Mitchell v. Stephens

CHARLES HENSLEY MITCHELL, II (TDCJ No. 1851936), Petitioner, v. WILLIAM STEPHENS, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice,Correctional Institutions Division, Respondent.

No. 3:13-cv-4754-M-BN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

July 16, 2015

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Petitioner Charles Hensley Mitchell, II, a Texas prisoner, proceeding pro se, has filed an application for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons explained below, the application should be denied.

Background

After a Dallas County, Texas jury found Petitioner guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, he entered into a plea agreement as to sentencing, and the trial court sentenced him to 7 years' imprisonment. See State v. Mitchell, F09-60722-R (265th Dist. Ct., Dallas County, Tex. Nov. 11, 2010). His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. See Mitchell v. State, No. 05-11-00022-CR, 2012 WL 1501110 (Tex. App. - Dallas Apr. 30, 2012). And the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (the "TCCA") refused his petition for discretionary review. See Mitchell v. State, PD-0601-12 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 12, 2012).The TCCA also denied his state habeas applicationwithout written order, on the findings of the trial court, which were made without a live hearing. See Ex parte Mitchell, WR-65,486-06 (Tex. Crim. App. Aug. 21, 2013); see also Dkt. No. 39-1 at2; Dkt. No. 41-1-18.

On direct appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals presented the following summary of the case:

The State's Witnesses

[Petitioner] was charged with intentionally and knowingly threatening his nephew, Christopher Houston, with a hatchet. The State's witnesses included Christopher, his mother Ruth Houston, his sister Crystal Houston, and police officers who responded to the scene.

Ruth testified that her mother, Albert Lynn Mitchell, lived alone in a home in Oak Cliff until she was transferred to an "assisted living or nursing home." She granted Ruth a general power of attorney so that Ruth could pay Albert's bills and take care of Albert's home. Ruth or her children checked on Albert's home every day "to insure that everything was okay and that no one was in the house." On the date of the offense, Ruth and her daughter Crystal went to Albert's home and discovered that [Petitioner] was inside the home without Ruth's permission and had put a third lock on the door to keep other people out. When Ruth tried to remove the lock [Petitioner] opened the windows and started cussing at her and later "came out with a butcher knife and an ax." [Petitioner] said, "I'm going to 'F' you up, you know, this is my house." Ruth's daughter called the police but [Petitioner] left before they arrived. Ruth returned to Albert's home later that day and saw her son fighting with [Petitioner]. At that time [Petitioner] had the same ax or hatchet in his hand that Ruth had seen earlier.

Christopher testified that on the date of the offense he was in training to be a peace officer with the Dallas Sheriff's Department. When he finished his training for the day he checked his cell phone voice mail and retrieved a message from his sister about something going on at his grandmother's home. His sister "sounded panicked." Christopher went home to change out of his uniform and then went to his grandmother's home. When he arrived he saw a hand-made "no trespassing" sign and "a garden hose wrapped from the fence to the porch."Christopher got out of his car and attempted to remove the hose and sign. He saw [Petitioner], his uncle, between the home and the garage. Christopher asked [Petitioner] whatwas going on. In response, [Petitioner] picked up "a small hatchet or a small ax," walked towards Christopher, raised the hatchet, and said "get off my property." As Christopher tried to "talk him down," [Petitioner] swung the hatchet at him and the two men started fighting. According to Christopher, "the whole tussle was trying to get the hatchet out of [Petitioner's] hand." When [Petitioner] swung the hatchet it came so close to Christopher's head that he could hear the noise of it "whizzing past" his ear. Ruth pulled up and called the police. Christopher took the hatchet away from [Petitioner] and restrained him until the police arrived.

Officer Andrea Isom of the Dallas Police Department was the first officer to arrive at the scene after the police were called. When she arrived at the scene she spoke to Christopher and [Petitioner]. They each claimed that the other man was the aggressor. Officer Isom decided to arrest [Petitioner]. She explained,

Upon speaking to [Christopher], I was told that [Petitioner] had swung a hatchet at him, putting him in fear for his life, which is an aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, and they are family members as well. [Christopher] is the nephew of [Petitioner], and that's a family violence situation[.]

Officer Isom also identified State's Exhibit 13 as the hatchet that Christopher said [Petitioner] had used to attack him.

Defense Witnesses

Two eyewitnesses testified in [Petitioner]'s defense. Mobutu Hurd testified that she lives near [Petitioner]'s mother's home. On the day of the offense she heard Christopher's car come around the corner "fast." The car stopped suddenly in front of the house. Christopher jumped out and ran toward [Petitioner], who was holding "a machete or an ax." According to Hurd, Christopher "started punching on" [Petitioner], and [Petitioner] never punched back or swung the ax. During cross-examination she was asked whether [Petitioner] raised the ax up in the air or had it down at his side. She responded, "[H]onestly, when his nephew got out of the car, I watched the nephew. I can't remember if he had it up or down, and I don't want to say because I'm not for sure." Hurd did not talk to the police after they arrived.

Darrell Brooks also lived in the neighborhood and testified for the defense. He testified that he saw Christopher's car pull up "real quick likehe was doing a drug bust or something." Christopher got out and ran towards [Petitioner]. Christopher was "cussing and hollering, telling him he was going to die today." According to Brooks, Christopher slung [Petitioner] to the ground, put his right hand around [Petitioner]'s throat, and was choking him. Brooks and another man walked over to [Petitioner] and Christopher, and Brooks said, "[M]an, you're killing him." The other man pulled at Christopher and told him to leave [Petitioner] alone. Then Brooks walked away. During cross-examination Brooks acknowledged that he has been convicted of several offenses including murder, burglary, assault, and DWI.

Rebuttal Testimony

After [Petitioner] rested the State called Christopher as a rebuttal witness. He testified that no one approached him, spoke to him, or put hands on him while he was fighting with [Petitioner]. Christopher also testified that he did not punch [Petitioner] or touch his throat.

Mitchell, 2012 WL 1501110, at *1-*2.

Through his federal habeas application, timely filed on or about November 25, 2013, see Dkt. No. 3 at 9, Petitioner asserts that both his counsel at trial and on direct appeal rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance [Grounds 1 and 4], that the trial court erred by denying his request for a jury instruction on self-defense [Ground 2], and that the prosecutor failed to disclose exculpatory evidence "and used perjured documents and testimony at trial" [Ground 3], see Dkt. Nos. 3, 4, & 5.

Legal Standards

A federal court will not reach the merits of claims denied by the state court on state procedural grounds if the state-law grounds are independent of the federal claim and adequate to bar federal review. See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 338 (1992); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991), modified by Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315, 1316-19 (2012). But, if the state procedural determination is based onstate grounds that were inadequate to bar federal habeas review, or if the habeas petitioner shows than an exception to the bar applies, the federal court must resolve the claim without the deference that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (the "AEDPA"), 110 Stat. 1214, otherwise requires. See Woodfox v. Cain, 609 F.3d 774, 794 (5th Cir. 2010) (the AEDPA's deferential standard of review would not apply to a procedural decision of the state court); Miller v. Johnson, 200 F.3d 274, 281 n.4 (5th Cir. 2000) ("Review is de novo when there has been no clear adjudication on the merits." (citing Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409, 416 (5th Cir. 1997))); Mercadel v. Cain, 179 F.3d 271, 274-75 (5th Cir. 1999) ("the AEDPA deference scheme outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) does not apply" to claims not adjudicated on the merits by the state court).

But, where a state court has already rejected a claim on the merits, a federal court may grant habeas relief on that claim only if the state court adjudication:

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). A state court decision is "contrary" to clearly established federal law if "it relies on legal rules that directly conflict with prior holdings of the Supreme Court or if it reaches a different conclusion than the Supreme Court on materially indistinguishable facts." Busby v. Dretke, 359 F.3d 708, 713 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Lopez v. Smith, 135 S. Ct. 1, 2 (2014) (per curiam) ("We have emphasized, time andtime again, that the AEDPA, prohibits the federal courts of appeals from relying on their own precedent to conclude that a particular constitutional principle is 'clearly established.'" (citation omitted)).

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