Mireles v. Dart

228 N.E.3d 285

2023 IL App (1st) 221090

Joel MIRELES, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.Thomas J. DART and the Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 1-22-1090

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, FOURTH DIVISION.

Filed March 30, 2023

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 2016 CH 11288, Honorable Neil Cohen, Judge, Presiding.

Cass T. Casper, of Disparti Law Group, P.A., of Chicago, for appellant.

William Andrichik, of Steptoe & Johnson, LLP, of Chicago, for appellee.

OPINION

JUSTICE HOFFMAN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The plaintiff, Joel Mireles, appeals from orders of the circuit court affirming a decision of the Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board (Board) separating him from his employment as a correctional officer with the office of the Cook County sheriff and dismissing his claim for a declaratory judgment, which sought findings that the Board was illegally constituted and that its decision terminating his employment as a correctional officer is void. For the reasons which follow, we affirm the orders of the circuit court.

¶ 2 The procedural posture of this case is not in dispute. The plaintiff was appointed as a correctional officer with the office of the Cook County sheriff on July 23, 2007, and thereafter assigned to the Receiving Classification Diagnostic Center (RCDC) of the Cook County Department of Corrections (CCDOC). On March 17, 2015, Thomas J. Dart, the Sheriff of Cook County (Sheriff), filed a complaint with the Board, alleging that the plaintiff used excessive force against an inmate, Jabari Funches, by striking him in the head and pushing him into a wall and doorway; failed to document his use of force against Funches in three official reports he completed relating to the incident; falsely documented that Funches had raised his hands before he struck him; falsely stated in a January 31, 2014, interview that he did not see other officers kick Funches; and made other false statements regarding the incident. Based upon those allegations, the complaint charged the plaintiff with violations of the rules and regulations and general orders of the CCDOC and sought his separation from employment as a correctional officer. A hearing on the complaint was conducted on February 4 and 5, 2016. On July 29, 2016, the Board issued its final written decision, upholding the charges and terminating the plaintiff’s employment.

¶ 3 On August 26, 2016, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the circuit court for administrative review of the Board’s decision, asserting, inter alia, that the Board’s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence and that his termination was arbitrary and capricious. The plaintiff requested an order setting aside the Board’s decision, reinstating him to his position, and awarding him compensation for his losses, including back pay. On May 31, 2017, the circuit court affirmed the Board’s decision, finding that the Board’s factual findings were supported by the evidence and that the plaintiff’s termination was neither arbitrary, unreasonable, nor capricious.

¶ 4 On June 27, 2017, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal from the circuit court’s order of May 31, 2017, which was docketed in this court as No. 1-17-1672. While that appeal was pending, the plaintiff filed a motion in the circuit court on June 30, 2017, requesting reconsideration of the May 31, 2017, order affirming the Board’s decision and raising for the first time an argument that the Board’s decision was void because the Board was illegally constituted at the time of its decision terminating his employment. On the plaintiff’s motion, this court entered an order on August 7, 2017, in appeal No. 1-17-1672, dismissing that appeal.

¶ 5 Thereafter, the circuit court stayed proceedings in the instant case pending the supreme court’s resolution of an appeal in Goral v. Dart, 2020 IL 125085, 450 Ill.Dec. 384, 181 N.E.3d 736. Following the supreme court’s decision in Goral, the circuit court entered an order on January 12, 2022, over the objection of the Sheriff, granting the plaintiff’s oral motion for leave to file an amended complaint.

¶ 6 On January 14, 2022, the plaintiff filed a two-count complaint titled "Second Amended Class Action Complaint." Count I consisted of a repleading of the plaintiff’s complaint for administrative review of the Board’s decision, which clearly stated that it was being pled solely for the purpose of preserving for appeal the propriety of the circuit court’s order of May 31, 2017. Count II sought a declaratory judgment finding that seven members of the Board participating in the decision terminating his employment were "invalidly appointed" and declaring that the Board’s decision terminating his employment is void. On June 23, 2022, the circuit court entered an order dismissing the plaintiff’s second amended complaint, and this appeal followed.

¶ 7 For his first issue in this appeal, the plaintiff contends that the circuit court erred in dismissing his claim for a declaratory judgment that the Board’s decision terminating his employment is void due to the invalid appointment of seven of the eight members of the Board participating in the decision. The plaintiff argues that, contrary to the circuit court’s determination, the de facto officer doctrine does not apply to validate the Board’s decision. According to the plaintiff, once the defendants were put on notice by the circuit court’s August 19, 2014, order in Taylor v. Dart, 13 CH 26319, 2014 WL 12644844 (Cir. Ct. Cook County, Aug. 19, 2014), which found that the Board was illegally constituted, none of the Board’s decisions issued thereafter and until the Board was legally constituted can be validated by application of the de facto officer doctrine. He concludes that, since the Board’s decision in this case was issued after the circuit court’s finding in Taylor but before the Board was legally constituted, the de facto officer doctrine is inapplicable.

[1] ¶ 8 In support of the circuit court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim for declaratory judgment, the Sheriff argues that, since the plaintiff failed to raise an argument that the Board was illegally constituted before the Board itself and did not raise the claim until long after the Board had issued its final decision in this case, the de facto officer doctrine bars any challenge to his dismissal based upon the Board’s composition. According to the Sheriff, the plaintiff’s arguments on this issue have been rejected by this court in Malacina v. Cook County Sheriff’s Merit Board, 2021 IL App (1st) 191893, 458 Ill. Dec. 769, 197 N.E.3d 182. We agree. See also Cruz v. Dart, 2019 IL App (1st) 170915, ¶¶ 28–41, 431 Ill.Dec. 388, 127 N.E.3d 921.

[2–4] ¶ 9 The de facto officer doctrine is an equitable doctrine that confers validity upon acts performed by a person acting under the color of official title even though it is later discovered that the legality of that person’s appointment to office is deficient. Goral, 2020 IL 125085, ¶ 71, 450 Ill.Dec. 384, 181 N.E.3d 736. "Under the doctrine, the acts of a person actually performing the duties of an office under color of title are valid so far as the public or third parties who have an interest in them are concerned." Id. The doctrine acts as defense to an attack on the acts of an officer or appointee in a collateral proceeding. Id. ¶ 72. The doctrine does not preclude a timely challenge to an agency’s authority or a direct attack in the same proceeding in which a board member is appointed. Id. ¶ 73. Rather, it is a defense to a collateral challenge brought after the official action has been completed. Malacina, 2021 IL App (1st) 191893, ¶ 21, 458 Ill.Dec. 769, 197 N.E.3d 182.

¶ 10 In this case, the plaintiff raised the illegal composition of the Board for the first time in his motion for reconsideration of the circuit court’s May 31, 2017, order affirming the Board’s decision, which motion was filed 11 months after the Board rendered its final decision. The plaintiff’s reliance upon the circuit court’s August 19, 2014, order in Taylor which found that the Board was illegally constituted to support his conclusion that the de facto officer doctrine is inapplicable is misplaced. The Board’s illegal composition as found in Taylor "remained ripe for a challenge by a party before the Board—as long as the party raised it at the time of those administrative proceedings, and not merely afterward, post-final decision." (Emphasis in original.) Id. ¶ 31.

¶ 11 As was the case in Malacina, the plaintiff’s declaratory judgment claim is barred by the de facto officer doctrine because his challenge to the Board’s composition was made after the Board rendered its final decision. Id. ¶ 32; see also Cruz, 2019 IL App (1st) 170915, ¶¶ 28–41, 431 Ill.Dec. 388, 127 N.E.3d 921.

¶ 12 The plaintiff next seeks reversal of the circuit court’s May 31, 2017, order affirming the Board’s final decision terminating his employment as a correctional officer. He argues that the Board’s decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence and that termination of his employment was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonably harsh. A resolution of the arguments requires consideration of the Sheriff’s complaint, the evidence presented during the hearing on that complaint, and the Board’s findings of fact based on that evidence.

¶ 13 As noted earlier, the Sheriff filed a complaint with the Board, charging the plaintiff with violations of the rules and regulations and the general orders of the CCDOC. The complaint alleged that: on May 4, 2012, the plaintiff used excessive force against an inmate, Funches, by striking him in the head and pushing him into a wall and doorway; that he failed to document his use of force against Funches in three official reports he completed relating to the incident; that he falsely documented that Funches had raised his hands before he struck him; that he falsely stated in a January 31, 2014, interview...