Mirza v. Dolce Vida Med. Spa

1

DR. MUHAMMAD MIRZA and ALLIED MEDICAL AND DIAGNOSTIC SERVICES, LLC, Plaintiffs, v. DOLCE VIDA MEDICAL SPA, LLC and SCOTT CALLAHAN, Defendants.

No. 19 Civ. 6444 (PGG)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

January 26, 2024

ORDER

PAUL G. GARDEPHE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

This action stems from an allegedly defamatory email widely disseminated by Defendants Scott Callahan and Dolce Vida Medical Spa, LLC (“Dolce Vida”). Plaintiffs Dr Muhammad Mirza and Allied Medical and Diagnostic Services LLC (“Allied Medical”) assert claims for false advertising in violation of the Lanham Act, unfair competition, unfair and deceptive trade practices in violation of New York General Business Law § 349, trade libel and defamation, and misappropriation of likeness. (Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 1) ¶¶ 1-3, 51-78)

Defendants have moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue or, in the alternative, to transfer this case to the District of Connecticut. (Mot. (Dkt. No. 30); Def. Br (Dkt. No. 32)) For the reasons stated below, the motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction will be granted.

BACKGROUND

I. FACTS

Dr. Mirza is “board-certified in internal medicine and licensed to practice medicine in the states of New York and New Jersey.” (Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 1) ¶¶ 4; see also Id. ¶ 20 (stating that “Dr. Mirza visits different offices on different days for the convenience of his patients, but his principal office is [in New York]”)) Dr. Mirza is domiciled in New Jersey. (IL ¶ 4) Allied Medical is Dr. Mirza's medical practice. (Id. ¶ 17) Allied Medical “is a limited liability company organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware, with its principal place of business in [New York].” (IL ¶ 5)

“Callahan is an individual domiciled in the State of Connecticut,... and is the principal, owner, operator and sole member of Dolce Vida.” (Id. ¶ 7; see id. ¶¶ 8-11 (asserting that Callahan and Dolce Vida are interchangeable)) “Dolce Vida is a limited liability company organized and existing under the laws of the State of Connecticut, with a principal place of business” in Connecticut. (Id. ¶ 6) The Complaint further asserts that Dolce Vida “advertises and transacts business in the State of New York and within this judicial district.” (Id.) According to Plaintiffs, Defendant Callahan is a “competing medical professional,” and “Defendants continuously and systematically conduct and transact business and provide health care services in competition with Plaintiffs in this District.” (IL ¶ 26)

The Complaint alleges that in “June 2019, Defendants perpetuated [sic] an attack campaign against Plaintiffs by communicating false, defamatory and completely fabricated statements directly to the general public and Plaintiffs' customers - in order to promote their competing business, products and services.” (Id. ¶ 28) According to Plaintiffs, “[o]n or around June 4, 2019, Defendant[s] created, or caused to be created, a false, misleading and defamatory negative, email blast campaign that denigrates Plaintiffs' services . . . [which] was viewed by thousands of email recipients, including some of Plaintiffs' own clients and patients, and Defendants continue to defame and injure Plaintiffs with this false, negative ad.” (Id. ¶ 2)

The June 4, 2019 email (hereinafter, the “Email”) begins with the phrase “Attention Dolce Vida Clients,” includes a photo of Dr. Mirza, and states: “If you have received any services from Dr. Muhammed Mirza in the Past 2 years and have experienced any complications, problems, or issues please contact us directly. We are working with the Department of Public Health.” (See Cmplt., Ex. A (Dkt. No. 1-1)) The following email address was printed below this message: “CallahanScott@msn.com.” (Id.; see also Cmplt. (Dkt. No. 1) ¶¶ 29-31) The Complaint asserts, “[u]pon information and belief, [that] hundreds, if not thousands, of recipients received the mass email blast from Defendants - including some of whom reside and/or received such message in the State of New York.” (Id. ¶ 33)

Plaintiffs further claim, “[u]pon information and belief, [that] Defendants began systematically emailing and messaging various clients and potential customers of Plaintiffs in an effort to get those customers to either stop doing business with Plaintiffs, or induce them not to start doing business with Plaintiffs - and to purchase Defendants' competing products and services instead.” (Id. ¶ 43; see id. ¶ 46 (“Upon further information and belief, from January 2019 to the present, Defendants have communicated these same false and defamatory statements to several of Plaintiffs' customers, via email, social media, orally and elsewhere in writing.”))^[1]

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The Complaint was filed on July 11, 2019. (Dkt. No. 1) On August 30, 2019, Defendants filed a pre-motion letter asserting, inter alia, that this case should be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper service or, in the alternative, transferred to the District of Connecticut. (Aug. 30, 2019 Def. Ltr. (Dkt. No. 15) at I)^[2]

In an October 30, 2019 order, this Court directed the parties “to conduct jurisdictional discovery over the next 30 days, and to present their findings in a joint letter to the Court by December 2, 2019,” at which time Defendants could renew “their request to file a motion to dismiss. . . .” (Oct. 30, 2019 Order (Dkt. No. 20))

In a January 29, 2020 letter, Defendants reported that “[t]he parties do not agree as to the bases of this Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over Defendants.” (Jan. 29, 2020 Joint Ltr. (Dkt. No. 28)) Defendants requested that the Court adopt the parties' proposed briefing schedule regarding Defendants' motion to dismiss. (Id.) On January 30, 2020, the Court approved the parties' proposed briefing schedule. (Dkt. No. 29)^[3]

DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs contend that this Court has general personal jurisdiction over the Defendants pursuant to New York's long-arm statute, N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 301, and specific personal jurisdiction over the Defendants pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R § 302(a)(1) and (a)(3). (Pltf. Opp. (Dkt. No. 34) at 18-22) Defendants contend that this action must be dismissed because this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them. (Def Br. (Dkt. No. 32) at 11)

I. LEGAL STANDARDS

“The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant when served with a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss.” Whitaker v. Am. Telecasting, Inc., 261 F.3d 196, 208 (2d Cir. 2001). The nature of plaintiffs burden “varies depending on the procedural posture of the litigation.” Ball v. Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, S.A., 902 F.2d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 1990). Prior to discovery, a plaintiff may carry this burden “by pleading in good faith . . . legally sufficient allegations of jurisdiction. At that preliminary stage, the plaintiffs prima facie showing may be established solely by allegations.” Id. “In contrast, when an evidentiary hearing is held, the plaintiff must demonstrate the court's personal jurisdiction over the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence.” Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp., 84 F.3d 560, 567 (2d Cir. 1996).

“Where as here ... the parties have conducted ... discovery regarding the defendant's contacts with the forum state, but no evidentiary hearing has been held[,] the plaintiffs prima facie showing, necessary to defeat a jurisdiction testing motion, must include an averment of facts that, if credited ..., would suffice to establish jurisdiction over the defendant.” Bank Brussels Lambert v. Fiddler Gonzalez & Rodriguez, 171 F.3d 779, 784 (2d Cir. 1999) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff may make this showing through “affidavits and supporting materials.” S. New England Tel. Co. v. Glob. NAPs Inc., 624 F.3d 123, 138 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, where jurisdictional discovery has taken place, the Court may consider materials outside of the pleadings, but the materials must be construed “in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, resolving all doubts in their favor.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Ziegler, Ziegler & Assocs. LLP v. China Digital Media Corp., No. 05 Civ. 4960 (LAP), 2010 WL 2835567, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2010) (same).

The determination of whether a federal court has personal jurisdiction over a defendant involves a "two-part inquiry.” Metro. Life Ins., 84 F.3d at 567. The court "must [first] determine whether the plaintiff has shown that the defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction under the forum state's laws[.]" Id. The court "must [then] assess whether the court's assertion of jurisdiction under these laws comports with the requirements of due process." Id.; see also Chloe v. Queen Bee of Beverly Hills, LLC, 616 F.3d 158, 163-64 (2d Cir. 2010) ("To determine personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary in a case involving a federal question,the Court must engage in a two-step analysis. First,we apply the forum state's long-arm statute .... If the long-arm statute permits personal jurisdiction,the second step is to analyze whether personal jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. This analysis has two related components: the 'minimum contacts' inquiry and the 'reasonableness' inquiry." (citations omitted)). "Where,as here,the plaintiffs premise their theory of personal jurisdiction upon the New York long-arm statute,[courts] first consider whether the requirements of the statute have been satisfied before proceeding to address whether the exercise of jurisdiction would comport with the Due Process Clause."' Licci ex rel. Licci v Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 673 F.3d 50, 60 (2d Cir. 2012) (citin...