Miller v. Fed. Express Corp.

CHRISTIN MILLER, Plaintiff, v. FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:12-cv-03461

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA CHARLESTON DIVISION

ENTER: May 21, 2014

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the court is the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment [Docket 93] and the Plaintiff's Motion to Strike "Exhibit A" from Reply Brief [Docket 99]. For the reasons stated below, the motion for summary judgment [Docket 93] is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and the motion to strike [Docket 99] is GRANTED.

I. Motion to Strike Exhibit A from Reply Brief

The defendants' reply memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment contains a six-page, single-spaced exhibit that rebuts factual allegations. This is not a proper exhibit. Factual rebuttals are properly contained within the body of a memorandum. Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Motion to Strike "Exhibit A" [Docket 99] is GRANTED.

Further, I admonish the defendants for violating this court's Local Rules on line spacing. Instead of using double-spacing as required, the defendants used what appears to be 1.5 spacing in briefing for this motion and nearly every other motion made in this case. See L.R. Civ. P. 7.1(a)(3). This tactic, as well as attaching the now-stricken exhibit, is an attempt to circumvent the 20-pagelimit on briefing. See L.R. Civ. P. 7.1(a)(2). The defendants' counsel is cautioned that sanctions may follow any future failure to conform to applicable rules.

II. Factual Background

The plaintiff in this case was employed by defendant Federal Express Corporation ("FedEx") as a part-time customer service agent. She complains that FedEx, along with defendant Norma Gonzalez, wrongfully cut her hours and terminated her after she became pregnant and could not lift more than 25 pounds. The following facts are undisputed. The plaintiff worked the front counter at Charleston's FedEx station where she processed, weighed, and distributed packages, answered phones, sold packaging materials, and researched addresses. (See Miller Dep. [Docket 96-3], at 48-52, 62). After more than a year on the job, on May 10, 2011, the plaintiff confirmed that she was pregnant and received a note from her nurse stating, "Due to current medical condition, Christin does not need to lift over 25lbs." (Note [Docket 96-6]). The next day, the plaintiff informed her supervisor, Norma Gonzalez,¹ that she was pregnant and gave Gonzalez the note with the 25 pound lifting restriction. Gonzalez forwarded the note FedEx's human resources officials. On May 12, 2011, FedEx placed the plaintiff on an involuntary "medical leave of absence" under FedEx's Temporary Return to Work Policy ("TRW"). (See Jones Dep. [Docket 96-9], at 38-39). FedEx's TRW capped the plaintiff's hours at 21 each week and authorized the plaintiff to avoid lifting anything exceeding 25 pounds. (Defs.' Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. ("Defs.' Mem.") [Docket 94], at 4; Letter from Gregory Barkdull [Docket 96-10]; Letter from Michael Rosato [Docket 96-15]). According to FedEx, TRW leave would last 365 days. The plaintiff worked her light-duty assignment with a 25-pound lifting restriction under the TRW policy for the remainder of her pregnancy. (See Miller Dep. [Docket 96-3], at 91, 144).

In May 2011, FedEx also placed the plaintiff on medical leave under the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), even though the plaintiff continued working. FedEx determined how much available FMLA leave the plaintiff used each week by subtracting her hours actually worked, which were capped at 21, from 27.23 hours, the average number of hours the plaintiff worked prior to being placed on FMLA leave. (See Jackson Decl. [Docket 93-24] ¶ 9). Therefore, although the plaintiff continued working, FedEx determined that she was using several hours of FMLA leave each week. By December 31, 2011, the plaintiff had exhausted her available leave under the FMLA. (See id.).

The plaintiff gave birth to her child on January 2, 2012. On January 11, 2012, FedEx notified the plaintiff that because she had been on leave in excess of 90 days, and her FMLA leave had been exhausted, her position at the Charleston station could be eliminated or replaced. (See Letter from Michael Rosato [Docket 96-21]; Miller Dep. [Docket 96-3], at 146). In fact, the plaintiff's position was eliminated, and the plaintiff was told she could remain on leave until May 18, 2012, at which time she would be terminated if she did not secure another position with FedEx. (See Miller Dep. [Docket 96-3], at 153; Gonzalez Dep. [Docket 96-2], at 74-76; Davis Decl. [Docket 93-23] ¶¶ 12-14). In March 2012, the plaintiff applied for and was offered a handler position in Huntington, which the plaintiff declined. The plaintiff contends that the Huntington position was not economically feasible for her because she would be required to commute to Huntington and the position only offered three hours of work each day. (See Miller Dep. [Docket 96-3], at 179-80; Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. ("Pl.'s Resp.") [Docket 96], at 8). The plaintiff was terminated on May 21, 2012. (See Letter from Michael Rosato [Docket 96-23]).

The plaintiff brings four claims against FedEx and Gonzalez: (1) employment discrimination and retaliation in violation of the West Virginia Human Rights Act ("WVHRA"),(2) wrongful termination under the FMLA, (3) wrongful interference with FMLA rights, and (4) retaliation in violation of the FMLA. In addition to back wages and other compensatory damages and interest, the plaintiff seeks punitive damages under the WVHRA and liquidated damages under the FMLA. The defendants now move for summary judgment on all claims, as well as punitive and liquidated damages.

III. Legal Standard

To obtain summary judgment, the moving party must show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In considering a motion for summary judgment, the court will not "weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). Instead, the court will draw any permissible inference from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986).

Although the court will view all underlying facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the nonmoving party nonetheless must offer some "concrete evidence from which a reasonable juror could return a verdict in his [or her] favor." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Summary judgment is appropriate when the nonmoving party has the burden of proof on an essential element of his or her case and does not make, after adequate time for discovery, a showing sufficient to establish that element. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The nonmoving party must satisfy this burden of proof by offering more than a mere "scintilla of evidence" in support of his or her position. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or unsupported speculation, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of a summary judgment motion. See Felty v. Graves Humphreys Co., 818 F.2d 1126,1128 (4th Cir. 1987); Ross v. Comm'ns Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985), abrogated on other grounds by Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).

IV. Analysis

A. West Virginia Human Rights Act Discrimination Claim

The plaintiff argues that FedEx discriminated against her based on her pregnancy and a perceived disability, both in violation of the WVHRA. I FIND that material disputes of fact preclude summary judgment on the basis of pregnancy discrimination, but not on the basis of a perceived disability. I address both theories below.

1. Pregnancy Discrimination

Pregnancy-based discrimination in employment violates the WVHRA. Syl. Pt. 2, Frank's Shoe Store v. W. Va. Human Rights Comm'n, 365 S.E.2d 251, 252 (W. Va. 1986); see W. Va. Code § 5-11-1, et seq. A plaintiff bringing a claim under the WVHRA must first make out a prima facie case of discrimination. Montgomery Gen. Hosp. v. W. Va. Human Rights Comm'n, 346 S.E.2d 557, 560 (W. Va. 1986). At that point, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Id. If the defendant is successful in articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, the plaintiff then has an opportunity to demonstrate that the defendant's reason is merely a pretext for discrimination. Id.

The Supreme Court of Appeals has laid down a general framework for making out a prima facie case:

(1) That the plaintiff is a member of a protected class.

(2) That the employer made an adverse decision concerning the plaintiff.

(3) But for the plaintiff's protected status, the adverse decision would not have been made.

Conaway v. E. Associated Coal Corp., 358 S.E.2d 423, 429 (W. Va. 1986).² On the final prong, the Supreme Court of Appeals has stated that "[d]irect proof . . . is not required. What is required of the plaintiff is to show some evidence which would sufficiently link the employer's decision and the plaintiff's status as a member of a protected class so as to give rise to an inference that the employment decision was based on an illegal discriminatory criterion." Id. at 429-30.

The first requirement for establishing a prima facie case—that the plaintiff is a member of a protected class—is undisputed. The second requirement—that the defendants took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff—is also undisputed. The plaintiff's hours were capped and her position at FedEx was eliminated while she was on leave. The main dispute is over the third requirement—whether the defendants' actions were based on illegal discrimination. On this point, the plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute of...