Mitchell v. Savage

1

GLENDA MITCHELL, Administratrix of the estate of Ryan G. Mitchell, et al. PLAINTIFFS v. CALEB SAVAGE, in his individual capacity, et al. DEFENDANTS

Civil Action No. 24-33-DLB-CJS

United States District Court, E.D. Kentucky, Northern Division, Covington

October 7, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

David L. Bunning, United States District Judge

This matter is before the Court upon Defendant Caleb Savage's (“Savage's) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. (Doc. #12). Plaintiffs the Estate of Ryan Mitchell (“the Estate”), Glenda Mitchell, and Tracy Mitchell (collectively “the Mitchells”) filed their Response (Doc. # 18), Defendant Savage filed his Reply (Doc. #19), and this matter is now ripe for review. For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant Savage's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is granted and the Mitchells are dismissed as individual plaintiffs.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In the early morning hours of March 12, 2023, Defendant Savage, an officer with the Village of Ripley, Ohio Police Department (“RPD”), was the only RPD officer on duty. (Doc # 8 ¶¶ 7 and 13). While Savage was on duty, a “county-wide radio dispatch” was issued by the Brown County Communication Center “regarding a complaint by a citizen that a vehicle had damaged some property in their yard.” (Id. ¶ 14). The dispatch did not call for assistance, but simply advised that the incident had occurred in Aberdeen, Ohio, a nearby town, and told officers to be on the lookout for the culprit. (Id. ¶¶ 15-16).

Later, Savage left the Village of Ripley, Ohio (“Ripley”) and began pursuing Ryan Mitchell (“Mitchell”). (Doc. # 8 ¶ 25). At some point, Savage and Mitchell crossed the Ohio river into Kentucky.^[1] (Id. ¶ 23). Savage pursued Mitchell at high speeds “down a narrow, winding, country road in Mason County, Kentucky.” (Id. ¶ 26). During the pursuit, Mitchell lost control of his vehicle, crashed into a tree, flipped over, and then burst into flames. (Id ¶ 34). The Complaint alleges that Savage, aware of the crash, elected not to help Mitchell and instead left the scene of the crash without notifying anyone of what happened. (Id. ¶¶ 36 and 39-40). Mitchell died in the fire and his body “burned to ash.” (Id. ¶¶ 43-44).

As a result of this incident, the Estate has asserted a Section 1983 claim against Savage for being “deliberately indifferent” to Mitchell's “serious medical needs” in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (Doc. # 8 ¶ 56). The Estate has also asserted several supplementary state law claims against Savage and Ripley. (See Id.). Finally, the Mitchells have asserted their own Section 1983 claims against Savage for deprivation of their rights to their son's body in violation of their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Id. ¶¶ 46 and 57). The Defendants have only moved for Judgment on the Pleadings with respect to the Estate's Section 1983 claim and for the Mitchells' Section 1983 claim. (See Doc. # 12).

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

The standard of review for a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Roth v. Guzman, 650 F.3d 603, 605 (6th Cir. 2011); Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 399-400 (6th Cir. 1999). Such a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. RMI Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 F.3d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir. 1996). As the Supreme Court explained, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). This “does not require detailed factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (quotations omitted). The claimant must put forward enough facts that the court could reasonably infer “that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

In deciding a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court must accept “all well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings” from the non-moving party as true. See Tucker v. Middleburg-Legacy Place, 539 F.3d 545, 549 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 581 (6th Cir. 2007)). However, as with a 12(b)(6) motion, this assumption of truth does not extend to “legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences.” JPMorgan, 510 F.3d at 581-82 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The court may grant a Rule 12(c) motion “when no material issue of fact exists and the party making the motion is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. at 582. Courts may consider exhibits attached to the complaint without converting a 12(c) motion into a motion for summary judgment, as well as “public records, items appearing in the record of the case and exhibits attached to [the] defendant's motion . . . so long as they are referred to in the [c]omplaint and are central to the claims contained therein.” Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008).

B. The Estate's Section 1983 Claim

Plaintiffs' Complaint contends that Savage “was deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of Ryan Mitchell which deprived him of the rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.” (Doc. # 8 ¶ 57). Section 1983 authorizes an individual to bring an action “against anyone who, under color of state law, deprives a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or conferred by federal statute.” Wurzelbacher v. Jones-Kelly, 675 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 2012).

1. Fourth Amendment Claims

In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Savage's deliberate indifference to Mitchell's medical needs deprived Mitchell of rights secured by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Doc. # 8 at ¶ 56). In his Motion, Savage argues that the Estate's Section 1983 claim under the Fourth Amendment fails because constitutional claims for failure to render medical aid usually fall under the Fourteenth Amendment, and because even if a Fourth Amendment claim were viable here, Mitchell was never “seized” for Fourth Amendment purposes. (Doc. # 12 at 3-4) (citing Esch v. Cty. of Kent, 699 Fed.Appx. 509, 515 (6th Cir. 2017)). In their Response, Plaintiffs, apparently in agreement with Savage, state that “[the] Estate's federal claims allege solely that Defendant Savage's deliberate indifference to Mr. Mitchell's obvious medical need violated the Fourteenth Amendment.” (Doc. # 18 at 6). In light of this concession, this Court will grant Defendant Savage's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings with respect to Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment Section 1983 claim.

2. Fourteenth Amendment Claim

Plaintiffs' Complaint also contends that Savage “was deliberately indifferent to the serious medical needs of Ryan Mitchell,” and that it was Savage's indifference which deprived Mitchell of his Fourteenth Amendment Rights. (Doc. # 8 ¶ 56). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. A general principle of the Due Process Clause is that it does not confer an “affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the individual.” DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep't. of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989). There are “two exceptions under which the Constitution ‘imposes upon [the government] a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for [the] safety and wellbeing' of an individual.” Sexton v. Cernuto, 18 F.4th 177, 186 (6th Cir. 2021) (alterations in original) (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 196). They are “(1) the custody exception and (2) the state-created danger exception.” Jackson v. Schultz, 429 F.3d 586 (6th Cir. 2005). Unfortunately for Plaintiffs, neither exception applies here.

a. The Custody Exception

Under the DeShaney custody exception, also called the “special relationship exception,” a state “has a duty to protect an individual when it has ‘so restrain[ed] an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs-e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety.'” Sexton, 18 F.4th at 187 (alteration in original) (quoting Lipman v. Budish, 9743d 726, at 742 (6th Cir. 2020). In other words, the duty to provide an individual with basic needs arises when that individual is placed in custody. Sexton, 18 F.4th at 187. The Complaint alleges that Savage pursued Mitchell until Mitchell crashed his car, and then Savage-aware of the crash-left the scene without notifying anyone. (Doc. # 8 ¶¶ 25-41). Taking these facts as true, the issue is whether Mitchell was ever in custody during Savage's pursuit.

“Custody” for Fourteenth Amendment purposes is a “difficult and more exacting standard than a Fourth Amendment seizure.” Pierce v Springfield Twp. Ohio, 562 F. App'x. 431, 437 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Cutlip v City of Toledo, 488 Fed.Appx. 107, 114 (6th Cir. 2012)). “The overarching prerequisite for custody is an affirmative act by the state that restrains the ability of an individual to act on his own behalf.” Jackson, 429 F.3d at 590; see also Pierce, 562 F. App'x. at 437 (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200) (custody “requires that the state restrain an individual ‘through incarceration,...