Miller v. Umdnj

SHAWN MILLER, Plaintiff, v. UMDNJ, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 12-4045 (CCC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

August 10, 2015

*NOT FOR PUBLICATION*

OPINION

CECCHI, District Judge:

Pro se Plaintiff Shawn Miller ("Plaintiff") is proceeding, in forma pauperis, with the instant Complaint, alleging that Defendants University of Medicine & Dentistry of New Jersey ("UMDNJ"), Nurse James ("James"), and Paul Lagana - the Administrator of Northern State Prison ("Lagana") (collectively referred to as "Defendants") are liable to Plaintiff for violations of his Eighth Amendment rights, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Presently before the Court are two motions for summary judgment filed by Defendants, one by Defendants UMDNJ and James and one by Defendant Lagana, asserting various defenses against Plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff did not file an opposition to either motion. For reasons stated below, the Court denies summary judgment on the claim against Lagana for failure to provide Plaintiff with the special diet as required by his diabetic condition, grants summary judgment in favor of Lagana on Plaintiff's prison conditions claim against him, and dismisses the balance of the claims.¹

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

For the purposes of this Opinion, the Court construes all facts most favorable to the non-moving party, and recites only relevant facts. Plaintiff is a diagnosed diabetic who requires continuing medication, including periodic injections of insulin. (ECF No. 40-2, Ex. B, Deposition of Shawn Miller, Jan. 28, 2014 ("Dep.") at 12:2-14:9.) Plaintiff was also prescribed, by a doctor, a special diabetic diet. Id. at 61:11-20. On April 22, 2012, James visited Plaintiff at his cell for the purposes of giving him two injections of insulin. (Defs.' Statement of Material Facts, ECF No. 7 at ¶ 5.) James was able to administer the first injection, but after injecting about half of the content of the second injection, James withdrew the syringe and attempted to place it in again. Id. at ¶ 6. Plaintiff refused to let James re-inject the syringe, because he believed that it was not medically appropriate to do so, and James should have used a new needle. (Dep. at 24:8-23.) After some back and forth, James, apparently out of frustration, sprayed the remaining content of the second injection onto Plaintiff's face. Id. at 24:24-25-5. The evidence of this incident is consistent with Plaintiff's allegations in the Complaint, that "Nurse James was supposed to deliver two shots of insulin to plaintiff on the date in question, however he pulled the syringe out of plaintiff's arm before delivering the dosage," and that James assaulted him by "spray[ing] the contents of the syringe in plaintiff's face and departed the unit without providing plaintiff with his insulin shot."² (ECF No. 1 at 7-8.)

Plaintiff also contends that he was not provided with the special diet prescribed by a doctor. (ECF No. 1 at 6.) According to Plaintiff's deposition testimony, he submitted numerous remedy forms to notify the prison of this problem, (Dep. at 30:15-21, 59:14-17, 63:20-64:6), includingseveral letters to Lagana. Id. at 30:15-21, 59:14-17, 63:20-64:6. Despite his complaints, Plaintiff did not receive his special diet. Id. at 64:8-65:5.

In addition, Plaintiff claims in the Complaint that he suffered health complications with permanent debilitating effects, including life-threatening blood sugar levels and multiple diabetic seizures, due to having to consume non-diabetic food. (ECF No. 1 at 6.) Furthermore, Plaintiff asserts that he was housed in units that had deplorable living conditions. Id. at 7. Plaintiff claims that the showers did not have running water, and were dirty enough to cause inmates to have fungus on their feet; there was no light in his cell; and the toilet in the cell leaked to such an extent that the cell floor was covered with waste water. Id. Plaintiff asserts that he also made repeated complaints about the living conditions. Id.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate where the Court is satisfied that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). A factual dispute is genuine only if there is "a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party," and it is material only if it has the ability to "affect the outcome of the suit under governing law." Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Disputes over irrelevant or unnecessary facts will not preclude a grant of summary judgment. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. "In considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the non-moving party's evidence 'is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.'" Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson, 447 U.S. at 255); see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 271, 276-77 (3d Cir. 2002).

The burden of establishing that no "genuine issue" exists is on the party moving for summary judgment. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 330. "A nonmoving party has created a genuine issue of material fact if it has provided sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find in its favor at trial." Gleason v. Norwest Mortg., Inc., 243 F.3d 130, 138 (3d Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds, Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Central Pension Fund of Int'l Union of Operating Engineers and Participating Employers, 134 S. Ct. 773 (2014). The non-moving party must present "more than a scintilla of evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Woloszyn v. Cnty. of Lawrence, 396 F.3d 314, 319 (3d Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted). Under Anderson, Plaintiffs' proffered evidence must be sufficient to meet the substantive evidentiary standard the jury would have to use at trial. 477 U.S. at 255. To do so, the non-moving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (quotations omitted); see also Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. In deciding the merits of a party's motion for summary judgment, the court's role is not to evaluate the evidence and decide the truth of the matter, but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Credibility determinations are the province of the factfinder. Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992).

There can be "no genuine issue as to any material fact," however, if a party fails "to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. "[A] completefailure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. at 323; Katz v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 972 F.2d 53, 55 (3d Cir. 1992).

B. Sua Sponte Dismissal

Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996) ("PLRA"), district courts must review complaints in those civil actions in which a plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), or a prisoner seeks redress against a governmental employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). The PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. Id. This action is subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under these statutes because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, he is a prisoner, and he seeks redress from a governmental entity.

"[A] pleading that offers 'labels or conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a claim, the complaint must allege "sufficient factual matter" to show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shady side, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470, 483 n.17 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Moreover, while pro se pleadings are liberally construed, "pro se litigants still must allegesufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim." Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

A plaintiff can pursue a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides in relevant part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish, first, the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the...