Mines v. Wolf

1

Kevin S. Mines; Lonnie Wright; James Brown; Charles Sheppard; Kevin Evans; Brian Thompson; Thomas Davis; and Joel Muir, and Similarly Situated Members, Petitioners v. Honorable, Tom Wolf, Governor; Honorable, Josh Shapiro, Attorney General; Theodore W. Johnson, Secretary Parole Board; George M. Little, Secretary PA Department of Corrections; Jaime Sorber, Superintendent of SCI Phoenix; Kim Nixon, Inmate Records Supervisor, SCI Phoenix, Respondents

No. 102 M.D. 2022

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

September 8, 2023

OPINION NOT REPORTED

SUBMITTED: May 19, 2023

BEFORE: HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge, HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge, HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER Senior Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, PRESIDENT JUDGE EMERITA

Before the Court in our original jurisdiction are the preliminary objections of Respondents Tom Wolf, Josh Shapiro, Theodore W Johnson, George M. Little, Jaime Sorber, and Kim Nixon, to the second amended petition for review (petition) filed pro se by Petitioners Kevin S. Mines, Lonnie Wright, James Brown, Charles Sheppard, Kevin Evans, Brian Thompson, Thomas Davis, and Joel Muir, all of whom are inmates currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Phoenix. Petitioners, purportedly on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, seek declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to their sentences of life imprisonment without parole (LWOP). For the reasons that follow, we sustain Respondents' preliminary objections and dismiss the petition.

The pertinent facts as asserted in the petition are as follows. Petitioners have each been convicted and sentenced to LWOP for the crime of murder.^[1] Pet. ¶¶ 29-36. Their convictions were obtained decades ago and, as of the filing of the petition, they have served between 13 and 43 years. Pet. ¶¶ 20, 29-36. Notwithstanding their sentences of LWOP, each Petitioner submitted a parole application to the Pennsylvania Parole Board. Pet. ¶¶ 22, 15-16, Ex. A-1. The Board's individual correspondence to Petitioners denying their applications all contain the following language: "Upon review of your application for parole and the Department of Corrections['] records of your sentencing, it appears that you are serving a life sentence and are therefore not eligible for parole consideration based upon [Section 6137(a) of the Prisons and Parole Code (Code),] 61 Pa.C.S. § 6137(a)." Pet. Ex. B; see also Pet. ¶¶ 16, 47(a). That section of the Code provides, in pertinent part, that "[t]he [B]oard may parole . . . any offender to whom the power to parole is granted to the [B]oard by this chapter, except an offender condemned to death or serving life imprisonment[.]" 61 Pa.C.S. § 6137(a) (emphasis added).

Petitioners subsequently filed the petition in which they assert several state and federal constitutional claims, including that their sentences of LWOP violate their equal protection^[2] and due process rights,^[3] are grossly disproportionate to any penological interest being served and constitute cruel and unusual punishment,^[4] and that they are unlawfully being subjected to an ex post facto law.^[5]Petitioners further claim that the above-quoted "boilerplate response" they received from the Board denying their parole applications violates their equal protection and due process rights and that the process they received before the Board was arbitrary and capricious. Pet. ¶¶ 16, 47(a), 47(c), 54, 94. Finally, Petitioners maintain that they are being improperly incarcerated without a valid and authentic commitment form or sentencing order.

By way of relief, Petitioners seek declarations from this Court that LWOP is unconstitutional under both the Pennsylvania and United States Constitutions as it essentially "means condemning people to die in prison," and that their continued incarceration serves no legitimate penological interest. Pet. ¶¶ 3, 126. They also seek a determination that the "boilerplate responses" of the Board denying their applications for parole violate due process and equal protection, and they "request the right to parole eligibility review." Pet. ¶¶ 26, 126(j), 127. Finally, Petitioners ask that we order "Respondents to establish criteria for review of all murder cases, including a minimum number of years that must be served prior to consideration for parole," and that this Court conduct an evidentiary hearing regarding their LWOP sentences. Pet. ¶¶ 128-29.^[6]

Respondents filed preliminary objections asserting^[7] that Petitioners are essentially challenging the constitutionality of their sentences. As such, their claims sound in the nature of applications for post-conviction relief, over which this Court lacks jurisdiction. 42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1)(i). In addition, Respondents argue that the petition should be dismissed, rather than transferred to common pleas, because pro se inmates cannot initiate a class action, Respondents are not proper parties, Petitioners failed to exhaust their statutory remedies under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546, and the petition fails to state a valid claim upon which relief can be granted (demurrer).

Of particular note, Petitioners argue in their brief in opposition that Respondents' preliminary objection for lack of jurisdiction "is based on a fundamental mischaracterization of the nature of" their petition and the claims asserted therein. Inmates' Br. at 4.^[8] Petitioners attempt to backtrack or reframe their claims, maintaining that the petition should not be interpreted as a writ of habeas corpus or a PCRA petition. Petitioners repeatedly assert that they are not challenging the legality or constitutionality of their sentences; rather, they are challenging the "boilerplate" determinations of the Board denying them any meaningful opportunity of review for parole and "the Department of Corrections['] denial of constitutional rights." Id. at 3-4, 6-7, 16. In addition, Petitioners argue that they pleaded sufficient facts to meet all the prerequisites for a class action.

Before turning to Respondents' arguments, we note that

[w]hen reviewing preliminary objections to a petition for review in our original jurisdiction, this Court must treat as true all well-pleaded, material and relevant facts together with any reasonable inference[s] that can be drawn from those facts. Courts, however, are not required to accept as true conclusions of law, unwarranted inferences from facts, expressions of opinion or argumentative allegations. In ruling on a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer, the objection is properly sustained where, based on the facts averred, the law says with certainty that no recovery is possible; if doubt exists, then it should be resolved in favor of overruling the objection.

Cnty. of Berks v. Pa. Off. of Open Recs., 204 A.3d 534, 539 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (citations omitted). Further, "'courts reviewing preliminary objections may not only consider the facts pled in the [petition for review in the nature of a] complaint, but also any documents or exhibits attached to it.' Allen v. Dep't of Corr., 103 A.3d 365, 369 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014)." Foxe v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 214 A.3d 308, 310 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019).

As a threshold matter, we first address Respondents' objection for lack of jurisdiction. Respondents point to Section 761(a)(1)(i) of the Judicial Code, which states:

(a) General rule.--The Commonwealth Court shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions or proceedings:

(1) Against the Commonwealth government, including any officer thereof, acting in his official capacity, except:

(i) actions or proceedings in the nature of applications for a writ of habeas corpus or post-conviction relief not ancillary to proceedings within the appellate jurisdiction of the court[.]

42 Pa.C.S. § 761(a)(1)(i) (emphasis added). The PCRA squarely commits jurisdiction to the courts of common pleas over "action[s] by which persons convicted of crimes they did not commit and persons serving illegal sentences may obtain collateral relief." 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542. Moreover, the PCRA is "the sole means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law and statutory remedies for the same purpose that exist[ed] when [the PCRA took] effect, including habeas corpus and coram nobis." 42 Pa.C.S. § 9542 (emphasis added).

While "Petitioners contend that they are not attacking their sentences, their argument is belied by the [p]etition itself." Scott v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. &amp Parole, 256 A.3d 483, 491 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2021) (Scott I), aff'd, 284 A.3d 178, 189 (Pa. 2022) (Scott II) (noting "[m]isdesignation does not preclude a court from deducing the proper nature of a pleading"). The petition is rife with assertions that Petitioners' sentences of LWOP are unconstitutional, e.g., that LWOP constitutes cruel and unusual punishment as it "means condemning people to die in prison," albeit by "silent, [] torturous execution," Pet. ¶¶ 3, 97; that those serving LWOP sentences have been deprived of "life and liberty under color of state law" without "fair warning," Pet. ¶ 47(d); that the Board's parole application process and policies are "misleading, ambiguous, and unconstitutional," Pet. ¶ 47(f); that "[t]here is no legitimate penological interest for keeping Petitioners incarcerated for the duration of their natural li[ves]," Pet. ¶ 53; and that the refusal to provide Petitioners with any meaningful opportunity for parole eligibility has denied them due process and equal protection under the law, Pet. ¶¶ 57, 60, 72, 74, 80, 84, 87. This Court has repeatedly held that similar arguments constitute collateral attacks on criminal sentences and therefore sound in the nature of PCRA petitions. See Scott I, 256 A.3d at 495 (...