Mohan v. State

BRANDON MOHAN v. STATE OF MARYLAND

No. 1853-2021

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

November 30, 2022

Circuit Court for Wicomico County Case No. C-22-CR-20-000497

Berger, Friedman, Harrell, Glenn T., Jr. (Senior Judge Specially Assigned), JJ.

MAJORITY OPINION

Berger, J. Appellant, Brandon Mohan, was charged in the Circuit Court for Wicomico County with child sexual abuse, two counts of third-degree sex offense, two counts of fourthdegree sex offense, and two counts of second-degree assault. The State charged Mohan with committing sexual abuse of a minor, specifically as a "parent." The jury convicted Mohan of child sexual abuse, one count of third-degree sex offense, one count of fourthdegree sex offense, and one count of second-degree assault. The circuit court sentenced Mohan to twenty-five years' incarceration for the child sexual abuse offense, and ten years consecutive for the third-degree sex offense, but the court suspended the sentence for third-degree sex offense in favor of a five-year period of probation and lifetime registration as a sex offender.

Mohan presents two questions for our review,^[1] which we have rephrased, for clarity, as follows:

I. Whether the circuit court erred in concluding Mohan was a "parent" under CR § 3-602(b)(1).

II. Whether the circuit court erred in admitting certain witness testimony as prior consistent statements.

For the reasons explained herein, we shall hold the circuit court erred in concluding Mohan was a "parent" as contemplated by Md. Code (2002, 2021 Repl. Vol.), § 3-602(b)(1) of the Criminal Law Article ("CR") (hereinafter also referred to as "the criminal statute"). We shall further hold the circuit court did not err in admitting certain witness testimony.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The underlying facts of Mohan's convictions are not in dispute. Accordingly, we address only those facts essential to our review. Furthermore, to protect the privacy of the witnesses and the victim, certain individuals will only be identified by first name or initial.

In 2016, Mohan began a relationship with Haley. At the onset of their relationship, Haley was -- and still is -- the mother to a one-and-a-half-year-old girl, hereinafter referred to as "C." Mohan and Haley were later married in 2017, and then proceeded to live together -- along with C -- in a mobile home in Salisbury, Maryland from 2018 to 2020.

In August 2020, C disclosed to Haley that, on two separate occasions, Mohan put his penis on her vagina and/or told her to touch his penis. According to Haley's testimony at trial, Mohan denied these incidents occurred when she confronted him. Haley further testified that C refuted Mohan's denial. Haley further testified that Mohan ultimately admitted to touching C with his penis and/or having C touch his penis.

The State charged Mohan with various sex abuse offenses including a charge for the sexual abuse of a minor under CR § 3-602(b)(1). The Statement of Charges filed on August 30, 2020, and the Criminal Information filed on October 21, 2020, provided in relevant part:

STATEMENT OF CHARGES

UPON THE FACTS CONTAINED IN APPLICATION OF Officer: SCHULTZ, DET IT IS FORMALLY CHARGED

THAT MOHAN, BRANDON LEE at the dates, times and locations specified below:

006 10322 CR 3 602 ((b)(1)) 25Y

. . . did cause sexual abuse to JUVENILE FEMALE, a minor, the defendant being said child's parent. ***

Count 1

THAT BRANDON LEE MOHAN, between the 1st day of June, 2020 and the 30th day of August, 2020, in Wicomico County, State of Maryland, did cause sexual abuse to [C], [a] minor, the defendant being said child's parent . . . CR:3:602 (b)(1).

In both the Statement of Charges and the Criminal Information, the State specified that Mohan committed the alleged child sexual abuse as a "parent" of C.^[2] At the close of the State's case -- with respect to Count 1 for child sexual abuse -- Mohan moved for judgment of acquittal. Mohan argued there was insufficient evidence to convict him as a "parent" of C, and further, he was not a "parent" under the criminal statute because he was neither C's biological nor adoptive parent.

The trial judge denied Mohan's motion and held he was a "parent" under the criminal statute. Specifically, the circuit court judge found Mohan was a "parent" under CR § 3-602(b)(1) because: (1) he was married to C's mother at the time of the alleged abuse and acted as a "live-in" step-parent; (2) he was a de facto parent; and (3) he stood in loco parentis to C. After Mohan testified and the State presented its rebuttal, Mohan renewed his motion for acquittal. The circuit court denied Mohan's motion, finding there was sufficient evidence to convict him as a "parent" under CR § 3-602(b)(1).

Before submitting the case to the jury, the circuit court judge instructed that to find Mohan guilty of child sexual abuse, the State must prove: (1) that Mohan sexually abused C by sexual offense or sexual exploitation; (2) at the time of the abuse C was under 18 years of age; and (3) at the time of the abuse Mohan was a parent of C. The jury convicted Mohan of child sexual abuse, one count of third-degree sex offense, one count of fourthdegree sex offense, and one count of second-degree assault. The trial judge sentenced Mohan to twenty-five years' incarceration for the child sexual abuse offense, and ten years consecutive for the third-degree sex offense. The trial court fully suspended the sentence for the third-degree sex offense in favor of a five-year period of probation and lifetime registration as a sex offender. Mohan's convictions for fourth-degree sexual offense and second-degree assault merged for sentencing with his conviction for third-degree sexual offense. This timely appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a criminal conviction we must determine "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Our review is made without deference to the legal reasoning of the trial judge, and instead, we will defer to the finder of fact and to "any reasonable inferences a jury could have drawn in reaching its verdict." Purnell v. State, 250 Md.App. 703, 711 (2021); Lindsey v. State, 235 Md.App. 299, 311 (2018).

Mohan argues there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for child sexual abuse. Mohan further maintains that the circuit court erred in its interpretation of the term "parent" under CR § 3-602(b)(1). The critical question before us is whether the circuit court erred in concluding that Mohan was a "parent" under the criminal statute. Indeed, whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain Mohan's conviction is secondary to the initial question of whether the circuit court properly concluded that the General Assembly intended the term "parent" to apply to an individual such as Mohan who is a step-parent with parental responsibilities. Because we must first determine whether the circuit court correctly interpreted CR § 3-602(b)(1), our review is de novo. Richardson v. Boozer, 209 Md.App. 1, 9 (2012) ("A question regarding statutory interpretation is a legal question, which we review de novo.").

I. The circuit court erred in concluding Mohan was a "parent" under CR § 3-602(b)(1).

The goal of statutory interpretation "is to ascertain and effectuate the real and actual intent of the Legislature." Lockshin v. Semsker, 412 Md. 257, 274 (2010). Statutory interpretation begins with the plain language. Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 387 (2003). If the plain language of the statute is unambiguous, our inquiry ends, and the statute is applied as written. Lockshin, supra, 412 Md. at 275. When the language is ambiguous, however, we must look further to grasp the legislative intent, and will turn to other indicia "including the relevant statute's legislative history, the context of the statute within the broader legislative scheme, and the relative rationality of competing constructions." Harrison-Solomon v. State, 442 Md. 254, 265-66 (2015). We do not read the statutory provision in isolation, but rather, the statute "must be viewed within the context of the statutory scheme to which it belongs, considering the purpose, aim, or policy of the Legislature in enacting the statute." Lockshin, supra, 412 Md. at 276. Furthermore, we will not attempt to clarify a statute with "forced or subtle interpretations" that would either limit or extend the statute's application. Id. at 275.

We presume the General Assembly "intend[ed] its enactments to operate together as a consistent and harmonious body of law, and, thus, we seek to reconcile and harmonize the parts of a statute, to the extent possible consistent with the statute's object and scope." Id. at 276. Further, "[w]e interpret statutes to give every word effect, avoiding constructions that render any portion of the language superfluous or redundant." Blondell v. Balt. City Police Dep't, 341 Md. 680, 691 (1996). Indeed, in all cases concerning statutory interpretation, we seek "a reasonable interpretation -- one that is consonant with logic and common sense." Twigg v. State, 447 Md. 1, 24 (2016).

Our interpretation of the criminal statute is focused on the meaning of the word "parent" as used in CR § 3-602(b)(1). This is because the State -- rather than charging Mohan generally under the statute -- charged and tried Mohan specifically and only as a "parent" of C. The circuit court determined Mohan was a "parent" as contemplated by the criminal statute because he was: (1) a "live-in" step-parent; and (2) a de facto parent; and (3) he stood in loco...