Mohammed v. Jenner & Block, LLP

ABDUL MOHAMMED, Plaintiff, v. JENNER & BLOCK, LLP, et al., Defendants.

No. 21 cv 3261

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

March 2, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

SHARON JOHNSON COLEMAN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

On July 17, 2021, defendants, including Uber Technologies, Inc. Raiser, LLC, and employees of Uber (collectively “the Uber defendants”) and the law firm of Littler Mendelson, P.C. and some of its employees (collectively “the Littler Mendelson defendants”), removed this lawsuit from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Law Division. Pro se plaintiff Abdul Mohammed brings fifteen claims against the Uber and Littler Mendelson defendants, among others. The Court presumes familiarity with its February 28, 2022 rulings concerning the other defendants in this lawsuit. Before the Court is defendants' motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, the Court grants the present motion to dismiss in its entirety.

Background

Mohammed filed a federal court complaint against Uber and certain Uber employees, along with other defendants, on February 24, 2016 case number 16 C 2537, Mohammed v. Uber, et al., (“Mohammed I”). Mohammed had been a driver for Uber starting in October 2014 through June 2015. In Mohammed I, the Court granted defendants' motion to compel arbitration and final judgment was entered on September 1, 2021 in favor of Uber.

Construing his pro se allegations liberally, Harris v. United States, 13 F.4th 623, 627 (7th Cir. 2021), Mohammed alleges that he had an appointment with the law firm of Romanucci & Blandin, LLC on November 10, 2016. On that day, he went to the Romanucci firm's conference room at 321 North Clark Street in Chicago to meet with attorney Antonio Romanucci. While he was waiting in the conference room, a building security officer and Romanucci entered the room. The security officer informed Mohammed that he had an order from another tenant of 321 North Clark Street, the law firm of Littler Mendelson, to remove him from the building. The security officer then allegedly shoved Mohammed into the elevator to go to the ground floor of the building, pushed him towards the exit of the building, held him by his belt and threatened him. Thereafter, Mohammed called Antonio Romanucci, who informed him that the Littler Mendelson law firm would not allow Mohammed in the building. Prior to being escorted out of the building, Mohammed alleges that he overheard the security officer say someone at Littler Mendelson called him a criminal.

Mohammed alleges that Littler Mendelson and Uber knew he was in the building on November 10, 2016 because Uber tracks him through its Uber Rider and Driver Apps that he had installed on his phone when he drove for Uber. Mohammed asserts that the November 2016 incident was in retaliation for bringing his earlier lawsuit Mohammed I, in which Littler Mendelson represented Uber.

Mohammed is a frequent litigant having filed over twenty lawsuits in the Northern District of Illinois, along with numerous state court cases. Due to his frequent, often frivolous lawsuits Mohammed is subject to filing bars in different courts, including the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, and Illinois state courts and agencies. See Mohammed v. Naperville Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. #203, No. 19 C 6525, 2021 WL 1253452, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 5, 2021) (Feinerman, J) (listing cases). As relevant here, the Northern District of Illinois Executive Committee has ordered that all of Mohammed's lawsuits must be reviewed before going forward. After reviewing this case, the Executive Committee allowed this lawsuit to go forward on September 16, 2021.

Legal Standard

A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim tests the sufficiency of the complaint, not its merits. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 529, 131 S.Ct. 1289, 179 L.Ed.2d 233 (2011). When considering dismissal of a complaint, the Court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (per curiam). To survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiff must “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). “[A] motion to dismiss based on failure to comply with the statute of limitations should be granted only where the allegations of the complaint itself set forth everything necessary to satisfy the affirmative defense.” Vergara v. City of Chicago, 939 F.3d 882, 886 (7th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court may consider “documents attached to the complaint, documents that are critical to the complaint and referred to in it, and information that is subject to proper judicial notice.” O'Brien v. Village of Lincolnshire, 955 F.3d 616, 621 (7th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).

Discussion

In Count I of his pro se complaint, Mohammed alleges an assault and battery claim sounding in tort. Under Illinois law, a plaintiff must bring a claim for assault and battery within two years of the injury. See 735 ILCS 5/13-202; Lynam v. Foot First Podiatry Ctr., P.C. 919 F.Supp. 1141, 1149 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (Castillo, J.). As such, Mohammed's assault and battery claim is time-barred because he filed this lawsuit over four years after the November 2016 incident.

Nevertheless, Mohammed argues that defendants fraudulently concealed this cause of action, and thus a five-year limitations period applies under 735 ILCS 5/13-215. This argument is without merit because an assault and battery claim accrues on the day the injury occurred. See Slabon v. Sanchez, No. 15 C 8965, 2021 WL 4146909, at *20 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13, 2021) (Seeger, J.). Here, Mohammed was well aware that he was allegedly assaulted and battered on November 10, 2016. See Greenhill v. Vartanian, 917 F.3d 984, 988 (7th Cir. 2019) (“Illinois starts the period of limitations no later than actual discovery, even if the potential defendant tried unsuccessfully to conceal the offense.”). His claim in Count I is thus time-barred.

Next, Illinois' aggravated assault and battery statutes are criminal statutes without a private cause of action, therefore, the claims alleged in Count II are untenable because only the government can bring criminal charges. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 64, 106 S.Ct. 1697, 90 L.Ed.2d 48 (1986) (“a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution” of another). In fact, Mohammed voluntarily dismisses Count II.

Similarly, in Count III, Mohammed brings a stalking and aggravated stalking claim under the Illinois Criminal Code, 720 ILCS 5/12-7.3, 5/12-7.4, which criminalize a wide range of conduct. Mohammed cannot bring a civil action for stalking and aggravated stalking because these are criminal statutes that do not authorize a civil right of action. See Ellison v. Minnear, No. 08 C 3247, 2008 WL 11432100, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 7, 2008) (Leinenweber, J.). In his response brief, Mohammed voluntarily dismisses this claim against defendants.

In Count IV, Mohammed asserts a claim under the Illinois Hate Crime Act (“IHCA”), which allows for a civil right of action independent of any criminal prosecution. See 720 ILCS 5/12-7.1(c). Although the IHCA does not specifically state a statutory period of limitation, courts have applied the two-year limitations period for Illinois personal injury lawsuits. See Nihiser v. Lutz, 15 CV 2102, 2017 WL 5759979, at *4 (C.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2017) (Bruce, J); Caudle v. Illinois, No. 18 CV 50230, 2019 WL 1522641, at *5 n.9 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 5, 2019) (Johnston, J.); Smith v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, No. 94 CV 6850, 1995 WL 781463, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 1995) (Holderman, J.). Mohammed was aware that he was removed from the building on November 10, 2016 through the alleged assault and battery of the security guard. His IHCA claim is therefore untimely. See Hobley v. Burge, No. 03 C 3678, 2004 WL 1243929, at *8 (N.D. Ill. June 3, 2004) (Aspen, J.); Gudino v. Town of Cicero, No. 02 C 6248, 2003 WL 260707, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 29, 2003) (Grady, J.).

Next, in Count V, Mohammed alleges a claim under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) based on Uber allegedly tracking him through its apps on his iPhone. “The CFAA, 18 U.S.C. § 1030, is primarily a criminal anti-hacking statute, ” however, “§ 1030(g) provides a civil remedy for any person who suffers damage or loss due to a violation of § 1030.” Fidlar Tech. v. LPS Real Estate Data Sol., Inc., 810 F.3d 1075, 1079 (7th Cir. 2016). The CFFA prohibits any person from “knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer without authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by means of such conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of value.” 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(4). And, § 1030(g) of the CFFA clearly states that “[n]o action may be brought under this subsection unless such action is begun within 2 years of the date of the act complained of or the date of the discovery of the damage.”

Mohammed's response brief indicates that he knew Uber was following him by intercepting, accessing, monitoring and/or transmitting electronic communication by February 9, 2018, therefore he had until February 9, 2020 to file this claim. It is untimely because he brought this action in January 2021. The Court grants defendants' motion to dismiss Count V.

Likewise Mohammed contends that defendants violated the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”) in Count VI. “The SCA provides a private cause of...