Molinary-Fernández v. BMW of N. Am., LLC

LUIS MOLINARY-FERNÁNDEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, LLC, Defendant.

CIVIL NO. 184538 (JAG)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

March 31, 2021

OPINION AND ORDER

GARCIA-GREGORY, D.J.

Plaintiffs Luis Molinary-Fernández ("Molinary") and Aileen Cabrera-Vinolo ("Cabrera"), by themselves and on behalf of their conjugal partnership, as well as Luis Molinary-Jiménez (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), brought suit against BMW of North America, LLC ("Defendant") for an alleged product liability tort, seeking to recover physical and emotional damages under Article 1802 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31 § 5141. Docket No. 1.¹

On October 10, 2019, Defendant moved for summary judgment arguing that Plaintiffs cannot establish proof of a product defect that led to the alleged damages because they failed to designate a liability expert as witness, nor establish the existence of any genuine issue of material fact that would preclude summary judgment. Docket No. 24 at 3-4. Plaintiffs opposed the motion, asserting that Defendant's theory of applicable law is erroneous and that there are genuine issues of material fact. Docket No. 27. Defendant replied. Docket No. 31. After considering the Parties'positions and applicable law, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE Plaintiffs' claims.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment will be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is in genuine dispute if it could be resolved in favor of either party, and it is material if it potentially affects the outcome of the case. Calero-Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 19 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-50 (1986)).

The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of showing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). "Once the moving party has properly supported [its] motion for summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party . . . ." Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 52 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting DeNovellis v. Shalala, 124 F.3d 298, 306 (1st Cir. 1997)). The non-movant must demonstrate "through submissions of evidentiary quality [] that a trial worthy issue persists." Iverson v. City of Bos., 452 F.3d 94, 98 (1st Cir. 2006) (internal citations omitted).

In evaluating a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the entire record "in the light most hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging in all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Winslow v. Aroostook Cty., 736 F.3d 23, 29 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Suarez v. Pueblo Int'l, Inc., 229 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 2000)). The court may safely ignore "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation." Medina-Rivera v. MVM, Inc., 713 F.3d 132, 134 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir. 1990)). Throughout this process, courts cannot make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence, as these are jury functions and not those of a judge. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255; Garcia-Gonzalez v. Puig-Morales, 761 F.3d 81, 99 (1st Cir. 2014) (internal citations omitted).

FINDINGS OF FACT

The following factual findings are taken from the Parties' statements of uncontested facts and supporting documentation. In accordance with Local Rule 56(e), the Court only credits facts properly supported by accurate record citations. The Court has disregarded all argumentative and conclusory allegations, speculations, and improbable inferences disguised as facts. See Forestier Fradera v. Mun. of Mayaguez, 440 F.3d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 2006); Medina-Munoz, 896 F.2d at 8.

1. On September 11, 2017, shortly after arriving home in her 2016 BMW X5 Hybrid vehicle, Cabrera noticed a fire in the garage of her and her spouse's residence. Docket Nos. 24-2 at 1; 28 at 1, 3.

2. Cabrera had left the vehicle—bought roughly a year before and had low mileage—charging through an extension cord connected to an electrical outlet in the wall of the garage. Docket Nos. 24-2 at 1-2; 28 at 1.

3. The extension cord was at least ten months old and was previously utilized to charge house electronics. It also had a tightened zip tie around it and was coiled up in an area containing shelves, boxes, and other articles. Docket Nos. 27-3 at 6-8; 31-1 at 4-5; 31-3 at 15.

4. This was the first time since at least September 6, 2017 that the vehicle was charged. Id.

5. The vehicle had been working well, and Cabrera did not notice anything unusual when she used it earlier that day on September 11, 2017. Docket No. 28 at 3-4.

6. The electrical outlet used to charge the car did not arc, nor short circuit. Docket Nos. 28 at 4; 32 at 3.

7. The breakers in the main electrical panel of the house did not trip and were working well after the fire. Id.

8. According to the fire marshal who investigated the incident, determining the cause of the fire should be up to a "certified electrical mechanic and expert in hybrid vehicles." Docket Nos. 24-2 at 1; 28 at 1-2; see also Docket No. 24-4. Furthermore, the fire marshal determined that the incident was "accidental," meaning that it could have been caused either by "a problem or defect in the vehicle or by an involuntary human error in the use and handling of said vehicle." Docket No. 24-4 at 2.

9. The deadline for Plaintiffs to announce expert witnesses, and to produce expert reports and expert witnesses' disclosures, expired on June 28, 2019. Docket No. 20. Plaintiffs failed to designate any expert witness or submit any expert report on the vehicle. Docket Nos. 24-2 at 1; 28 at 1.

10. As noted by Defendant's mechanical engineer expert, Hernán Mercado-Corujo, the vehicle's owner manual cautions users not to "extend the supplied charging cable with external cables." Docket No. 31-3 at 15. Furthermore, the manual specifically warns that "[i]mproper use of the charging cable can [] lead to damage, for example cable fire. There is a risk of fire." Id.

11. Defendant's expert specifically ruled out the vehicle as the fire's place of "origin" and suggested that the utilization of a used extension cord, coiled around several objects, could have caused the incident. Id. at 13-14, 17

The Court's review of the record shows that the only contested fact relates to the fire's place of origin.² Nonetheless, considering the applicable law, infra, said fact is not material and does not preclude the Court from entering summary judgment. Even assuming without deciding that the fire originated in the vehicle's motor, the Court's conclusion remains the same.

ANALYSIS

I. Product Liability Under Article 1802

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant is strictly liable because its product suffered from either a manufacturing defect or a design defect. Docket No. 27 at 9. Plaintiffs further posit that, as to either form of defect, they may establish a prima facie case of product liability solely by presenting circumstantial evidence at trial. Id. at 1. The Court disagrees.

In general, "a manufacturer is strictly liable [] when an article he places on the market, [] proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being." Rivera Santana v. Superior Packaging Inc., 132 D.P.R. 115, 125-26 (1992) (cleaned up); Montero Saldaña v. Am. Motors Corp., 107 D.P.R. 452, 461 (1978) (citation omitted). To establish strict liability under Puerto Rico law, a plaintiff must prove that (1) the product had a defect that made it unsafe, and (2) the defect proximately caused the plaintiff's injury. See Rivera Santana, 132 D.P.R. at 126.

Plaintiffs have failed to present sufficient evidence to satisfy the first element of this test much less the second, given the complex nature of the product in this case. This stands true regardless of whether Plaintiffs claim a manufacturing defect or a design defect.³ As such, Plaintiffs are incorrect in arguing "it can be inferred by the nature of the incident that the damage occurred because of the defect in the product, although no proof is produced of the particular or specific causes of the injurious event." Docket No. 27 at 10.

A. Manufacturing Defect

When it comes to manufacturing defect claims, courts have recognized that a defective product is "one that differs from the manufacturer's intended result or from other ostensibly identical units of the same product line," i.e. it is a product in "substandard condition." Rivera Santana, 132 D.P.R. at 128-29 n.7 (citation omitted). The manufacturer is then responsible for the damages resulting from any deviations from the norm. See Montero Saldaña, 107 D.P.R. at 462. The manufacturer, however, is not an absolute insurer of the product's safety; thus, it will respond instrict liability only where the usage to which the product was put by the plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer. See Rivera Santana, 132 D.P.R. at 127; Pérez-Trujillo v. Volvo Car Corp., 137 F.3d 50, 53 (1st Cir. 1998).

Moreover, under Puerto Rico law, Plaintiffs must essentially prove four elements: (1) the vehicle (here, its electric operation, engine, or battery) had a "manufacturing defect" of which Plaintiffs were unaware, (2) the defect made the recharging system "unsafe," (3) the usage to which the vehicle was put by Plaintiffs was reasonably foreseeable by Defendant, and (4) the defect proximately caused the injury. Rivera Santana., 132 D.P.R. at 127 (citations omitted); see also Malave-Felix v. Volvo Car Corp., 946 F.2d 967, 971 (1st Cir. 1991). If a plaintiff offered sufficient proof of these four elements, Defendant would be strictly liable even though the vehicle and its components...