Minholz v. Lockheed Martin Corp.

227 F.Supp.3d 249

Lauren MINHOLZ, Plaintiff,

v.LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION; Raytheon Company;¹ Alaska Structures Inc., Weatherport Shelter Systems LLC, and Dutton–Lainson Company, Defendants.

Civil Case No: 1:16–CV–154

United States District Court, N.D. New York.

Signed December 30, 2016

Scott W. Iseman, Thomas J. Dinovo, O'Connell, Aronowitz Law Firm—Albany Office, Albany, NY, for Plaintiff.

Michael L. Chartan, Stephanie P. Chery, Duane, Morris Law Firm—NY Office, New York, NY, David E. Leach, Heather K. Zimmerman, Goldberg, Segalla Law Firm—Syracuse Office, Syracuse, NY, Jonathan H. Bard, Barclay Damon LLP—Albany Office, Sean A. Tomko, Keith M. Frary, Santacrose, Frary Law Firm, Albany, NY, Phillip A. Oswald, R. Anthony Rupp, III, Rupp, Baase Law Firm—Buffalo Office, Buffalo, NY, for Defendants.

DECISION & ORDER

THOMAS J. McAVOY, Senior United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Lauren Minholz commenced this action to recover for personal injuries she received on February 11, 2014 in Antarctica while deployed with the New York State Air National Guard 109th Airlift Wing. Compl. ¶¶ 5–9. Defendants WeatherPort Shelter Systems LLC ("WeatherPort"), Lockheed Martin Corporation ("Lockheed Martin"), and Alaska Structures, Inc. ("Alaska Structures") move to dismiss the action against them pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) on the grounds that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over each defendant. See dkt. # 36 (WeatherPort's motion); dkt. # 44 (Lockheed Martin's motion); dkt. # 52 (Alaska Structures' motion). WeatherPort and Alaska Structures also move to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3), asserting that venue in this court is improper. Plaintiff opposes the motions, and each defendant has filed a reply. For the reasons that follow, the Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) motions are granted and the Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(3) motions are denied as moot.

II. BACKGROUND

On February 11, 2014, Plaintiff Lauren Minholz was deployed with the 109^th Airlift Wing of the New York State Air National Guard to McMurdo Station, Antarctica. Com pl., dkt. # 1, ¶¶ 6–8, 236, 457–58. On this date, she was performing her job duties as an aircraft mechanic, which included entering one of the Engine Tents. While inside the Engine Tent, Plaintiff began opening the Engine Tent door to access aircraft engines by using the provided winch system. Id. ¶¶ 85, 460. The winch handle began to uncontrollably spin and violently struck Plaintiff's right hand and wrist, causing her to sustain personal injuries. Id. ¶¶ 5, 6, 8, 86, 461. Plaintiff's damages include, "but [are] not limited to, severe fractures of her right hand, the need for multiple surgeries, disfigurement, and the sequelae thereof." Id. ¶ 95.

After Plaintiff was injured, she was evacuated and returned to New York, her State of residence. See Minholz Aff. (attached as Exhibit "A" to Iseman Aff.). Once she returned to New York, her medical care was provided by medical professionals located in the Northern District of New York. Id. Due to her physical injury, the New York State Air National Guard deemed Plaintiff physically unfit to work in her trained position and she was unable to complete physical fitness tests and other practical requirements to advance within the Air National Guard. Id. As a consequence, Plaintiff's promotion to Senior Airman was delayed. Id.

Plaintiff alleges that "[a]t all times herein relevant, both the winch system and the shelter were negligently manufactured, engineered, procured, sold, assembled, installed, repaired and maintained by the Defendants as described herein." Compl. ¶ 9. Alaska Structures is sued under theories of negligence (First and Third Causes of Action), strict products liability (Second Cause of Action), and breach of warranty (Fourth Cause of Action). Lockheed Martin is sued under a theory of negligence (Fifth Cause of Action). WeatherPort is sued under theories of strict products liability (Tenth Cause of Action), negligence (Eleventh Cause of Action), and breach of warranty (Twelfth Cause of Action).

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Rule 12(b)(2)

Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes motions to dismiss on the basis of lack of personal jurisdiction over a defendant. "On a Rule 12(b)(2) motion ... the plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant." Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson–Ceco Corp. , 84 F.3d 560, 566–567 (2d Cir. 1996). "In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, 'a court may consider documents beyond the pleadings in determining whether personal jurisdiction exists.' " SPV OSUS Ltd. v. UBS AG , 114 F.Supp.3d 161, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting Greatship (India) Ltd. v. Marine Logistics Solutions (Marsol) LLC , No. 11–cv–420, 2012 WL 204102, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2012) ).

"Where ... the issue of personal jurisdiction 'is decided ... without discovery, the plaintiff need show only a prima facie case' of jurisdiction on a motion under Rule 12(b)(2)." Bonkowski v. HP Hood LLC , 2016 WL 4536868, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2016) (quoting Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Beech Aircraft Corp. , 751 F.2d 117, 120 (2d Cir. 1984) ); see Troma Entm't, Inc. v. Centennial Pictures Inc. , 729 F.3d 215, 217 (2d Cir. 2013) (Courts require that "[a]t this stage of the proceedings" a plaintiff make a "prima facie showing that jurisdiction exists."). Plaintiff's prima facie showing "must include an averment of facts that, if credited by the ultimate trier of fact, would suffice to establish jurisdiction over the defendant." In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001 , 714 F.3d 659, 673 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Chloe v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC , 616 F.3d 158, 163 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see Troma , 729 F.3d at 217 (To survive a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the allegations in the complaint when taken as true must be "legally sufficient allegations of jurisdiction.").

In considering a Rule 12(b)(2) motion, the pleadings and affidavits are to be construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, and all doubts are to be resolved in Plaintiff's favor. Bonkowski , 2016 WL 4536868, at *1. Plaintiffs allegations must provide "factual specificity necessary to confer jurisdiction." Jazini by Jazini v. Nissan Motor Co. , 148 F.3d 181, 185 (2d Cir. 1998). "[C]onclusory statements" without any supporting facts are insufficient. Id. The Court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain , 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986) ). Moreover, "where a defendant 'rebuts [a plaintiff's] unsupported allegations with direct highly specific, testimonial evidence regarding a fact essential to jurisdiction—and plaintiff[ ] do[es] not counter that evidence—the allegation may be deemed refuted.' " Leroi, Inc. v. Csc3c, Inc. , 2016 WL 4997228, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2016) (quoting MEE Direct LLC v. Tran Source Logistics, Inc. , 2012 WL 6700067, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2012) (citation, internal quotation marks, and footnote omitted)).

"It is well settled under Second Circuit law that, even where plaintiff has not made a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction, a court may still order discovery, in its discretion, when it concludes that the plaintiff may be able to establish jurisdiction if given the opportunity to develop a full factual record." Leon v. Shmukler , 992 F.Supp.2d 179, 194 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (citing In re Magnetic Audiotape Antitrust Litig. , 334 F.3d 204, 208 (2d Cir. 2003) ). Thus, jurisdictional discovery is appropriate when the party has made a "colorable basis for personal jurisdiction, which could be established with further development of the factual record." Id. (internal citation omitted); see Ikeda v. J. Sisters 57, Inc. , 2015 WL 4096255, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2015) (same). However, "[w]here [a plaintiff does] do not establish a prima facie case that the district court has jurisdiction over the defendant, the district court does not err in denying jurisdictional discovery." Chirag v. MT Marida Marguerite Schiffahrts , 604 Fed.Appx. 16, 18–19 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Jazini v. Nissan Motor Co., Ltd. , 148 F.3d 181, 186 (2d Cir. 1998) ).

To make this prima facie showing, a plaintiff must demonstrate a statutory basis for personal jurisdiction over the defendant, and that the Court's exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant is in accordance with constitutional due process principles. Stroud v. Tyson Foods, Inc. , 91 F.Supp.3d 381, 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing Licci ex rel. Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL , 673 F.3d 50, 59–60 (2d Cir. 2012) ). Plaintiff asserts that personal jurisdiction over Defendants is obtained pursuant to New York's general jurisdiction statute, New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 301 (" CPLR § 301"), and New York's specific jurisdiction statute, New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 302(a)(3) (" CPLR § 302(a)(3)").

1. General Jurisdiction—CPLR § 301

CPLR § 301 confers general personal jurisdiction "over persons, property, or status as might have been exercised heretofore." N.Y. CPLR § 301. "[A] foreign corporation is subject to general personal jurisdiction in New York [under CPLR § 301 ] if it is 'doing business' in the state." Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. , 226 F.3d 88, 95 (2d Cir. 2000) (citing CPLR § 301 ); see Robert Diaz Assocs. Enters. v. Elete, Inc. , 2004 WL 1087468, *6, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8620, *16 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2004) (In determining whether a foreign corporation is subject to general personal jurisdiction pursuant to CPLR § 301, courts engage in an analysis to determine whether the corporation "was regularly doing business" in New York.). A court that has "general jurisdiction over a corporation may adjudicate all claims against that corporation-even those entirely unrelated to the defendant's contacts with the state." Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova Holding A.S. , 750 F.3d...