Mitchell v. Energy Transfer Partners, LP

FREDDIE MITCHELL, Plaintiff, v. ENERGY TRANSFER PARTNERS, LP, Defendant.

Civ. A. H-14-2784

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION

February 9, 2017

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The First Amended Complaint (instrument #7) in the above referenced case alleges racial discrimination leading to Plaintiff Freddie Mitchell's ("Mitchell's") purported termination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and in violation of the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act ("TCHRA"), Texas Labor Code Ann. §§ 21.001-21.556,¹ and violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act (the "FMLA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., following Mitchell's return from authorized leave under the FMLA, and seeking re-employment, compensatory damages, costs including attorneys' fees, and other relief to which he may be entitled. Pending before theCourt is Defendant Energy Transfer Partners, L.P.'s ("Energy's")² motion for summary judgment (instrument #17).

In his opposition (#19) to the motion for summary judgment, Mitchell states that "[a]fter conducting discovery, Plaintiff has decided to no longer pursue the FMLA claims." #19, p.6, n.1. Therefore the Court dismisses Mitchell's claims under the FMLA with prejudice and does not otherwise address them here.

Standard of Review

Summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) is appropriate when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, the court determines that "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." A dispute of material fact is "genuine" if the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to find in favor of the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

Initially the movant bears the burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery in the record that it finds demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on which the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial; a "complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1990); Edwards v. Your Credit, Inc., 148 F.3d 427, 431 (5^th Cir. 1998).

If the movant meets its burden and points out an absence of evidence to prove an essential element of the nonmovant's case on which the nonmovant bears the burden of proof at trial, the nonmovant must then present competent summary judgment evidence to support the essential elements of its claim and to demonstrate that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Board, 40 F.3d 698, 712 (5^th Cir. 1994). The nonmovant may not rely merely on allegations, denials in a pleading or unsubstantiated assertions that a fact issue exists, but must set forth specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact concerning every element of its cause(s) of action. Morris v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5^th Cir. 1998).

Conclusory allegations unsupported by evidence will not preclude summary judgment. National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Board, 40 F.3d at 713; Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5^th Cir. 1996). "'[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwiseproperly supported motion for summary judgment . . . .'" State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Gutterman, 896 F.2d 116, 118 (5^th Cir. 1990), quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.. 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). "Nor is the 'mere scintilla of evidence' sufficient; 'there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.'" Id., quoting Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252. The Fifth Circuit requires the nonmovant to submit "'significant probative evidence.'" Id., quoting In re Municipal Bond Reporting Antitrust Litig., 672 F.2d 436, 440 (5^th Cir. 1978), and citing Fischbach & Moore, Inc. v. Cajun Electric Power Co-Op., 799 F.2d 194, 197 (5^th Cir. 1986). "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Thomas v. Barton Lodge II, Ltd., 174 F.3d 636, 644 (5^th Cir. 1999), citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, and Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50.

Allegations in a plaintiff's complaint are not evidence. Wallace v. Texas Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042, 1047 (5^th Cir. 1996)("[P]leadings are not summary judgment evidence."); Johnston v. City of Houston, Tex., 14 F.3d 1056, 1060 (5^th Cir. 1995)(for the party opposing the motion for summary judgment, "only evidence--not argument, not facts in the complaint--will satisfy' the burden."), citing Solo Serve Corp. v. Westown Assoc., 929 F.2d 160, 164 (5^th Cir. 1991). The nonmovant must "go beyond the pleadings and by [his] own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact fortrial." Giles v. General Elec. Co., 245 F.3d 474, 493 (5^th Cir. 2001), citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324.

The court must consider all evidence and draw all inferences from the factual record in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Board, 40 F.3d at 712-13.

Relevant Law

Under § 703(a) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) and (2), it is "an unlawful employment action for an employer . . . (1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin."

Pursuant to the statute, suit may be brought under two distinct theories of discrimination, disparate treatment and disparate impact. International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977); Pacheco v. Mineta,448 F.3d 783, 787 (5^th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 888 (2006). Title VII expressly prohibits both (1) intentional discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin, known as"disparate treatment," as well as (2) an employer's facially neutral practices that are discriminatory in operation against protected groups (race, color, religion, sex or national origin) and not required by the nature of the job, known as "disparate impact". 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1) and 2000e(k)(1)(A); Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2672-73 (2009); Pacheco, 448 F.3d at 787. The instant suit is one for disparate treatment, which requires proof of discriminatory motive. Pacheco, 448 F.3d at 787.

A plaintiff may establish a claim of discrimination under Title VII by presenting direct evidence or by using the indirect method of proof set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). This suit falls in the latter category.

Under the McDonnell Douglas framework applied to circumstantial evidence cases, a plaintiff must first make a prima facie case of employment discrimination. To establish a prima facie case of intentional discrimination under a disparate treatment theory Plaintiff must demonstrate that he "(1) is a member of a protected class (Mitchell is African American); (2) was qualified for the position; (3) was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (4) was replaced by someone outside the protected class, or in the case of disparate treatment, shows that other similarly situated employees [not in the protected class] were treated more favorably." Bryan v. McKinsey & Co., 375 F.3d 358, 360 (5^th Cir. 2004).

An "adverse employment action for Title VII discrimination claims based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin "'include[s] only ultimate employment decisions such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, or compensating.'" McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 559 (5^th Cir. 2007), quoting Green v. Administrator of Tulane Educ. Fund, 284 F.3d 641, 657 (5^th Cir. 2002). "Title VII was only designed to address 'ultimate employment decisions, not to address every decision made by employers that arguably might have some tangential effect upon those ultimate decisions.'" Burger v. Central Apartment Mgmt., Inc., 168 F.3d 875, 878 (5^th Cir. 1999)(emphasis in original), quoting Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5^th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 932 (1997),(abrogated on other grounds by Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006). If an employer's action fails to have more than a "mere tangential effect on a possible future ultimate employment decision," it does not constitute an adverse employment action. Mattern, 104 F.3d at 708. To be actionable, an adverse employment decision must be a "tangible employment action that constitutes a significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits." Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998).

"[A] decision made by an employer that only limits an employee's opportunities for promotion or lateral transfer does not qualify as an adverse employment action under Title VII."Banks v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 320 F.3d 570, 575 (5^th Cir....