Miranda v. Classic Concepts Constr.

HUGO E MIRANDA, Husband and Wife; and HERMINIA MIRANDA, Husband and Wife; Plaintiffs, v. CLASSIC CONCEPTS CONSTRUCTION, LLC, JOHN BENEFIELD, and PRAIRIE ENGINEERING, INC., Defendants.

No. 8:19CV267

United States District Court, D. Nebraska

August 31, 2021

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Joseph F. Bataillon, Senior United States District Judge

This matter is before the Court on defendant's motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, for defendants John Benefield and Classic Concepts Construction and for defendant Prairie Engineering, Inc. Filing Nos 91 and 94. This is a diversity action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Plaintiff sues defendants alleging negligence. See Amended Complaint Filing No. 73. Defendant Prairie and defendant Classic Concepts contend that plaintiff's exclusive remedy is worker's compensation. See Amended Answer, Filing Nos. 74 and 76.

BACKGROUND

This case involves a construction project that was ongoing on August 17, 2015 at the Dupont Pioneer HiBred International Inc. facility located in York, Nebraska. The Pioneer Site was a seed corn processing facility used to produce seed corn for ultimate use by farmers for planting. Pioneer contracted with Defendant Prairie (as General Contractor) to erect a new building at the existing Pioneer Site, and otherwise do some additional work at the existing Pioneer Site and buildings. Specifically, Defendant Prairie was also hired to do some retooling work and otherwise install equipment at the Pioneer Site for, among other things, placing seeds into packages or bags or boxes. Pioneer owned the facility and hired Prairie Engineering (Prairie) as the general contractor. Prairie hired Classic Concepts Construction (Classic) as a subcontractor, and Prairie also hired General Contractors, Inc., (General) to act as a subcontractor. Pioneer additionally hired Safety Management group of Indiana, Inc. to manage safety issues. The work done by General was distinct from the work done by Classic Concepts.

At some point toward the end of summer, General (the subcontractor) took its crew from the York project to another project in Atkinson, Illinois. Prairie asked that Hugo Miranda, an employee of General from Texas, and one other employee remain behind to assist Classic with meeting the deadline.

Miranda stayed and worked with Classic employees. On the day in question, Miranda was working with Francis Neville, an employee of Classic. They were working “in a scissors lift installing sheeting near an 18-foot overhead door.” Filing No. 1, ¶ 10. The lift was about 7 ft. long by 3 ft. wide, and the enclosed sides were about 4 ft. high. Filing No. 95-1, Miranda Depo, p. 114, ll. 11-19. Neville was operating the lift, although Miranda was also familiar with it and knew how to operate it. Id., Miranda deposition, p. 76, 13-16. The lift was not working correctly. Neville, apparently over Miranda's objection, removed all but one of the bolts with no problems. When he removed the last bolt, the tension in the spring was released, and the spring that operated the door came loose. Miranda put his hand out to protect Neville from being hit in the face, and the free-flying metal spring hit Miranda on his left hand.

The record is replete with contractual language requiring both the general contractor, Prairie, and the subcontractor, Classic, to adhere to safety training requirements. The contract stated: “[t]he following documents are a requirement of this subcontract - to be provided by Subcontract to Prairie . . . Safety Matric - documentation showing safety training for all the subcontractor tasks that will be performed on the Prairie Jobsite. The documentation should only show the employees that will be on this particular Prairie jobsite, listed with their safety training information, on your company letterhead and with your company's safety contract.” (Subcontract p. 4, Article 10).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. “Summary judgment is appropriate when, construing the evidence most favorably to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Crozier v. Wint, 736 F.3d 1134, 1136 (8th Cir. 2013). “Summary judgment is not disfavored and is designed for ‘every action.'” Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1043 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986)). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court will view “all evidence and mak[e] all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Inechien v. Nichols Aluminum, LLC, 728 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir. 2013.). Credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge. Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042 (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000). But the nonmovant must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042; and see Briscoe v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, 690 F.3d 1004, 1011 (8th Cir. 2012) (stating that the nonmoving party “must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'”).

When the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, the moving party need not negate the nonmoving party's claims by showing “the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325 (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S 144, 159 (1986)). Instead, “the burden on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing' . . . that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 325. In response to the movants showing, the nonmoving party's burden is to produce specific facts demonstrating “‘a genuine issue of material fact' such that [its] claim should proceed to trial.” Nitro Distrib., Inc. v. Alticor, Inc., 565 F.3d 417, 422 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmovant's] position will be insufficient, there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [nonmovant]. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)); see Quinn v. St. Louis Cty., 653 F.3d 745, 751 (8th Cir. 2011) (stating “[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties'” will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48). Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial. Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042.

DISCUSSION

A. Filing No. 91

1. Arguments of defendants, Defendants John Benefield, Classic Concepts Construction, LLC

First defendants contend that defendant John Benefield has no personal liability in this matter, arguing that negligence of a corporate entity cannot be attributed to an individual. Plaintiff concedes there is no personal liability as to John Benefield and that summary judgment is proper as to him. The Court will grant summary judgment in favor of John Benefield.

Next, defendants contend that Miranda was a, loaned or borrowed employee, of Classic at the time of the incident. The defendants rely on a Nebraska Supreme Court case which held “when a general employer … loans an employee to another for the performance of some special service, then that employee … may become the employee of the party to which his services have been loaned.” Kaiser v. Millard Lumber, Inc., 587 N.W.2d 875, 880 (Neb. 1990) (quoting Daniels v. Pamida, Inc., 561 N.W.2d 568 (Neb. 1997). The Kaiser Court further stated that the Workers' Compensation Act states:

When a general employer lends an employee to a special employer, the special employer becomes liable for workmen's compensation only if:

(a) the employee has made a contract of hire, express or implied, with the special employer;

(b) the work being done is essentially that of the special employer; and

(c) the special employer has the right to control the details of the work.

When all three of the above conditions are satisfied in relation to both employers, both employers are liable for workmen's compensation.

Kaiser, 587 N.W.2d 875, 880 (Neb. 1999) (quoting Daniels, 561 N.W.2d at 572). As stated in Daniels,

[t]he loaned-servant doctrine provides that if an employer loans an employee to another for the performance of some special service, then that employee, with respect to that special service, may become the employee of the party to whom his services have been loaned.... This common-law principle applies to cases arising particularly under the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act and allows an employee to be simultaneously in the general employment of one employer and in the special employment of another. Thus, the loaned employee not only remains the employee of the person who loaned him or her but also may be the employee of the person to whom he or she is loaned.... In such cases, the employee may look to one or to the other or to both employers for compensation, since he or she is at the same time under a general and a special employment relationship.

(Citations omitted) Daniels v. Pamida, Inc., 251 Neb. at 927, 561 N.W.2d at 571-72 (1997), cited by Morin v. Industrial Manpower, 687 N.W.2d 704, 712 (Neb. 2004).

In the case before the Court, defendants contend that Miranda was an employee of General (subcontractor). Classic asked to...