Mitchell v. Fuentes, Civil No. 12-3394(FLW)

DWIGHT D. MITCHELL Plaintiff. v. COLONEL JOSEPH R. FUENTES, et al., Defendants

Civil No. 12-3394(FLW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

Dated: May 22, 2013

*NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

WOLFSON, United States District Judge:

The instant matter arises out of Plaintiff Dwight D. Mitchell's (Plaintiff) Complaint asserting state and federal constitutional violations against Defendants Colonel Joseph R. Fuentes ("Fuentes"), Vinicius Vicente ("Vicente"),¹ and Dameon Crawford ("Crawford") (collectively, "Defendants") arising out of a traffic stop and resulting citations.² Defendants filed a motion to dismiss all counts of the Complaint on the basis that the Complaint is barred by collateral estoppel and fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Plaintiff opposes Defendant's motion, and has filed a cross-motion for leave to amend his Complaint. In response, Defendants argue that leave to amend the Complaint should be denied on futility grounds. Forthe reasons that follow, the Court grants Defendants' motion to dismiss, and grants, in part, Plaintiff's motion for leave to file an amended complaint.

I. BACKGROUND

For the purposes of this motion to dismiss, the following facts, taken from the Complaint, are assumed to be true.³

On June 6, 2010, Plaintiff, an African American male, was stopped by Defendants Vicente and Crawford, New Jersey State Police Officers, for speeding and reckless driving on northbound Route 287 in Edison Township. Compl., ¶¶ 2-3, 5-7. Plaintiff alleges that he was driving home when he noticed that a police car began following him at a high rate of speed, forcing Plaintiff to change lanes and speed to avoid a collision. Id., ¶ 5. After being stopped by Defendants Vicente and Crawford, Plaintiff was issued citations for speeding at 130 mph in a 65 mph zone and for reckless driving. Id., ¶ 6.

On September 14, 2010, after a trial in the Edison Municipal Court, Plaintiff was convicted of speeding at 130 mph in a 65 mph zone, fined $272 and $33 in court costs, and received a six month license suspension. Id., ¶ 11. Plaintiff appealed this decision to the Superior Court, Law Division of New Jersey, and in so doing, supplemented the record with the newly obtained patrol car video (the "Patrol Video").⁴ Id., ¶¶ 12-13. The Superior Court modified the municipal court's judgment and findings with regard to the speeding charge, holding that Plaintiff was speeding at 90 mph instead of 130 mph, and reinstated Plaintiff'sdriving privileges. Id., ¶ 14. The Superior Court left unaltered Plaintiff's reckless driving conviction. See id. Plaintiff then appealed this judgment to the Appellate Division, which affirmed the speeding conviction but reversed the reckless driving conviction. Id., ¶ 15.

Plaintiff subsequently filed the instant action alleging constitutional violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, and a violation of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act ("NJCRA").⁵ Specifically, Plaintiff argues that Defendants Vicente and Crawford lacked probable cause to stop Plaintiff, and/or did so, or conspired to do so, only on account of his race, see id., ¶¶ 4-6, thus violating his Fourth Amendment right to be free from an unlawful seizure and his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection under the law. See id., Counts One through Four. Plaintiff also alleges a failure to train claim against Defendant Fuentes for failing to prevent these officers from depriving Plaintiff of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See id., Count Six. Lastly, Plaintiff reiterates his federal constitutional claims against all Defendants in the form of a violation of the NJCRA. See id., Count Five. In addition to the facts plead in the Complaint, Plaintiff implicitly incorporates by reference the Patrol Video as further proof supporting his claims. See id., ¶¶ 16-17; see also supra Footnote 4. Defendants now move to dismiss the entirety of Plaintiff's Complaint as either barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel or for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In addition to opposing Defendants' motion, Plaintiff also filed a motion for leave to file an Amended Complaint, with the proposed Amended Complaint attached thereto, which Defendants oppose on the ground that any amendment would be futile.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In reviewing a motion to dismiss on the pleadings, the court "accept[s] all factual allegations as true, construe[s] the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine[s] whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief." Phillips v. Cnty of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation and quotations omitted). As such, a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted does not attack the merits of the action but merely tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal quotations omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) ("[a] pleading that states a claim for relief . . . must contain a short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled to relief"). In other words, to survive a Fed R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

However, "the tenant that a court must accept as true all the allegations contained in the complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Plaintiff need not meet any particular "probability requirement" but must show that there is "more than a sheer possibility that the defendant has act unlawfully." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Moreover, "context matters in notice pleading" and a complaint will fail to state a claim if the "factual detail in the claim is so underdeveloped that it does not provide a defendant with the type of notice of a claim which is contemplated by Rule 8." Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008).

When presented with a motion to dismiss, the court should engage in a two-part analysis. Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210. First, the court must separate the factual and legal elements of each claim. Id. It "must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions." Id. at 210-11 (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 667). Second, the court must determine whether the facts alleged are "sufficient to show that the plaintiff has 'a plausible claim for relief.'" Id. at 211 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). The plausibility determination is a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. In other words, for the plaintiff to prevail, the "complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief;" it must "'show' such an entitlement with its facts." Fowler, 578 F.3d at 211 (citing Phillips, 515 F.3d at 234-35).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants move to dismiss all counts of Plaintiff's Complaint. In response, Plaintiff opposes certain arguments advanced by Defendants, but effectively concedes that the majority of Plaintiff's claims in the Complaint are inadequately pled by instead filing a motion for leave to file an Amended Complaint. See generally Pl. Omnibus Brief. Defendants oppose Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend on the basis that, even in light of the additional facts pled in the proposed Amended Complaint, Plaintiff does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and thus amendment is futile. In the interest of clarity, I analyze first those issues which do not depend on amendment, namely, whether Plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel; I then analyze Defendants' motion to dismiss and opposition to amending the Complaint by relying on Plaintiff's proposed Amended Complaint.

A. Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment § 1983 Claims⁶

Plaintiff alleges, in Count One, that Defendants Vicente and Crawford violated Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights,⁷ and, in Count Two, that Defendants Vicente and Crawford conspired to do so.⁸ Specifically with regard to these Fourth Amendment claims, Plaintiff asserts false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution claims based on the Fourth Amendment's protection against deprivations of liberty without due process of law. The core of all of these claims is Plaintiff's assertion that Defendants Vicente and Crawford lacked probable cause to stop Plaintiff's car and issue him speeding and reckless driving citations. Defendants argue in their motion to dismiss that the doctrine of collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) bars Plaintiff from contesting probable cause because that issue was raised and decided in prior state court proceedings. Def. Br., 9-12. Specifically, Defendants argue that the Appellate Division, in affirming Plaintiff's speeding conviction, concluded that probable cause existed for the traffic stop. Id. at 9. Plaintiff opposes Defendants' motion, contending that collateral estoppel does not apply because Defendants were not parties to the state court proceedings. As explained below, Plaintiff's argument is misplaced.

Collateral estoppel "prevents a party who litigated an issue previously from rearguing that particular issue even if the other litigants were not party to the earlier proceeding." James v. Heritage Valley Fed. Credit Union, 197 F. App'x 102, 105 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Szehinskyj v. Atty. Gen. of the United States, 432 F.3d 253, 255 (3d Cir. 2005). Indeed, under New Jersey law,⁹ issue preclusion, "requires only that an issue of fact or law be determined in a valid proceeding and that final judgment on that issue was...