Mills v. Hayden

1

CHRISTINE MILLS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. CARLA HAYDEN,^[1] in her official capacity as the Librarian of Congress, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 04-2205 (RBW)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

November 6, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION

REGGIE B. WALTON, United States District Judge

The plaintiffs, Christine Mills, Runako Balondemu, Geraldine Duncan, David Hubbard, Priscilla Ijeomah-Mills, Clifton Knight, Charles Mwalimu, Lawrence Perry, Sharon Taylor, and William Rowland, bring this civil action against the defendant, Carla Hayden, in her official capacity as the Librarian of Congress, asserting discrimination based on their race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. See Second Amended Class Action Complaint (“2d Am Compl.”) ¶ 27, ECF No. 28.^[2] Currently pending before the Court is the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, for Summary Judgment (“Def.'s Mot.”), ECF No. 269, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6), and 56.

Upon careful consideration of the parties' submissions,^[3] the Court concludes for the following reasons that it must grant the defendant's motion to dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

The following allegations are derived from the plaintiffs' Complaint, unless otherwise specified. The plaintiffs are “African-American [men and women] who ha[ve] been employed with the Library of Congress in the non[-]professional series since about January 1, 2003,” 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 6, where the plaintiffs allege that the defendant subjected them to “an ongoing pattern and practice of discrimination[,]” Id. ¶ 2. The plaintiffs represent that this “ongoing pattern and practice of discrimination[,]” id., is ultimately rooted in the fact that “[t]he [d]efendant promotes a two[-]tier classification system” of professional or non-professional positions “with Caucasians dominating the professional tier while the minorities fill the nonprofessional ranks[,]” id. ¶ 20. They contend that this two-tier classification system “adversely impacts the [p]laintiffs” because the defendant allegedly treats these positions differently in a variety of ways. Id. The plaintiffs represent that “[t]he [defendant's organizational structure creates a segregated working environment in which the [p]laintiffs work in groupings that are separate and apart from their Caucasian co-employees[,]” id. ¶ 15, and that “[t]he [p]laintiffs disproportionately fill positions that the [d]efendant treats as dead-end careers[,] and as a result[,] [the p]laintiffs suffer from work place frustration and are prone to find themselves in hostile work environments[,]” id. ¶ 18, and they “are not afforded meaningful work place training that could provide an opportunity for work place advancement[,] . . . further exacerbat[ing] their frustration of being placed in dead[-]end jobs[,]” id. ¶ 19. The plaintiffs further represent that “[t]he [d]efendant has failed to proportionately offer [the p]laintiffs incentives for advancement in their careers as [she] has done in relation to those positions primarily filled by [her] Caucasian employees[,]” Id. ¶ 17, and that “[t]he [defendant's policies and operating practices dissuade[] [the p]laintiffs from moving from the non-professional tier to the professional tier” in part because the defendant “does not properly consider actual on[-]the[-]job work experience gained by the [p]laintiffs so that they may move from the non-professional tier to the professional tier” and by requiring “superfluous education requirements” for job openings, id. ¶¶ 21-22. The plaintiffs also represent that “[t]he [d]efendant has imposed and imposes disproportionate disciplinary actions against the [p]laintiffs that [she] does not impose upon [her] Caucasian workforce for work[-]related conduct that is similar in terms of breaches of any mandated employer protocols, rules, and regulations.” Id. ¶ 16. Finally, the plaintiffs represent that

[t]he [d]efendant is acutely aware that [her] minority employees are discriminated against by [her] policies and practices, yet rather th[a]n seek to amend these policies to mitigate the harm[,] the [d]efendant has fortified [her] policies by limiting or corrupting the remedial purposes of the various offices intended to assist [the p]laintiffs with their grievances ....

Id.¶ 23.

B. Procedural Background

This case has a long and complicated procedural history, dating back to 2004, see Complaint (“Compl.”) at 1, ECF No. 1, and the Court will not describe it in full here. The Court will, however, briefly summarize the current procedural posture of the case relevant to the resolution of the defendant's pending motion to dismiss.

On April 2, 2007, the plaintiffs filed their Second Amended Complaint. See 2d Am. Compl. at 1. On April 9, 2010, the defendant filed her first motion to dismiss, see generally Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 172, based on, inter alia, the plaintiffs' lack of personal injury and failure to state a cognizable claim, see Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, or Alternatively, for Summary Judgment at 1, ECF No. 172. On September 15, 2011, this case was reassigned from the first judge who had been assigned this case to another member of this Court. See Reassignment of Civil Case at 1, ECF 220. Subsequently, on March 12, 2013, that second judge denied the motion “insofar as [the] motion [was] based on failure to exhaust administrative remedies[,]” and “the doctrine of res judicata.” Order at 1 (Mar. 12, 2013), ECF No. 233.

Thereafter, on April 25, 2014, the plaintiffs moved to certify a class pursuant to Local Rule 23(1) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). See Plaintiff's Motion for Class Certification at 1, ECF No. 263. On May 20, 2014, the defendant filed her combined opposition to class certification and motion to dismiss, or alternatively, for summary judgment. See generally Def.'s Mot.; Defendant's Memorandum in Support of [Her] Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint, or Alternatively, for Summary Judgment (“Def.'s Mem.”), ECF No. 268. In response, the prior counsel for the plaintiffs submitted an incomplete filing that did not address the defendant's arguments beyond class certification. See generally Reply Memorandum for Plaintiffs in Support of their Motions for Bifurcation and Class Certification and in Opposition to Defendant's [ ] Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 274; see also Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (“Pls.' Opp'n”) at 1, ECF No. 296 (noting that “prior counsel failed to respond to the motion to dismiss”). That judge assigned to preside over the case at that time denied class certification and dismissed the case pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7(b). See Order at 1 (Mar. 3, 2016), ECF No. 277.

On April 14, 2016, the plaintiffs, then proceeding pro se, moved for reconsideration of the dismissal of their case. See Motion for Reconsideration at 1, ECF No. 279. On July 6, 2018, the then-assigned judge granted the motion in part and denied it in part. See MemorandumDecision and Order at 9-10 (July 6, 2018), ECF No. 292. Specifically, that judge vacated the judgment and reinstated the case but denied reconsideration of the prior judge's denial of the plaintiffs' motion for class certification. Id. at 10.

On July 6, 2018, this case was reassigned to this Court. See Reassignment of Civil Case at 1, ECF No. 293. Subsequently, on September 14, 2018, the plaintiffs filed their opposition to the defendant's May 2014 motion to dismiss, which addressed “the general arguments regarding collateral estoppel and standing[,]” Pls.' Opp'n at 2, and “reserve[d] the right to refile [the plaintiffs'] motion for class-certification,” id. at 2 n.1. The defendant filed her reply in support of her motion to dismiss on October 15, 2018. See Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Her Reply to Plaintiffs' Opposition to Her Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint, or Alternatively, for Summary Judgement at 1, ECF No. 298 (“Def.'s Reply”).^[4]

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A. Rule 12(b)(1)

“Federal [district] courts are courts of limited jurisdiction[,]” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994), and “[a] motion for dismissal under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(1) ‘presents a threshold challenge to the [C]ourt's jurisdiction[,]'” Morrow v. United States, 723 F.Supp.2d 71, 75 (D.D.C. 2010) (Walton, J.) (quoting Haase v. Sessions, 835 F.2d 902, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). Thus, the Court is obligated to dismiss a claim if it “lack[s] . . . subject-matter jurisdiction.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Because “[i]t is to be presumed that a cause lies outside [the Court's] limited jurisdiction,” Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction, see Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).

“In deciding a [Rule] 12(b)(1) motion, the [C]ourt need not limit itself to the allegations of the complaint.” Grand Lodge of the Fraternal Ord. of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F.Supp.2d 9, 14 (D.D.C. 2001). Rather, the “[C]ourt may consider such materials outside the pleadings as it deems appropriate to resolve the question [of] whether it has jurisdiction to hear the case.” Scolaro v. D.C. Bd of Elections & Ethics, 104 F.Supp.2d 18, 22 (D.D.C. 2000); see Jerome Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 402 F.3d 1249, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Caul v. U.S. Capitol Police, No. 15-1243 (BAH), 2016 WL 2962194, at *5 (D.D.C. May 19, 2016) (“[I]n evaluating subject matter jurisdiction, the [C]ourt, when necessary, may undertake an independent investigation to assure itself of its own...