Mills v. Roderick

1

ALBERT CURTIS MILLS, Plaintiff, v. RICHARD RODERICK et al, Defendants.

Civil Action No. BAH-22-2452

United States District Court, D. Maryland

August 5, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Brendan A. Hurson United States District Judge

On September 26, 2022, self-represented Plaintiff Albert Curtis Mills ("Mills") filed a civil rights Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he was denied adequate time to shower in violation of his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2018), and the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C §§ 12101-12213 (2018). ECF 1. Defendants Richard Roderick, O. Wayne Hill, Frank Bishop, Sandra Holmes, F. Todd Taylor, Robert Green, Lawrence J. Hogan, North Branch Correctional Institution ("NBCI"), Division of Correction, Inmate Grievance Office, and Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services ("DPSCS")^[1] filed a Motion to Dismiss, or in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. ECF 14. Mills was advised of his opportunity to respond to the dispositive motion and the risks of failing to do so. ECF 16. To date, Mills has not filed a response in opposition. To that end, on August 5 2024, all Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the matter should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) "for want of prosecution." ECF 18. No hearing is necessary to determine the matters pending. .See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2023). For the reasons stated below, Defendants' dispositive Motion at ECF 14 is granted and the motion at ECF 18 is denied as Moot.^[2]

I. BACKGROUND

A. Mills' Allegations

In Mills' Complaint, ECF 1, signed September 11, 2022, he alleges that he suffers from severe mental illness. Id. at 10-14. He explains that he was prescribed Haloperidol (Haldol) to treat his illnesses. Id. at 18. Side effects of this medication include blurred vision, shakes or tremors, headache, deep sedation, muscle spasms, seizures, confusion, muscle rigidity, drowsiness, and dizziness. Id., at 18-21. Due to the side effects of this medication, Mills claims he needs more shower time because he cannot complete his shower in the allotted time due to delays attributable to the side effects noted above. Id. at 21. The lack of adequate shower time deprives Mills of basic hygiene, id. at 44, and adversely impacted his sleep and mental health, id. at 53-54, 25. He states that the issue regarding shower time "went on from 2008 to 2019." Id. at 21.

Mills states that Defendant Roderick is the acting warden of NBCI when the Warden is away. ECF 1, at 22. The Warden, Division of Correction Commissioners, and Inmate Grievance Office dismissed Mills' administrative grievance'regarding the issue of his shower time. Id. at 22-23. Mills claims that the dismissal of his grievance exacerbated his mental health symptoms. Id. at 25.

Mills asserts that the issue regarding his shower time violates his rights under the Eighth Amendment, ECF 1, at 27-32, 66-72, Fourteenth Amendment, id. at 104, Rehabilitation Act, id. at 73-88, and ADA, id. at 80-84. He asserts that Defendants have failed to accommodate his mental health disability and the side effects of his medication by providing him additional shower time. Id. at 73-88. Mills states that "the Warden was the responsible official in charge of the prison and was fully advised of the problem of shower time abuse. .. ." Id. at 33. Mills claims that "the Defendants participated directly in the alleged constitutional violation by not giving the plaintiff more shower time for his drug's side effects." ECF 1, at 90. He claims that Defendants were notified of the issue by "a report or appeal" and did not remedy the problem. Id. at 91. He alleges that "Defendants created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred so the denial of shower time because of the medication on the plaintiff of side effects." Id. He contends that Defendants created a policy or custom that resulted in the refusal of more shower time. Id. at 92. He also claims that Defendants were "grossly negligent in supervising subordinates." Id. He states that Defendants are responsible for the policy that requires the same shower time for all prisoners. Id. at 97.

B. Defendants' Response

Defendants filed a motion seeking dismissal of the Complaint or, in the alternative, summary judgment. ECF 14-1. Defendants explain that the complaint should be dismissed: (1) because it is barred by the statute of limitations and the doctrine of laches; (2) Defendants are entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity; (3) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity; (4) Mills failed to exhaust administrative remedies; (5) Mills has failed to state a claim; and (6) all Defendants are entitled to summary judgment.^[3]

In support of their Motion, Defendants submitted institutional administrative remedy complaint ("ARP") records, ECF 14-3; Commissioner of Correction ARP appeal records, ECF 14-4; Inmate Grievance Office records, ECF 14-5; and pertinent portions of Mills' medical records, ECF 15.^[4]

The record evidence demonstrates that Mills filed an ARP on September 6, 2019 (ARP-NBCI-1844-19), complaining that he needed more time to shower due to the side effects of his prescribed medication, Haldol. ECF 14-3. The ARP was investigated and it was determined that Mills was not on any medication that would require that he receive more than the fifteen-minute allotted shower time. Id. at 2. As such, the ARP was dismissed. Id. Mills appealed this decision to the Commissioner of Correction, who dismissed the appeal on October 3, 2019 after finding that there was no evidence to substantiate Mills' claim that it was medically necessary that he receive additional shower time. ECF. 14-4, at 2. Mills filed an appeal of that dismissal with the Inmate Grievance Office on November 1, 2019. ECF 14-5, at 1 ¶ 2; id. at 9. Mills was directed to provide "missing paperwork or [an] explanation" related to his claim. Id. at 1 ¶¶ 3-4. He did not do so. Id. ¶ 3. The IGO independently investigated whether Mills had a medical order or an accommodation for additional shower time, but the Office of Inmate Health/Clinical Services confirmed that he did not have such an Order. Id.; ECF 14-5, at 5-8. It was also confirmed that Mills had been noncompliant with his prescription for Haldol since October 2019. ECF 14-5, at 6. The appeal was dismissed as without merit. Id. at 1 ¶ 4.

According to Defendants, and without opposition from Mills, there is no evidence in Mills' medical records that he required additional shower time. ECF 15-1.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Defendants argue that the Complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), or that summary judgment should be granted in their favor pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Defendants' motions are styled as a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for summary judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. Motions styled in this manner implicate a court's discretion under Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Kensington Vol. Fire Dep't, Inc. v. Montgomery County, 788 F.Supp.2d 431, 436-37 (D. Md. 2011). Conversion of a motion to dismiss to one for summary judgment under Rule 12(d) is - permissible where plaintiff has "actual notice" that the motion may be disposed of as one for summary judgment. See Laughlin v. Metropolitan Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 260-61 (4th Cir. 1998). When a movant expressly captions its motion to dismiss or "in the alternative" as one for summary judgment and submits matters outside the pleadings for the court's consideration, the parties are deemed to be on notice that conversion under Rule 12(d) may occur as the court "does not have an obligation to notify parties of the obvious." Laughlin, 149 F.3d at 261.

Because Defendants filed their motions as a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment, Mills was on notice that the Court could treat the motions as seeking summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court will review Mills' claims against Defendants under the Rule 56(a) standard and will consider the exhibits filed in support of the dispositive motion at ECF 14.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that summary judgment should be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to. any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The relevant inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a [trier of fact] or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 25 -52(1986).

"Once a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, the opposing party has the burden of showing that a genuine factual dispute exists." Progressive Am. Ins. Co. v. Jireh House, Inc., 603 F.Supp.3d 369, 373 (E.D. Va. 2022) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86 (1986). "A dispute is genuine if 'a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Libertarian Party of Va. v. Judd, 718 F.3d 308, 313 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Dulaney v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 673 F.3d 323, 330 (4th Cir. 2012)). "A fact is material if it 'might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.'" Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Accordingly, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment ... ." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48 (emphasis in original).

The Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor, ...