Miller v. Pub. Storage

William Miller, Appellant, v. Public Storage, a foreign Real Estate Investment Trust,defendant and third-party plaintiff, Respondent, v. Penelope Isleman, third-party defendant, Appellant.

A20-1321

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS

May 24, 2021

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

Affirmed

Connolly, Judge

Anoka County District Court

File No. 02-CV-18-3689

Edward F. Rooney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants)

Abraham S. Kaplan, Jesse H. Kibort, Parker Daniels Kibort, LLC, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Bratvold, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

CONNOLLY, Judge

Appellants, a mother and her adult son, challenge the grant of summary judgment dismissing his conversion and civil-theft claims and her fraud counterclaims against respondent, owner of the storage facility in which mother had stored property that respondent subsequently sold. Because we conclude that no genuine issues of material fact preclude the summary judgment and that respondent is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we affirm.

FACTS

In January 2012, appellant Penelope Isleman (P.I.) signed a lease to rent a storage space from respondent Public Storage. The lease identified her as "Occupant" and respondent as "Owner" and provided in relevant part:

3(a). . . . UNDER MINNESOTA LAW, OWNER HAS A LIEN UPON THE PROPERTY OR UPON THE PROCEEDS OF THE PROPERTY STORED BY OCCUPANT AT THE SELF-STORAGE FACILITY. THE LIEN COVERS OVERDUE RENT . . . . IF THE RENT . . . REMAIN[S] UNPAID FOR FIFTEEN (15) CONSECUTIVE DAYS, OWNER HAS THE RIGHT . . . TO ENFORCE AND SATISFY THE LIEN BY SELLING THE PROPERTY STORED BY OCCUPANT AT THE FACILITY. . . .

3(b). . . . Owner shall not be liable to Occupant or anyone else for the removal or sale of personal property which is owned by someone other than Occupant . . . unless Occupant had notified owner that personal property in Occupant's space was not Occupant's personal property. Occupant agrees to notify owner, in writing, of any personal property stored in Occupant's space which is not the sole personal property of Occupant and of the name of any person who has an interest in the personal property. . . .. . . .

4. . . . The parties agree that in view of the limitations of value of the stored goods as provided in paragraph 5 below and the limitations as to Owner's liability as provided in paragraph 7 below, the value of any claim hereunder is limited to $5,000 . . . .

5. . . . Occupant shall store only personal property that belongs to Occupant. Because the value of the personal property may be difficult or impossible to ascertain, Occupant agrees that under no circumstances will the total value of all personal property stored in the Premises exceed, or be deemed to exceed, $5,000. Occupant acknowledges and agrees that the Premises and the Property are not suitable for the storage of heirlooms or precious, invaluable or irreplaceable property . . . .

. . . .

7. . . . Owner and Owner's Agents will have no responsibility to Occupant or to any other person for any loss, liability, claim, expense, damage to property or injury to persons ("Loss") from any cause, including without limitation, Owner's and Owner's Agents active or passive acts, omissions, negligence or conversion, unless the Loss is directly caused by Owner's fraud, willful injury or willful violation of law. Occupant shall indemnify and hold owner and Owner's Agents harmless from any loss incurred by Owner and Owner's Agents in any way arising out of Occupant's use of the Premises or the Property including, but not limited to, claims of injury or loss by Occupant's visitors or invitees. Occupant agrees that Owner's and Owner's Agents' total responsibility for any Loss from any cause whatsoever will not exceed a total of $5,000. . . .

. . . .

13(a). . . . In the event Occupant shall change Occupant's physical address or email address or alternate name and address as set forth on this Lease/Rental Agreement, Occupant shall give Owner written notice of such change signed byOccupant and specifying Occupant's current physical address or email address and alternate name, address and telephone number, within ten (10) days of the change; such notice to be mailed to Owner by first class mail with proof of mailing. Changes of addresses or telephone numbers cannot be effected telephonically or through the listing of such information on return envelopes or checks.

. . . .

16. . . . This Lease/Rental Agreement and any written amendment or addenda executed at the same time as this Lease/Rental Agreement, and any notices provided under this agreement by Owner, set forth the entire agreement of the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof and supersede all prior agreements or understandings with respect thereto. With the exception of posted rules and regulations . . . there are no representations, warranties, or agreements by or between the parties which are not fully set forth herein and no representative of Owner or Owner's Agents is authorized to make any representations, warranties, or agreements other than as expressly set forth herein and, further, with the exception of any subsequent notice from Owner to Occupant of adjustments [to monthly rent, etc.] as provided in paragraph 2 above, this Lease/Rental agreement may only be amended by a writing signed by the parties.

P.I. placed items in the storage facility space owned by herself and by her mother, Margaret Isleman (M.I.), and items given to her son, appellant William Miller (Miller), born in August 1997 and now age 23.

In 2013 P.I. moved to a different town. She called respondent and asked that M.I. "take over the [space]." Respondent's employee confirmed the monthly rate and payment deadlines with M.I., who agreed to "take over the payments." M.I. made payments, although she never received any notices, acknowledgments, or other mail from respondent.

Respondent continued to send mail relevant to the storage space, including notice of a rent increase, to P.I.'s old address. Although the mail was returned as undeliverable with a forwarding address that was entered into respondent's software, respondent continued to send mail only to P.I.'s old address.

In May 2015, rent payments became delinquent for a second time. After respondent sent a Notice of Enforcement of Owner's Lien—Notice of Sale and a Balance Due Letter to P.I.'s old address, both of which were returned as undeliverable, a sale was held.

In March 2017, P.I. and M.I. brought an action against respondent, alleging that M.I. had made the rent payments through June 2015. The district court denied P.I. and M.I.'s motion to replead their consumer-fraud claim, granted summary judgment dismissing P.I.'s conversion and civil-theft claims, granted summary judgment to respondent on M.I.'s conversion and civil-theft claims because M.I. was not a party to the lease, and denied M.I. and P.I.'s motion for leave to add a punitive-damages claim. This court affirmed those decisions. Isleman v. Public Storage, No. A20-0092, 2020 WL 6846352 (Minn. App. Nov. 23, 2020), review denied (Minn. Feb. 16, 2021) (Isleman I).¹

In June 2018, Miller, whose request to intervene in Isleman I had been denied, brought a separate action against respondent, alleging conversion and civil theft. Thedistrict court dismissed those claims under Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.02(e) (failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted); this court reversed the dismissal and remanded the claims. See Miller v. Public Storage, No. A18-2155 (Minn. App. June 24, 2019).

On remand in October 2020, the district court granted respondent's motion for summary judgment dismissing with prejudice Miller's conversion and civil-theft claims, denied Miller's motion for partial summary judgment on collateral-estoppel grounds on those claims, and dismissed P.I.'s consumer-fraud and false-advertising counterclaims as barred by the statute of limitations. Appellants challenge these determinations.

DECISION

This court reviews a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, assessing whether any genuine issues of material fact exist and whether the district court misapplied the law. Melrose Gates, LLC v. Moua, 875 N.W.2d 814, 819 (Minn. 2016). "We will affirm the [grant of summary] judgment if it can be sustained on any grounds." BFI Waste Sys. LLC v. Bishop, 927 N.W.2d 314, 325 (Minn. App. 2019) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. June 26, 2019). When considering a grant of summary judgment, we "need not adopt the district court's reasoning and may enter judgment on any appropriate legal grounds." Doe v. Archdiocese of St. Paul, 817 N.W.2d 150, 163 (Minn. 2012).

1. Summary Judgment on Miller's Claims of Conversion and Civil Theft

On appeal, Miller argues that he is entitled to damages because respondent "could not claim any lawful interest in [the] property at issue," i.e., the property in P.I.'s unit. But respondent had a lien on the property stored in P.I.'s unit under both Minn. Stat. § 514.972, subd. 1, ("The owner . . . has a lien against the occupant on the personal property storedunder a rental agreement in a storage space . . . or on the proceeds of the personal property subject to the defaulting occupant's rental agreement in the owner's possession.") and paragraph 3(a) of the lease; paragraph 3(b) obliged P.I. to notify respondent in writing if the property belonged to anyone else, and she did not do so. Miller's argument that respondent "could not claim any lawful interest" in the property is unpersuasive.

Miller also argues that he is entitled to damages because the fact that the property was in the possession of P.I. and M.I., rather than of himself, "does not permit [respondent] to escape liability for conversion and civil theft." But respondent's lien on the property stored in P.I.'s space depended not on who possessed the property but rather on the property's location in...