Miranda v. Alexander

JENNIFER MIRANDA, on behalf of real party in interest M.M. and real party in interest S.M. v. DAVID ALEXANDER, individually and in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Ascension Parish School Board, ET AL.

Civil Action No. 21-535-JWD-EWD

United States District Court, M.D. Louisiana

September 24, 2021

RULING AND ORDER

JOHN W. deGRAVELLES JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Consolidated Application for a Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 2) filed by pro se Plaintiff Jennifer Miranda, on behalf of her two minor children, M.M. and S.M. The Court has carefully considered the law, the facts in the record, and the arguments and submissions of Plaintiff and is prepared to rule. For the following reasons, Plaintiff's motion is denied.

I. Relevant Factual Background

This suit arises out of a challenge to the constitutionality of a mask mandate implemented by the Ascension Parish Board of Education. (See Compl., Doc. 1.) Plaintiff Jennifer Miranda initiated this action on behalf of her two minor children M.M. and S.M. (Id. ¶¶ 1-2.) M.M and S.M. are both students at an Ascension Parish public school. (Id. ¶ 1.)

Defendants are: (1) the Ascension Parish Board of Education ("School Board"); (2) David Alexander, in his individual capacity and in his official capacity as Superintendent of the Ascension Parish School District; and (3) Robyn P. Delaney, David S. Duplechein, Julie Blouin Marty Bourgeois, John D. Murphy, John Defrances, Taft Kleinpeter, Jared Bercegeay, Louis Lambert, Troy J. Gautreau, Sr., Patricia Russo, all individual elected officials sued in their individual capacity and in their capacity as members of the School Board (collectively, "Defendants"). (Id. ¶¶ 3-15.)

On August 4, 2021, the School Board enacted a mask mandate for all students, teachers, and faculty. (Doc. 2-1 at 12.)^[1] The policy states:

FACE COVERINGS ON SCHOOL PROPERTY (INDOORS OR OUTDOORS):Pursuant to Proclamation #137 JBE2021 (https://gov.louisiana.gov/assets/Proclamations/2021/137 JBE2021Stateof Emergency.pdf) issued by Governor John Bel Edwards, all individuals shall wear a face covering when indoors on Ascension Public Schools property, as well as on school buses. Individuals are required to wear a mask over the nose and mouth upon entry to any building and remain properly masked while traveling about hallways, corridors, and common spaces inside of the building or in classrooms. Masks are not required when outdoors.

(Id.)

On August 6, 2021, Plaintiff submitted religious exemption forms to the Principal of her children's school to opt out of the mask mandate. (Compl. ¶ 17, Doc. 1.) In response, the Principal stated, "they are not accepting religious exemptions[.]" (Id. (citing Ex. L, Doc. 1-1 at 14).)

Subsequently, on August 17, 2021, the School Board held a meeting which allowed for “open discussion of the [mask] mandate.” (Id. ¶ 39.)M.M. spoke at this meeting and “brought to the attention of the school board that he had acquired sores on both of his ears as result of wearing a mask at school that was too tight.” (Id.)

MM. also stated that his sores didn't heal until around Christmas. Mrs. Miranda clarified that the sores healed during Christmas break since a mask was not being worn during Christmas break. M.M. also informed the APSB that he was receiving negative dojo marks when he would take his mask off because the sores on the back of his ears were causing unbearable pain. M.M. stated to APSB "The points mean that you're doing bad things, so I don't think I was really doing anything bad" in reference to removing his mask to relieve the pain. M.M. concluded his speech saying "and no more masks[.]"

(Id.)

Plaintiff alleges that the School Board's mask policy causes immediate and irreparable health risks to students, staff, and the community at large. (Compl. at 9.) In support, Plaintiff relies on the Affidavit of Stephen E. Petty. (Id. ¶ 18 (citing Ex. O, Doc. 1-1 at 17-22).) Mr. Petty is an expert in the field of Industrial Hygiene, who has testified as to the “futility and danger caused by an individual wearing a mask in order to avoid transmitting or becoming infected with Covid-19[.]” (Id.)

Plaintiff further alleges that her two children have been harmed by having to comply with the mask mandate, which is “not only unsupported by science, but which also results in the possible resulting measurable drop in oxygen saturation of the blood on one hand and the increase in carbon dioxide on the other, which contributes to an increased noradrenergic stress response, with heart rate increase and respiratory rate increase and, in some cases, a significant blood pressure increase.” (Id. ¶ 50.)

Based on the above, Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated her Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to life, liberty, and property when they implemented the mask mandate, along with various provisions of the Louisiana Constitution. (Id. ¶¶ 51-69.) More specifically, Plaintiff alleges that (1) her children have a constitutionally protected interest in not being subjected to the School Board's mask mandate; (2) the School Board's policy unlawfully deprives Plaintiff's children of their constitutionally protected rights without due process of law; and (3) the School Board impeded on the fundamental right of her children to public education. (Id.)

On September 14, 2021, Plaintiff filed her Complaint seeking to enjoin Defendants “from implementing or enforcing the mask policy and from taking any other action to implement the masking policy that is not in compliance with applicable law[.]” (Compl. at 18.) On that same day, she filed her Motion for TRO, requesting that the Court enjoin Defendants from continued enforcement of the Policy. (Doc. 2.)

II. Legal Standard

Ex parte temporary restraining orders “should be restricted to serving their underlying purpose of preserving the status quo and preventing irreparable harm just so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer.” Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers Local No. 70, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974).

To obtain a temporary restraining order, a party must prove “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a substantial threat that Plaintiff[ ] will suffer irreparable injury if the [TRO] is not granted, (3) that the threatened injury outweighs the threatened harm to the Defendants, and (4) that granting the [TRO] will not disserve the public interest.” Gumns v. Edwards, 2020 WL 2510248, at *3 n.18 (M.D. La. May 15, 2020) (Dick, C.J.) (citing Planned Parenthood Ass'n of Hidalgo Cnty. Tex., Inc. v. Suehs, 692 F.3d 343, 348 (5th Cir. 2012) (quotation and citation omitted); Justin Indus. v. Choctaw Sec., L.P., 920 F.2d 262 (5th Cir. 1990)). A temporary restraining order is an “extraordinary remedy and should be granted only if the movant has clearly carried the burden of persuasion with respect to all four factors.” Allied Mktg. Group, Inc. v. CDL Mktg., Inc., 878 F.2d 806, 809 (5th Cir. 1989); RW Dev., LLC v. Cuningham Grp. Architecture, Inc., 2012 WL 3258782, at *2 (S.D.Miss. Aug. 8, 2012).

The Court will address each factor in turn, taking into consideration the higher burden Plaintiff bears due to the nature of her requested TRO. See Hargett, 348 F.Supp.3d at 769.

III. Plaintiff's Motion for TRO (Doc. 2)

Plaintiff moves the court for a temporary restraining order seeking to enjoin Defendants from continuing to enforce the mask mandate. (Doc. 2 at 1.) Plaintiff argues that all four prongs of the standard for obtaining a TRO weigh in her favor. (Id. at 13.)

Plaintiff contends that the School Board's mask mandate violates her children's “core constitutional right to personal autonomy and bodily integrity.” (Id. at 9, 10-11.) As such, the first factor is met because Plaintiff is likely to succeed on the merits.

The second factor-the risk of irreparable harm-is also met because the "actual or threatened violation of core constitutional rights is presumed irreparable by the federal courts.” (Id. at 6, 11.) In addition, “Plaintiffs M.M. and S.M. being exposed to potential physical injury and death may constitute irreparable harm justifying preliminary injunctive relief.” (Id. at 12.) Further, the third and fourth factors also weigh in her favor as the issuance of a TRO in this case is “in the public interest.” (Id. at 13.)

IV. Discussion

As an initial matter, the Court acknowledges that the TRO was filed pro se. (See Doc. 2 at 13.) Federal courts generally hold pro se petitioners to less stringent standards than those required of petitioners represented by counsel. See Ominski v. Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, Inc., 466 Fed.Appx. 341, 345 (5th Cir. 2012) (affording the plaintiff “the leeway to which she is entitled as a pro se petitioner”); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (holding the allegations of a pro se complaint to “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers”). Nevertheless, Plaintiff is advised that, “a pro se litigant is not exempt . . . from compliance with the relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.” NCO Financial Systems, Inc. v. Harper- Horsley, 2008 WL 2277843, at *3 (E.D. La. May 29, 2008) (citing Birl v. Estelle, 660 F.2d 592, 593 (5th Cir. 1981)).

1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The Court begins its analysis by evaluating the first prong of the TRO standard that asks whether Plaintiff has a strong likelihood of success on the merits of her claims. Lambert v. Bd. of Comm'rs of Orleans Levee Dist., 2006 WL 8456316, at *8 (E.D. La. Mar. 22, 2006). The Court finds that Plaintiff does not have a strong likelihood of success on the merits. As previously noted Plaintiff alleges a due process violation of her Fourteenth...