Case Law Minter v. Dist. of Columbia, Civil Action No. 10–0516 CRC

Minter v. Dist. of Columbia, Civil Action No. 10–0516 CRC

Document Cited Authorities (44) Cited in (16) Related

Michael S. Nadel, Brandon Herrick Barnes, McDermott Will & Emery LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Robert A. Deberardinis, Jr., Ronald William Gill, Juliane T. Demarco, Erica Taylor McKinley, Shermineh C. Jones, Office Of The Attorney General For The District Of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

CHRISTOPHER R. COOPER, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Penelope Minter, a longtime employee of the District of Columbia Government, contends that the District did not provide reasonable accommodation for her disability in the form of a flexible work schedule or permission to work from home one to two days per week, and ultimately fired her for requesting these accommodations. The District moves for summary judgment, arguing that Minter's claims were not timely filed, Minter is not a qualified individual with a disability under the relevant statutes, and Minter has not produced sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the non-discriminatory reason provided to justify the termination was not the actual reason. Because the District successfully demonstrates that Minter did not file her claims within the prescribed time limits, is not a qualified individual with a disability under the relevant laws, and has not provided sufficient evidence that the District's reasons for firing her were pretextual, the Court will grant its motion for summary judgment.

I. Background

Because the timeliness of Minter's claims is so central to this case, the Court will provide a detailed review of the chronology of events underpinning this litigation.

For approximately 19 years, Minter was employed as a social worker by various agencies of the government of the District of Columbia. Am. Compl. ¶ 9. According to her Complaint, Minter suffers from sarcoidosis, rheumatoid arthritis, and fibromyalgia. Id. ¶ 10; see Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. 5 at 5–6.1 She describes sarcoidosis and rheumatoid arthritis as “chronic, systemic inflammatory diseases that cause pain in the joints, lungs, lymph nodes and other tissue.” Am. Compl. ¶ 10. Fibromyalgia, she alleges, is “a medical disorder characterized by chronic widespread pain, debilitating fatigue, sleep disturbance and joint stiffness.” Id. Minter's alleged physical impairments “substantially limit[ ] the major life activity of working,” such that she deems herself a person with a disability for purposes of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), see 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.2 Am. Compl. ¶ 5. These impairments also limit her ability to sit, stand and walk. Minter Dep. 11/13/12 at 190:2.3

Over the years, plaintiff held positions in the District's Child and Youth Services Administration, the D.C. Mayor's Youth Initiative Office, the Office of the Commissioner of Social Services, the Youth Services Administration (“YSA”), and the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (“OCME”). See generally Pl.'s Opp'n, Ex. 6 at 9–12.4 In at least some of these positions, she had been allowed to move between a full time schedule and a reduced work schedule—typically a 32–hour work week—when she deemed it necessary. See Minter Dep. 9/18/12 at 26:14–27:14, 28:17–20. For example, between 1988 and 1995, although plaintiff's typical work hours were from 10:00 a.m. to 6:30 p.m., see id. at 26:14–18, she was allowed to “work a reduced schedule,” id. at 27:2–3, and “when [she] was ready to [go] back to full time,” id. at 27:4–5, she could do so without incident because she “remained in [a] full-time position,” id. at 27:6. At one point, an administrative officer “would literally do a personnel action to reduce [her] schedule and then a personnel action to bring it back to full time.” Id. at 28:17–19. In another position, beginning in 1995, id. at 32:7–8, plaintiff “had flexibility,” although she could not recall whether she was allowed to shift between a full time schedule and a reduced work schedule, id. at 33:9. She could work late and leave for medical appointments as necessary without any objection from her supervisors, see id. at 33:11–17.

While working at the Office of the Commissioner of Social Services beginning in 1996, see id. at 35:9–20, Minter's work hours still were from 10:00 a.m. to 6:30 p.m., see id. at 37:4–6, but when she “asked to go on a reduced work schedule,” she claims they shipped [her] off to another office,” id. at 37:9–10. At that point, plaintiff was told “to report to YSA, the Youth Services Administration.” Id. at 38:3–4. According to plaintiff, they booted [her] out and sent [her] to [YSA] because [she] asked for accommodation.” Id. at 38:12–14. At YSA, plaintiff reached an agreement with her supervisors to work a reduced schedule, typically taking a day off in the middle of the week or when she scheduled medical appointments. See id. at 48:12–22, 49:17–50:18.

Minter was “detailed” to the OCME on two occasions, first in 1999, see Minter Dep. 9/18/12 at 67:20–68:1, and again in November 2001 as a Program Specialist, id. at 76:14–17; Am. Compl. ¶ 12.5 Her reduced schedule continued, see Minter Dep. 9/18/12 at 67:14–68:1, 77:6–16, notwithstanding her “attempt[s] to go back to full time,” id. at 77:8. According to Minter, “all the players had changed [and] nobody would listen to [her] or respond,” id. at 78:3–5. Working on a reduced schedule meant that plaintiff lost pay and retirement benefits, Minter Dep. 11/13/12 at 198:11–19, which “be[came] problematic as [she was] getting older,” id. at 198:19– 20; see Minter Dep. 9/18/12 at 78:8–13. It was Minter's understanding that “the ADA does not require [that she work] reduced schedules in an accommodation because [she was] losing pay [and] benefits.” Minter Dep. 11/13/12 at 192:7–10, 198:21–199:3.

On May 1, 2006, Minter accepted a promotion to the full-time position of Secretariat (“Coordinator”) to the Child Fatality Review Committee (“CFRC”). Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. B (Letter to plaintiff from W.L. Stokes, SR, HRS, dated April 7, 2006 and Acceptance[ ] of Offer of Management Supervisory Service Appointment). “The mission of the [CFRC was] to examine the circumstances surrounding and leading to child deaths for the purpose of identifying contributing factors and making recommendations for systemic change, in order to improve service delivery to children, and possibly to reduce the number of preventable deaths, especially those associated with child abuse and neglect.” Id., Ex. C (position description for Secretariat to the Committee) at 1. This was a Management Supervisory Service position; Minter [did] not acquire permanent status, serve[d] at the pleasure of the appointing personnel authority, and [could] be terminated at any time.” Id., Ex. B at 1. Among other duties, the Coordinator managed the day-to-day functions of the CFRC, supervised and trained CFRC staff, developed grant applications, selected and assigned cases for review, developed reports from case reviews, and attended review team meetings. See id., Ex. C at 2. Sharan James, OCME's Fatality Coordinator, was Minter's immediate supervisor. Minter Dep. 9/18/12 at 190:17, 196:11–12. Dr. Marie–Lydie Y. Pierre–Louis was the District's Chief Medical Examiner at that time, and Beverly Fields was her Chief of Staff. See Minter Dep. 11/13/12 at 197:3–6; Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. E at 3.

James, with whom Minter had been acquainted since 1995, see Minter Dep. 9/18/12 at 57:3–13, knew that plaintiff had sarcoidosis and that plaintiff had arranged a reduced work schedule before her detail to OCME began. See James Dep. at 29: 3–21, 52:7–19. In her capacity as Minter's immediate supervisor, she had a number of conversations with Minter about her purported disability, both before plaintiff accepted the Coordinator position, Minter Dep. 11/13/12 at 190:10–22, and “after starting the job, [when] the discussions started again around June or July of 2006,” id. at 191:1–3. Among the topics of those discussions were “the possibility of working from home at times,” id. at 191:16–17, and “reduced schedules,” id. at 191:19; see id. at 192:11–193:2. Minter recalled a “positive conversation about those two options as possibilities,” id. at 193:1–2, and believed that James thought these options “reasonable,” id. at 192:19.

James apparently “was not comfortable” with Minter working from home, id. at 197:12–198:1, because she was concerned about security issues,” id. at 200:7, regarding “confidential records,” James Dep. at 69:18. Based on Minter's understanding that “the only thing [James was] comfortable with [was] a reduced schedule,” Minter Dep. 11/13/12 at 206:2–3, Minter decided to “go ahead and do this for now and then ... look at [her] other options later and change to something else because [she did not] want to keep losing benefits,” id. at 206:5–8. It was not clear, however, whether James had authority to approve either option. According to Minter, James “neither told [Minter] she didn't have the ability [to personally implement an accommodation], nor did she tell [Minter] she didn't. But [James] agreed that it was something [they] could negotiate, something [they] could talk about[.] Id. at 193:13–16. Notwithstanding the reduced work schedules Minter enjoyed while employed at other District offices, she “really had no accommodation after she got the job at OCME.” James Dep. at 53:15–16. Rather, she was “back on her five-day work week schedule....” Id. at 53:17–18. James “was pushing her to put in for the accommodation,” id. at 53:20–21, and urged Minter “to talk with the ADA coordinator, id. at 53:21–54:1. James intended to support Minter's request for an accommodation, id. at 54:10–12, and apparently was under the impression that Minter likely would have had to “to submit extensive documentation related to medical records ... to the ADA person.” Id. at 54:6–8. OCME's ...

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5 cases
Document | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia – 2021
Pappas v. Dist. of Columbia
"...finds more persuasive the interpretation that the Rehabilitation Act does not require exhaustion of administrative remedies."); Minter I , 62 F. Supp. 3d at 165 (noting that "[w]hile the D.C. Circuit has not addressed the issue since the 1992 amendments, every other Circuit to confront it h..."
Document | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas – 2017
Dugger v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ.
"...of N.M. , 678 F.2d 847, 850 (10th Cir. 1982) ; Kling v. Los Angeles Cty. , 633 F.2d 876, 879 (9th Cir. 1980) ; Minter v. Dist. of Columbia , 62 F.Supp.3d 149 (D.D.C. 2014). The exhaustion of remedies argument therefore has no traction with regard to the Rehabilitation Act claim. And because..."
Document | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia – 2019
Klotzbach-Piper v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp.
"...was decided however, courts have routinely applied the case in the Title VII and ADA context. See, e.g., Minter v. District of Columbia , 62 F.Supp.3d 149, 162 (D.D.C. 2014) (applying Holowecki to ADA claims); Hodge v. United Airlines , 666 F.Supp.2d 14, 21 (D.D.C. 2009) (applying Holowecki..."
Document | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia – 2014
Bartko v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Civil Action No. 13–1135 JEB
"... ... 13–1135 JEB United States District Court, District of Columbia. Signed August 5, 2014 62 F.Supp.3d 138 Gregory Bartko, Yazoo City, MS, ... "
Document | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia – 2017
Congress v. Dist. of Columbia
"...is required before bringing suit under the Rehabilitation Act is an open question in this Circuit. See, e.g., Minter v. District of Columbia, 62 F.Supp.3d 149, 164 (D.D.C. 2014). The Rehabilitation Act incorporates the "remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title VI of the Civil Rig..."

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