Miller v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n

1

ROSANNA L. MILLER, Plaintiff, v. OHIO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:21-cv-03973

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division

March 31, 2022

Vascura Magistrate Judge.

OPINION & ORDER

ALGENON L. MARBLEY CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

This matter comes before the Court on Defendants Mount Carmel Medical Group's (“Mount Carmel”) and Gahanna Physical Therapy, Limited Partnership d/b/a Cornerstone Physical Therapy (“Cornerstone”) respective Motions to Dismiss. (ECF Nos. 8, 11). For the reasons set forth more fully below, this Court GRANTS Defendants Mount Carmel's and Cornerstone Therapy's respective Motions to Dismiss. (Id.).

I. BACKGROUND

The Court incorporates by reference the facts and procedural background set forth in its previous Order denying Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. (ECF No. 29; Opinion & Order). The relevant procedural history follows. After this action was removed to federal court, Plaintiff proceeding pro se filed her Complaint on July 20, 2021. (ECF Nos. 1, 7). There, Plaintiff asserts several legal theories, including challenges to Defendants' conduct via^[1] 42 U.S.C. §§ 12182, 12203 and existing state law analogues, Ohio Revised Code § 4112.02(G); federal informed consent regulations under 45 C.F.R. § 46.116; Ohio's promulgation of emergency mask orders under Revised Code § 119.03(G); and a relief provision under 28 C.F.R. § 36.504.

On July 26 and August 5, 2021, Defendants Mount Carmel and Cornerstone filed their respective Motions to Dismiss. (ECF Nos. 8, 11). Plaintiff filed her Response in Opposition to Mount Carmel on August 24, 2021, and to Cornerstone on February 28, 2022. (ECF Nos. 12, 42). Both Defendants timely filed their Replies. (ECF Nos. 13, 48). Defendants' Motions are now ripe for review.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides for the dismissal of a complaint for a failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss, “the plaintiff must allege facts that, if accepted as true, are sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level and to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Hensley Mfg. v. ProPride, Inc., 579 F.3d 603, 609 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007)) (internal quotations omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)). And although the court “must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true, ” the court “need not accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (internal quotations omitted). Finally, “[t]he defendant has the burden of showing that the plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief.” Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007); Raymond v. Avectus Healthcare Sols., LLC, 859 F.3d 381, 383 (6th Cir. 2017); Taylor v. City of Saginaw, 922 F.3d 328, 331 (6th Cir. 2019).

III. LAW & ANALYSIS

Mount Carmel and Cornerstone each move to dismiss Plaintiff's various claims. (ECF Nos. 8, 11). While Cornerstone moves to dismiss pursuant to 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6) (See ECF No. 8), Mount Carmel argues that it is entitled to dismissal solely based on Plaintiff's failure to state a claim. (See ECF No. 11). Because the Court GRANTS Defendants' Motions under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court need not address Cornerstone's 12(b)(5) arguments.

Plaintiff identifies Mount Carmel and Cornerstone as “Resp II” in her Complaint. (ECF No. 7 at 2). Presumably, Resp is her abbreviation for Respondent, the term she uses to identify all Defendants on the first page of her Complaint. (See Id. at 1) (“[D]ue to denied medical care by Respondents.”). She then divides the Respondent groups into “Resp II” and “Resp III, ” seemingly to correspond to the applicable Title of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) she believes applies to her respective claims. (See id.). Although she uses the phrase “Resp II” in paragraph six of her Complaint to refer to Mount Carmel and Cornerstone, it appears she intended this “Resp II” group as “Resp III.” (See id.). There, “Resp II” includes healthcare providers Mount Carmel and Cornerstone. (See id.).

Mount Carmel argues that Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the ADA and Ohio state analogues; federal informed consent regulations; Ohio's administrative procedure act; and under 28 C.F.R. § 36.504. (ECF No. 8). Cornerstone argues that Plaintiff's inability to identify the conduct Cornerstone engaged in that gives rise to her claims is fatal. (ECF No. 11 at 3). The Court analyzes Defendants' arguments in tandem, except for Retaliation under the ADA which Plaintiff only asserts against Mount Carmel. The Court addresses these arguments in turn.

A. Reasonable Accommodation Under the ADA

Mount Carmel argues that Plaintiff's reasonable accommodation claim fails because her requested claim is neither necessary nor reasonable. (ECF No. 8 at 6). Specifically, Mount Carmel points out that Plaintiff admits that her request was not medically necessary-indeed, her treating doctor explained it would undermine Plaintiff's health to allow her to enter its facilities or receive treatment without a mask. (See id.). Because her treating doctor specifically considered and denied her request on medical grounds, Mount Carmel argues her dispute is with her doctor's medical opinion and not the accessibility of Mount Carmel's facilities. (Id. at 7). Since the ADA does not provide a cause of action for such generalized grievances, her claim must fail. (Id.).

Plaintiff argues that she has sufficiently alleged: (1) that she is disabled under the ADA; and (2) that she was denied a reasonable accommodation. (See ECF No. 12 at 1-2). Plaintiff argues that her requested accommodation was necessary because she required in-office procedures, and that her requested accommodation is reasonable because it was previously offered by Mount Carmel, then retracted. (See Id. at 2). Additionally, she asserts without authority that her “medical condition” was one that the Ohio Department of Health exempted from the mask requirement. (See id.).

To state a discrimination claim under Title III of the ADA, a plaintiff must show^[2]: “(1) he or she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the defendants own, lease, or operate a place of public accommodation; and (3) the defendants discriminated against the plaintiff within the meaning of the ADA.” Mortland v. Loc. Cantina Dublin LLC, No. 2:19-CV-01123, 2021 WL 3033355, at *4 (S.D. Ohio July 19, 2021) (Marbley, J.) (citing Young v. Kali Hospitality, LTD., No. 2:07-CV-395, 2010 WL 3037017, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 2, 2010)).

To state a reasonable accommodation claim, the Court must determine “whether the requested policy or practice modification (1) is reasonable, (2) is necessary for the disabled individual, and (3) would fundamentally alter the nature of the activity at issue.” Access Ctr. For Indep. Living v. WP Glimcher, Inc., No. 3:15-CV-444, 2018 WL 2763453, at *4 (S.D. Ohio June 8, 2018) (citing PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 683 n. 38 (2001)). As recognized by the Court in WP Glimcher, Inc., “[t]he word necessary means indispensable, vital, essential; requisite.” Id. (citing Oxford English Dictionary (3rd ed. June 2003) (internal quotations omitted)). That is, the statute “does not require a place of public accommodation to provide a plaintiff with the ideal or preferred accommodation; rather, [it] requires that a defendant provide a plaintiff with an accommodation that is reasonable and permits the plaintiff to participate equally in the good, service, or benefit being offered.” Hernandez v. El Pasoans Fighting Hunger, No. EP-21-CV-00055-DCG, 2021 WL 2763827, at *3 (W.D. Tex. July 1, 2021) (citing Bailey v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Louisiana Stadium and Exposition Dist., 484 F.Supp.3d 346, 365 (E.D. La. 2020)). “The ADA does not provide a general federal cause of action to challenge the sufficiency of the medical treatment of an individual's underlying disabilities.” Powell v. Bartlett Med. Clinic & Wellness Ctr., No. 2:20-CV-02118, 2021 WL 243194, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 25, 2021).

Assuming for the sake of argument that Plaintiff is able to meet the threshold requirements above, she still must demonstrate that her requested accommodation is necessary and reasonable. By Plaintiff's own words, her requested accommodation is not necessary. Dr. Tice, Plaintiff's treating doctor, considered and rejected Plaintiff's request to be exempted from Mount Carmel's early pandemic-era face-mask policy. (ECF No. 7 at 9). Indeed, Dr. Tice did not simply reject Plaintiff's requested accommodation; he recommended she do the opposite: “wear a mask because of her health condition.” (Id.). Because Plaintiff includes these facts as a part of her Complaint, this is fatal to Plaintiff's reasonable accommodation claim.

Concerning Cornerstone, unlike Mount Carmel, not once does Plaintiff mention either its name or specific conduct that Cornerstone undertook.^[3] (See Id. at 4-5). This alone Cornerstone argues is sufficient to dismiss this claim. Cornerstone is right. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”). Plaintiff simply does not plead enough facts-namely those implicating Cornerstone- to allow this Court to draw a reasonable...