Miller v. BrandSafway Indus.

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ZOSIMA MILLER, Plaintiff, v. BRANDSAFWAY INDUSTRIES, LLC, Defendant.

No. 2:23cv305

United States District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania

March 15, 2024

OPINION

DAVID STEWART CERCONE SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

Zosima Miller (“Plaintiff') commenced this action against Brandsafway Industries (“Defendant”) alleging it unlawfully terminated her employment in violation of the Pennsylvania Medical Marijuana Act (“PMMA”) and public policy. Presently before the Court is Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. For the reasons set forth below Defendant's motion will be denied as to Plaintiffs PMMA claim and granted as her public policy claim.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) governs motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim and the defense of failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See Anjelino v. New York Times Co., 200 F.3d 73, 87 (3d Cir. 1999). It is well-settled that in reviewing a motion to dismiss under F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6) "[t]he applicable standard of review requires the court to accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom, and view them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Rocks v. City of Philadelphia, 868 F.2d 644, 645 (3d Cir. 1989). Under the Supreme Court's decision in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 561 (2007), dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is proper only where the averments of the complaint plausibly fail to raise directly or inferentially the material elements necessary to obtain relief under a viable legal theory of recovery. Id. at 544. In other words, the allegations of the complaint must be grounded in enough of a factual basis to move the claim from the realm of mere possibility to one that shows entitlement by presenting "a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

"A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. In contrast, pleading facts that only offer "'labels or conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do,'" nor will advancing only factual allegations that are "'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability." Id. Similarly, tendering only "naked assertions" that are devoid of "further factual enhancement" falls short of presenting sufficient factual content to permit an inference that what has been presented is more than a mere possibility of misconduct. Id. at 1949-50; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n. 8 (A complaint states a claim where its factual averments sufficiently raise a "'reasonably founded hope that the [discovery] process will reveal relevant evidence' to support the claim.") (quoting Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005) & Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975)); accord Morse v. Lower Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997) (a court need not credit "bald assertions" or "legal conclusions" in assessing a motion to dismiss) (citing with approval Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357 (2d ed. 1997) ("courts, when examining 12(b)(6) motions, have rejected 'legal conclusions,' 'unsupported conclusions,' 'unwarranted inferences,' 'unwarranted deductions,' 'footless conclusions of law,' or 'sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.'").

This is not to be understood as imposing a probability standard at the pleading stage. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 ("'The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.'"); Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 235 (3d Cir. 2008) (same). Instead, "[t]he Supreme Court's Twombly formulation of the pleading standard can be summed up thus: 'stating ... a claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest the required element ... [and provides] enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.'" Phillips, 515 F.3d at 235; see also Wilkerson v. New Media Technology Charter School Inc., 522 F.3d 315, 321 (3d Cir. 2008) ("'The complaint must state 'enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.'") (quoting Phillips, 515 F.3d at 235) (citations omitted). "Once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563.

III. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Prior to her employment with Defendant, Plaintiff was diagnosed with a general anxiety disorder. Complaint (Doc. No. 1-1) at ¶ 7. Following her diagnosis, Plaintiff obtained a medical marijuana card in or around June of 2022 to treat her general anxiety. Id. at ¶ 12.

On or about June 6, 2022, Defendant hired Plaintiff as an industrial painter. Id. at ¶ 13. Plaintiff provided her Medical Marijuana Card to her supervisor, Chris Gongaware, around the same time. Id. at ¶ 14. Gongaware made a photocopy of Plaintiffs card. Id. at ¶¶ 15-16. Gongaware advised Plaintiff that he would present her card if, or when, it was needed. Id. at ¶ 17. Over the course of the next several days Plaintiff received positive feedback about her work performance and was not subject to any work discipline. Id. at ¶¶ 18-19.

On or about June 20, 2022, Plaintiff underwent a routine random drug test. Id. at ¶ 21. The testing had two components: an oral fluid test and a hair follicle test. Id. at ¶ 23. An oral fluid test is designed to detect THC and commonly detects the usage of marijuana in the past 24 hours; the hair follicle test reveals the use of marijuana in the past 90 days. Id. at ¶ 23(a)-(c).

After the test was taken Plaintiff expressed concern to Gongaware about receiving a positive result and assured him that she would not put anyone at work in danger by using marijuana on the job. Id. at 24. Gongaware stated he knew Plaintiff would not do so and indicated they should just wait and see what happened. Id. Gongaware knew Plaintiff was not under the influence of marijuana at work. Id. at ¶ 25.

On or about June 27, 2022, Plaintiff's test results came back as negative for the oral test and positive for the hair follicle test. Id. at ¶ 26. Plaintiff immediately informed the testing company of her medical marijuana card. Id. at ¶ 27. On that same day Defendant terminated Plaintiff's employment for “violation of site and company drug and alcohol policies.” Id. at ¶ 28. Upon information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant permits other employees to remain employed if they use prescription medications that would be evident in a drug screening test (and would place the employee in violation of the company's policies), just not individuals with medical marijuana cards. Id. at ¶ 29.

In or around July of 2022, defendant changed Plaintiff's termination to reflect a "layoff." Id. at 30. Nevertheless, Plaintiff was not permitted to return to work. Id.

On December 8, 2022, Plaintiff filed this action in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. Id. at 8. Defendant removed the case to this court on February 24, 2023.

Defendant's Notice of Removal (Doc. No. 1) at p. 1. On or about the same date, Plaintiff filed a complaint with Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission raising a claim under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act that Defendant terminated her based on her "disability" of having a "generalized anxiety." Defendant's Brief in Support (Doc. No. 8) at p. 15 (quoting Plaintiffs PHRC Complaint).^[1]

Defendant advances three central arguments in support of its motion to dismiss. First, Plaintiff's claims are completely preempted and can only be brought under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"). Because her ability to obtain relief is limited to § 301, Plaintiff is precluded from bringing her claims because she failed to exhaust administrative remedies provided by the CBA and any effort to do so now would be untimely. Second, Plaintiff's common law wrongful discharge claim is not available to unionized employees and the PMMA does not provide a source of public policy to support a wrongful discharge claim in any event. Finally, the facts asserted in the complaint and those submitted to the Pennsylvania Human Rights Commission are inconsistent and contradictory, resulting in Plaintiff being judicially estopped from pursuing any purported claim under the PMMA. For these reasons, Defendant maintains that its motion to dismiss must be granted.

Plaintiff contends that her claims under the PMMA and public policy exist independently from the CBA and do not depend upon or interfere with its administration in any way, thereby placing the claims outside of § 301 preemption. Further, the Pennsylvania courts have not imposed the heightened causation standard for claims pursuant to the PMMA as advocated by Defendant. And any perceived inconsistency in the allegations of the complaint and Plaintiffs charge with the PHRC is permissible under Rule 8 and does not preclude her from moving forward with the claims in this court. For these reasons, Plaintiff maintains that Defendant's motion should be denied.

IV. PREEMPTION

Plaintiff's claim for violation to the PMMA is not preempted by § 301 of the LMRA. The cause of action is predicated on rights conferred by state law, not the CBA. And Plaintiff's claim under the PMMA does not depend upon or require an interpretation of any provision of the CBA.

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