Molina v. DSI Renal, Inc.

840 F.Supp.2d 984

Maria MOLINA, Plaintiff,

v.DSI RENAL, INC., Defendant.

No. EP–11–CA–28–FM.

United States District Court,

W.D. Texas,

El Paso Division.

Jan. 4, 2012.

John A. Wenke, Attorney at Law, El Paso, TX, for Plaintiff.

Courtney M. Smith, Michael W. Fox, Ogletree Deakins Nash Smoak & Stewart PC, Austin, TX, for Defendant.

REVISED ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT¹

FRANK MONTALVO, District Judge.

On this day, the court considered Defendant DSI Renal, Inc.'s (“DSI”) “Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment” (“Motion for Summary Judgment”) [ECF No. 16], filed September 19, 2011; Plaintiff Maria Molina's (“Molina”) “Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment” (“Response”) [ECF No. 17], filed October 3, 2011; and “Defendant's Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment” (“Reply”) [ECF No. 18], filed October 17, 2011. After considering the parties' arguments, the applicable law, and the Record as a whole, the court will grant in part and deny in part DSI's Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. BACKGROUNDA. Procedural History

Molina filed her “Plaintiff's Original Petition” (“Petition”) in state court on November 19,2010.² Molina's Petition alleges claims against DSI under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (“TCHRA”). Specifically, Molina brings claims (1) that DSI failed to provide her with a reasonable accommodation when the company prohibited her from working with medical restrictions; (2) that the company failed to provide her with a reasonable accommodation when it denied her additional medical leave; (3) that Molina's disability was a motivating factor in DSI's decision to terminate her; and (4) that DSI retaliated against Molina based on her EEO activity. On January 19, 2011, DSI removed the case to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction.³ DSI denies each of Molina's claims and now moves for summary judgment on all of her claims.

B. Factual Background

Except where noted, the following facts are undisputed.

Molina is a certified medical assistant.⁴ On or around April 2003, she began working at a dialysis clinic (“Clinic”) in El Paso, Texas.⁵ Jaime Loya (“Loya”) was the manager of the Clinic ⁶ and Molina's supervisor.⁷ Molina performed well at her job with only one patient complaint during her entire tenure at the Clinic.⁸ In 2004 Molina began suffering from back pain, as well as head pain and tingling in her legs. ⁹The pain varied in frequency and severity.¹⁰ In 2005, Molina's doctor issued medical restrictions limiting her work hours and also restricting her from lifting over 20 pounds.¹¹ This restriction lasted at least two months.¹² Molina suffered a back injury in February 2006 and was restricted to working every other day and not lifting over 10 pounds.¹³ On both occasions, Loya accommodated Molina's restrictions and allowed her to continue working.¹⁴

DSI acquired the Clinic in April 2006.¹⁵ When DSI took over, all the employees, including Molina and Loya, retained their positions, and Molina's job duties did not change.¹⁶ Molina worked 15 hour shifts and was generally scheduled to work on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays.¹⁷

In September 2006 Molina's doctor again restricted her from lifting over 15 pounds due to her back injury.¹⁸ This restriction lasted several months, and again Loya accommodated Molina and allowed her to continue working. ¹⁹ In May 2009, Molina had surgery on her kidneys and she was again restricted from working more than six hours a day and lifting over 20 pounds. ²⁰ Loya was notified of these restrictions and allowed her to continue working.²¹ In September 2009, Molina's back problems worsened. ²² She was referred to a specialist, who assessed her as having lumbago, lumbar internal disc derangement, and lumbar radiculopathy. ²³ Molina's received an epidural injection on October 29, 2009. ²⁴

After this procedure, Molina returned to work on November 2, 2009. ²⁵ At that time she provided Loya with a note from her doctor stating she was restricted from lifting more than 20 pounds and from extreme bending at the waist.²⁶ Molina also requested she be scheduled part time, and specifically that she be scheduled only on Mondays and Wednesdays.²⁷ Molina did not want to work on Fridays because she wanted to be available in case she needed additional epidural injections, which her doctor performed on Fridays.²⁸ Molina continued working with her lifting restriction, and Loya initially accommodated her scheduling request.²⁹ In December and January, however, he began to schedule her on days other than Mondays and Wednesdays.³⁰

At some point, higher-level management at DSI learned that Loya was allowing Molina to work with medical restrictions.³¹ In mid-January 2010, Molina was called in to attend a conference call with Loya and Loya's supervisor, Sylvia Spencer (“Spencer”), DSI's Assistant Regional Vice President–Southwest Region.³² During this conference, Spencer told Molina DSI was placing her on FMLA leave until she could return to work without her lifting restrictions.³³ While she was on leave, Molina stayed in touch with DSI's human resource office and updated it on her medical condition. ³⁴ On January 13, 2010 Molina faxed a letter to DSI Human Resource Officer Melissa Monnin (“Monnin”) objecting to being placed on forced medical leave because she was still able to perform her job duties.³⁵ In the letter, Molina explained she had previously been permitted to work with the same, or greater, restrictions, and expressed that she believed she was placed on medical leave as punishment for previously contacting HR.³⁶ Finally, Molina asked Monnin to investigate the situation and asked that she be permitted to return to work as soon as possible.³⁷

Molina filed an EEOC charge on February 25, 2010.³⁸ On April 15, 2010, DSI sent Molina a letter notifying her that her FMLA leave had expired on April 2, 2010, and as she was not eligible for any other leave and could not return to work, her employment was terminated on April 3, 2010.³⁹

Molina subsequently underwent surgery in May to replace two discs in her back. ⁴⁰ After recovering from surgery, on June 15, 2010 her doctor cleared her to return to work without restrictions.⁴¹

C. Parties' Arguments

DSI contends summary judgment on Molina's claims for disability discrimination is warranted, because Molina cannot establish she is a qualified individual with a disability. DSI further argues it had no duty to accommodate Molina because she never requested an accommodation, and even if she had, no reasonable accommodation existed to allow her to work with her medical restrictions. DSI contends Molina is unable to establish that DSI terminated her because of her disability and in retaliation for her EEO activity, because the company had a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its action. Specifically, DSI asserts it terminated Molina because of her inability to return to work without medical restrictions after her FMLA leave expired. DSI maintains Molina cannot establish that the company's reason is pretextual.

Molina argues she can establish that she is disabled based on evidence that she was substantially limited in the major life activities of lifting, standing, sitting, and sleeping. She also contends she is qualified for her position because there is evidence that her medical restrictions on lifting did not prevent her from performing any essential functions of her position. In regard to her accommodation claims, Molina argues she did request an accommodation from DSI and DSI could have accommodated her lifting restriction by providing her with assistance in lifting. She contends the evidence establishes that her termination was motivated by her disability, because DSI admitted she was terminated when she could not return to work without medical restrictions, and there is evidence the company had a policy of refusing to accommodate any disability. Finally, Molina argues there is genuine issue of material fact as to whether her termination was retaliatory, based on the temporal proximity between her EEO activity and her termination, and evidence a similarly situated coworker was treated differently.

II. APPLICABLE LAWA. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment should be granted only where “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” ⁴² “A genuine issue of material fact exists when there is evidence sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party.” ⁴³ The substantive law defines whether disputed facts are material.⁴⁴ The party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings and any discovery on record, including any affidavits, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.⁴⁵ The court will “view all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party” ⁴⁶ and draw all factual inferences in the nonmovant's favor.⁴⁷ If the moving party cannot demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, summary judgment is inappropriate.⁴⁸

If the movant does meet this burden, however, the nonmovant must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” ⁴⁹ Accordingly, the “burden is not satisfied with some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence.” ⁵⁰ “[T]he nonmovant may not rely on mere allegations in the pleadings; rather, the nonmovant must respond to the motion for summary judgment by setting forth particular facts indicating that there is a genuine issue for trial.” ⁵¹ The court does not, “in the absence of any proof, assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts.” ⁵² “If the...