Miriyeva v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs.

9 F.4th 935

Gunay MIRIYEVA, et al., Appellants

v.UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES and Tracy Renaud, Acting Director, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, in her official capacity only, Appellees

No. 20-5032

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued November 2, 2020

Decided August 17, 2021

Jennifer M. Wollenberg, Washington, DC, argued the cause for appellants. With her on the briefs was Douglas W. Baruch.

Catherine M. Reno, Attorney, U.S. Department of Justice, argued the cause for appellees. On the brief were Ethan P. Davis, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Colin A. Kisor, Deputy Director, Elianis N. Perez, Assistant Director, and C. Frederick Sheffield, Senior Litigation Counsel.

Before: Srinivasan, Chief Judge, Rogers and Walker, Circuit Judges.

Walker, Circuit Judge:

In 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c), Congress set out the path for judicial review of certain claims intertwined with denied naturalization applications. Miriyeva strayed from that path when she filed suit in the District of Columbia. We therefore affirm the district court's dismissal of Miriyeva's claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

I

When this case began, Gunay Miriyeva and three others were seeking naturalization under 8 U.S.C. § 1440. Since then, all but Miriyeva became naturalized citizens. The claims of the three naturalized citizens are moot. See Foretich v. United States , 351 F.3d 1198, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 2003). Because Miriyeva has yet to become a naturalized citizen, we proceed with the question in this case under Miriyeva's facts.

Miriyeva is a citizen of Azerbaijan who lawfully entered the United States and, at the time she appeared in the district court, was a resident of San Diego, California. Hoping to become a naturalized United States citizen, she enlisted in the United States Army in 2016 through the Military Accessions Vital to the National Interest program. Under this initiative, noncitizens can follow an expedited path to citizenship by serving honorably in the military without having to first gain lawful permanent residence. Specifically:

Any person who, while an alien or a noncitizen national of the United States, has served honorably as a member of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve or in an active-duty status in the military, air, or naval forces of the United States ... and who, if separated from such service, was separated under honorable conditions , may be naturalized as provided in this section ....

8 U.S.C. § 1440(a) (emphasis added).

In 2018, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services initially approved Miriyeva's application for naturalization under the program. Miriyeva then needed to complete the oath of citizenship to become a naturalized citizen. But before the agency scheduled Miriyeva's oath ceremony, the Army sent her to basic training. And while at training, a medical condition abruptly ended her service.

When a soldier's service ends, the Army assigns one of four separation categories: (1) "honorable," (2) "general (under honorable conditions)," (3) "under other than honorable conditions," or (4) "uncharacterized." See Army Reg. 135-178, ch. 2, § III, 2-7. A soldier's separation can be "uncharacterized" if she is at "entry-level" status, meaning she "served less than 180 days of ... active duty service." Compl. ¶ 6 (cleaned up). The Army described Miriyeva's separation as "uncharacterized" since her service ended while she was still at "entry-level" status.

After her medical discharge, Miriyeva eventually succeeded in getting the agency to schedule her oath ceremony. But then the agency wavered. It ultimately reversed its prior approval of her naturalization application because the military did not describe her separation as "honorable." The agency determined that her "uncharacterized" separation did not meet § 1440 ’s "separated under honorable conditions" requirement. 8 U.S.C. § 1440(a).

Miriyeva sued in the District Court for the District of Columbia. Among other reasons, she argued that the military refers to "uncharacterized" as "separated under honorable conditions," when required to do so. She says the agency should have likewise recognized her "uncharacterized" separation as honorable and approved her naturalization application. She claims that the Army's policy of treating an uncharacterized separation as not under honorable conditions — which led to the denial of her naturalization application — violated the Administrative Procedure Act, the Constitution's Uniform Rule of Naturalization Clause, and the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) ; U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4 ; U.S. Const. amend. V. Miriyeva sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief.

The district court dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c), which provides that an individual with a denied naturalization application "may seek review of such denial before the United States district court for the district in which such person resides in accordance with chapter 7 of title 5." See Miriyeva v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services , 436 F. Supp. 3d 170, 186 (D.D.C. 2019). The district court determined that § 1421(c) precluded Miriyeva's Administrative Procedure Act and constitutional claims. Id. at 178-86. The court also concluded that the Declaratory Judgment Act claim failed without a different, standalone source of jurisdiction. And it rejected the count in which Miriyeva requested injunctive relief, which was not actually a separate claim but merely a request for a certain remedy purportedly required by other counts. Id. at 186 & n.19.

Miriyeva appealed. This court has jurisdiction to review de novo the district court's dismissal of the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 ; Arch Coal, Inc. v. Acosta , 888 F.3d 493, 498 (D.C. Cir. 2018).

II

The Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 - 1537, sets out the path for becoming a naturalized citizen. It also provides for judicial review of a denied naturalization application. That provision states in full:

A person whose application for naturalization under this subchapter is denied, after a hearing before an immigration officer under section 1447(a) of this title, may seek review of such denial before the United States district court for the district in which such person resides in accordance with chapter 7 of title 5. Such review shall be de novo, and the court shall make its own findings of fact and conclusions of law and shall, at the request of the petitioner, conduct a hearing de novo on the application.

8 U.S.C. § 1421(c). Here, Miriyeva claims she isn't seeking review of her denied naturalization application. See Appellants’ Br. 21 (Miriyeva "does not seek review of any ... naturalization decision or an order of naturalization."). She says her statutory and constitutional claims therefore fall outside the judicial review provision of the Act.

We disagree. Miriyeva could have brought challenges to the agency's policy in her home district. And § 1421(c) implicitly forecloses parallel district court jurisdiction.

III

The Supreme Court has provided "a framework for determining when a statutory scheme of administrative and judicial review forecloses parallel district-court jurisdiction." Jarkesy v. SEC , 803 F.3d 9, 12 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich , 510 U.S. 200, 114 S.Ct. 771, 127 L.Ed.2d 29 (1994) ). "Under Thunder Basin ’s framework, courts determine that Congress intended that a litigant proceed exclusively through a statutory scheme of administrative and judicial review when (i) such intent is fairly discernible in the statutory scheme, and (ii) the litigant's claims are of the type Congress intended to be reviewed within the statutory structure." Id. at 15 (quoting Thunder Basin , 510 U.S. at 207, 212, 114 S.Ct. 771 ) (cleaned up).

A

We begin by asking if it's "fairly discernible" that Congress intended to preclude judicial review outside a special statutory review scheme. Id. (quoting Thunder Basin , 510 U.S. at 207, 114 S.Ct. 771 ). Here, the answer is yes.

In Elgin v. Department of Treasury , the Supreme Court concluded that the Civil Service Reform Act laid out in "painstaking detail ... the method for covered employees to obtain [judicial] review of adverse employment actions." 567 U.S. 1, 11-12, 132 S.Ct. 2126, 183 L.Ed.2d 1 (2012). The Court reasoned that, through five sections of the statute, Congress explained the scope of the Act's application, made clear the procedures an employee should enjoy before agency action, and outlined the review system. Id. at 11, 132 S.Ct. 2126.

Likewise, in Jarkesy v. SEC , this court concluded that "[t]he securities laws contain a[ ] ... comprehensive structure for the adjudication of securities violations." 803 F.3d at 16. That scheme dictates an agency review process starting with a decision by an administrative law judge, allowing an appeal of the administrative law judge's decision, and lastly, allowing for judicial review in a court of appeals. Id.

Here, the statutory review scheme is similarly "elaborate." Elgin , 567 U.S. at 11, 132 S.Ct. 2126 (cleaned up). Codified §§ 1421, 1446, and 1447 of the Immigration and Nationality Act "exhaustively detail[ ]" the review process for a naturalization application. Id . After an individual submits a naturalization application under § 1445, an agency employee will investigate the applicant and determine whether to grant or deny the application. 8 U.S.C. § 1446. If the agency denies the application, "the applicant may request a hearing before an immigration officer." Id. § 1447(a). And if the immigration officer also denies the application, the applicant can seek review of the denial in the district court in which the applicant resides. Id. § 1421(c).

Because Congress intended these sections to collectively (and exclusively) direct the review process of naturalization application denials, it is no...