Miranda v. Dist. of Columbia Dep't of Emp't Servs.

257 A.3d 467

Juana MIRANDA, Petitioner,

v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, Respondent,andDevon & Blakely/2200 WSH Food Corp. and AmGuard Ins. Co., Intervenors.

No. 20-AA-92

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued April 27, 2021

Decided August 19, 2021

Benjamin E. Douglas, Washington, for petitioner.

Karl A. Racine, Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Loren L. AliKhan, Solicitor General, Caroline S. Van Zile, Principal Deputy Solicitor General, and Carl J. Schifferle, Deputy Solicitor General, filed a statement in lieu of a brief for respondent.

Todd S. Sapiro, Washington, for intervenors.

Before Glickman, McLeese, and Deahl, Associate Judges.

McLeese, Associate Judge:

Petitioner Juana Miranda challenges a decision of the Compensation Review Board (CRB) denying her claim for temporary total disability benefits. We vacate and remand.

I.

Except as indicated, the following facts appear to be undisputed for purposes of this petition for review. Ms. Miranda injured her knee while working for intervenor Devon & Blakely/2200 WSH Food Corp. Miranda , AHD No. 19-248, 2019 WL 4911007, at *1 (D.C. Dep't. of Emp. Servs. Sept. 24, 2019). After two surgeries to treat her injury, she was medically cleared to work with restrictions. Id. Devon & Blakely did not offer her a modified position, and Ms. Miranda met with a vocational-rehabilitation counselor in an effort to obtain other employment. Id. at *2, 4. When Ms. Miranda did not provide documentation showing eligibility to work in the United States, vocational-rehabilitation assistance ceased, and Devon & Blakely and its insurer stopped voluntarily paying temporary total disability benefits to Ms. Miranda in March 2019. Id. at *2.

Ms. Miranda made efforts on her own to obtain employment, and eventually she succeeded in obtaining a new position. Miranda , 2019 WL 4911007, at *2. Ms. Miranda's condition worsened, however, and she required further surgery, after which she was again physically unable to work. In June 2019, voluntary temporary total disability benefits therefore resumed. Id. at *1.

Ms. Miranda sought an award of temporary total disability payments for the period from March 2019 to June 2019. Miranda , 2019 WL 4911007, at *1-2. After an evidentiary hearing, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) denied Ms. Miranda's claim. Id. at *1-10.

At the hearing, Ms. Miranda invoked the Fifth Amendment when asked about her immigration status. Devon & Blakely introduced a labor-market survey that Devon & Blakely contended showed six available jobs that Ms. Miranda was physically capable of performing. Miranda , 2019 WL 4911007, at *1.

After the hearing, the ALJ inferred that Ms. Miranda was not authorized to work in the United States. Miranda , 2019 WL 4911007, at *2-3. We do not understand Ms. Miranda to dispute that inference for purposes of this petition for review. The ALJ further found that Ms. Miranda testified credibly, was willing to work, and had found subsequent employment on her own. Id . at *2. The ALJ determined that Devon & Blakely had not offered Ms. Miranda a modified position and that only two of the six positions identified in the labor-market survey were compatible with Ms. Miranda's work restrictions. Id . at *1, 3.

The ALJ acknowledged that Ms. Miranda's lack of authorization to work in the United States did not categorically render Ms. Miranda ineligible for workers’ compensation benefits under the District of Columbia Workers’ Compensation Act, D.C. Code § 32-1501 et seq. (2019 Repl.). Miranda , 2019 WL 4911007, at *5 ; see also Asylum Co. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp. Servs. , 10 A.3d 619, 625-28 (D.C. 2010) (upholding CRB's conclusion that undocumented workers can be eligible to receive workers’ compensation benefits). The ALJ analyzed Ms. Miranda's claim for temporary total disability benefits under a three-part test derived from Logan v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp. Servs. , 805 A.2d 237 (D.C. 2002). Miranda , 2019 WL 4911007, at *3-4. As the ALJ described that test, Ms. Miranda bore the burden of showing that her injury prevented her from performing her pre-injury job; then the burden would shift to Devon & Blakely to show that it had offered Ms. Miranda either her pre-injury job or a suitable modified position; then the burden would shift to Ms. Miranda to rebut Devon & Blakely's evidence. Id . at *3.

The ALJ noted that the parties did not dispute that Ms. Miranda could not physically perform her pre-injury job during the time period at issue. Miranda , 2019 WL 4911007, at *4. The ALJ acknowledged that, under "usual circumstances," Ms. Miranda therefore would have carried her burden at the first step of the Logan test. Id. The ALJ concluded, however, that Ms. Miranda had an "additional burden to prove she [wa]s entitled to work in the United States." Id. The ALJ concluded that Ms. Miranda could not meet her initial burden, because her immigration status, not her injury, prevented her from returning to any employment. Id. at *4-7. The ALJ also concluded that an employer who offered to employ an undocumented worker or who provided vocational-rehabilitation services to an undocumented worker would be violating federal immigration laws or facilitating such violations. Id . at *5.

Ms. Miranda appealed to the CRB, which affirmed the ALJ's order but relied on an alternative rationale. Miranda , CRB No. 19-105, 2020 WL 743001, at *1-5 (Comp. Rev. Bd. Jan. 9, 2020). The CRB also acknowledged that Ms. Miranda's undocumented status did not make her categorically ineligible for workers’ compensation benefits. Id . at *2-3. The CRB treated the issue before it as governed by the Logan test, which the CRB described as follows:

to determine the extent of disability a claimant first must establish a prima facie showing of total disability by proving the work injury prevents a claimant from returning to her pre-injury job. If that is established, then the burden shifts to an employer to rebut this showing by proving a claimant could return to her pre-injury work or showing that it offered a claimant a position consistent with her limitations. If employer rebuts a claimant's prima facie case with this showing, the burden then shifts back to the claimant to show the employer's evidence is faulty or inadequate.

Miranda , 2020 WL 743001, at *3.

The CRB noted, however, that immigration status is "not irrelevant at all times and in all cases." Id. at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted). The CRB then appeared to endorse the approach it had adopted in an earlier decision, Augustin , CRB No. 13-145, 2014 WL 1513449 (Comp. Rev. Bd. Mar. 7, 2014). Id. Under that approach, an undocumented "worker's continued wage loss is not, by itself, sufficient to support an award of ongoing disability compensation if, had the worker been documented, the worker could have returned to gainful employment." Id. (quoting Augustin , 2014 WL 1513449, at *5 ).

The CRB in this case also relied on another of its earlier decisions, Gonzales , CRB No. 08-077, 2008 WL 4335654, at *10 (Comp. Rev. Bd. Aug. 22, 2008), aff'd , Asylum Co. , 10 A.3d at 619. Miranda , 2020 WL 743001, at *5. As the CRB in this case explained, the CRB's decision in Gonzales stated that (1) federal law precluded employers from continuing to employ undocumented workers and (2) it could be a violation of federal law for employers to provide certain kinds of vocational-rehabilitation assistance to undocumented workers. Id. (citing Gonzales , 2008 WL 4335654, at *10 ).

Turning to the circumstances of the present case, the CRB stated that Devon & Blakely had "met its burden by identifying two jobs compatible with [Ms. Miranda's] restrictions however due to her undocumented status they are prohibited from re-employing her. Thus, [Ms. Miranda] fails to meet the Logan third step for reasons unrelated to her ability to physically do the work." Miranda , 2020 WL 743001, at *5.

II.

We may reverse a CRB decision "only if we conclude that the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise an abuse of discretion and not in accordance with the law." Placido v. District of Columbia Dep't of Emp. Servs. , 92 A.3d 323, 326 (D.C. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Although this court generally resolves legal questions de novo, the court ordinarily accords deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute that the agency administers, unless the interpretation is unreasonable or is inconsistent with the statutory language or purpose." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The court ordinarily will not affirm an agency action that is inadequately explained. E.g. , D.C. Appleseed Ctr. for L. & Just., Inc. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Ins., Sec., & Banking , 54 A.3d 1188, 1216-17 (D.C. 2012) ("[W]ithout sufficient findings and explanation from the agency, we are unable to affirm that the agency's determination flowed rationally from the factual findings, and that the agency in fact applied the law taking into account the entirety of the record.") (bracket, ellipses, and internal quotation marks omitted). We will, however, "uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency's path may reasonably be discerned." Id. at 1217 (internal quotation marks omitted).

We are unable to discern the CRB's path in this case. We note some inconsistency about the proper formulation of Logan ’s three-part test. As the ALJ and CRB in this case described the test, the focus at the second step is on whether the claimant's employer offered either to restore the claimant to the prior job or to provide a suitable replacement position with the employer. Miranda , 2019 WL 4911007, at *4 ; Miranda , 2020 WL 743001, at *3. In Logan , however, this court described the second step of the test more broadly, as whether the employer had provided "sufficient evidence of suitable job availability to overcome a finding of total disability." 805 A.2d at 243. This court described the third step in correspondingly...