including, but not limited to, mockery, snide remarks, aggressive behavior and tacit intimidation on the part of Tilden Middle School. . . administration and staff," in violation of Title VII and Maryland state law. ¶¶ 47-55. In Count IV, he alleges that the Board retaliated against him in the form of "unprovoked disciplinary reprimands and [an] arbitrar[y] increase in the number of students under his charge," in violation of Title VII, Maryland state law, and the Montgomery County Code. ¶¶ 56-63. In Count V, he alleges that the Board subjected him to a hostile work environment, (presumably) in violation of Title VII. ¶¶ 64-68.

The Board now moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint. ECF No. 25. First, the Board argues that Mr. Miller's claims are time barred because the facts underlying them occurred beyond the 300-day time limit for filing charges of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Second, the Board argues that even if Mr. Miller's EEOC filing was timely, he did not exhaust his administrative remedies his harassment, retaliation, and hostile workenvironment claims. Third, the Board argues that even if Mr. Miller's claims were timely and administratively exhausted, he still fails to state proper claims for harassment, retaliation, and hostile work environment. Fourth, the Board argues that Mr. Miller's claims asserted under Maryland state law and the Montgomery County Code are barred by the statute of limitations.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Factual Background

The following allegations are derived from the Amended Complaint. Mr. Miller identifies as an African American and is employed as a teacher at Tilden Middle School, which is part of the Montgomery County Public School System. ECF No. 24 ¶¶ 15, 18, 19. In April 2016, when Mr. Miller was 47 years old, he was the "target of a 'racially suggestive comment'" by a "Team Leader" during the course of his employment. Id. ¶ 20. Mr. Miller filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Montgomery County Office of Human Rights and "brought the comment to the attention of his School Principal and the Defendant's Assistant Superintendent."² Id. ¶¶ 20-21. Mr. Miller alleges that the Board retaliated against him for complaining about the "racially suggestive comment." Id. ¶¶ 26-28. He alleges that he was passed over for a promotion in favor of a younger, less experienced, less qualified, white candidate. Id. ¶¶ 29-31. He also alleges that he was subjected to mockery, snide remarks, aggressive behavior, acts of intimidation at the school, and unfair discipline. Id. ¶¶ 48-52, 66.

B. Legal Standard

Rule 12(b)(6) permits a court to dismiss a complaint if it fails to "state a claim upon which relief can be granted." "The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is to test the sufficiency of a complaint, [and not to] resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). A complaint must contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (internal quotation marks omitted). A complaint must consist of "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). When considering a motion to dismiss, a court must accept as true the well-pled allegations of the complaint and "construe the facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 474 (4th Cir. 1997).

Both the ADEA and Title VII require a plaintiff to "exhaust [their] administrative remedies by filing a charge with the EEOC before pursuing a suit in federal court." Sydnor v. Fairfax Cty., 681 F.3d 591, 592 (4th Cir. 2012); see also Jones v. Calvert Grp., Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 300 (4th Cir. 2009). Title VII establishes two possible limitation periods for filing a discrimination charge with the EEOC. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(e)(1). "The basic limitations period is 180 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice," but "the limitations period is extended to 300 days when state law proscribes the alleged employment practice and the charge has initially been filed with a state deferral agency." Jones, 551 F.3d at 300 (quoting Tinsley v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 155 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 1998)). The same limitation periods apply regarding ADEA claims. See 29 U.S.C.A. § 626(d); Byington v. NBRS Financial Bank, 903 F. Supp. 2d 342, 348 (D. Md. 2012) (explaining that "before filing a discrimination suit alleging violations of the ADEA . . ., anindividual must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC, pursuant to the same powers, procedures, and remedies applied to Title VII claims."). In Maryland, a deferral state, a claim of discrimination under Title VII or the ADEA must be filed with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory action. EEOC v. R&R Ventures, 244 F.3d 334, 338 n.1 (4th Cir. 2001). If the EEOC dismisses the charge, or if the plaintiff requests a right to sue notice, a plaintiff has ninety days from receiving his or her notice of dismissal and right to sue letter to file in action in court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). "Timeliness requirements for an action alleging employment discrimination are to be strictly enforced." Tangires v. Johns Hopkins Hosp., 79 F. Supp. 2d 587, 597 (D. Md.), aff'd, 230 F.3d 1354 (4th Cir. 2000) (citing Baldwin County Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466 U.S. 147, 152 (1984)).

The EEOC charge "defines the scope of the plaintiff's right to institute a civil suit." Bryant v. Bell Atlantic Maryland, Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 132 (4th Cir. 2002). "Only those discrimination claims stated in the initial charge, those reasonably related to the original complaint, and those developed by reasonable investigation of the original complaint may be maintained in a subsequent . . . lawsuit." Jones, 551 F.3d at 300. If an "EEOC charge alleges discrimination on one basis, such as race, and the formal litigation claim alleges discrimination on a separate basis, such as sex," the claim will generally be barred for the plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Id.

Here, Mr. Miller filed his Charge of Discrimination (ECF No. 25-2) on June 8, 2017. In the Charge, Mr. Miller stated that the alleged discrimination took place on July 1, 2016. Id. He claimed discrimination on the basis of race and age. Id. He did not check the box for "retaliation" as a basis for discrimination, and he did not check the box for "continuing action" under the date of the alleged discrimination. Id. Mr. Miller included the following particulars in his Charge:

I. I began my employment with the above named Respondent in July 2015 as a Teacher. In July 2016, I applied for the position of Team Lead. I was not selectedfor this position. Adam Atwood (white, 20's) who is less qualified was selected for the position.

II. I was not given a reason for the difference in treatment.

III. I believe I was discriminated against with respect to promotion based on my race (Black) and age (47) in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended and the Aged Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as amended.

Id.

1. ADEA and Title VII Claims

Because Mr. Miller alleged discrimination that occurred on July 1, 2016, he was required to file his Charge by April 27, 2017, which is 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice. Mr. Miller did not file his Charge until June 8, 2017, which is outside of the time limit. Accordingly, because Mr. Miller's claims under the ADEA and Title VII are time-barred, the claims will be dismissed with prejudice.

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