Mollica v. Cnty. of Sacramento

1

Lia D. Mollica, Plaintiff, v. County of Sacramento, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:19-cv-02017-KJM-DB

United States District Court, E.D. California

May 15, 2023

ORDER

Plaintiff Lia Mollica brings this action against Sacramento County and its employees for injuries she sustained while incarcerated in the County's jail. Defendants move for summary judgment on all of plaintiff's claims. For the reasons below the court grants the motion in part and denies the motion in part.

I. EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

Defendants object to plaintiff's evidence. Objs., ECF No. 85-3. Without providing any explanation, defendants make broad generalized objections on grounds of hearsay, lacking foundation, authentication or personal knowledge, and relevancy. See generally id. The court finds these objections lack merit.

As to relevancy, the court does not rely on irrelevant evidence when considering motions for summary judgment. The relevancy objections are redundant and thus are overruled. See Burch v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 433 F.Supp.2d 1110 1119 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (“[O]bjections to evidence on the ground that it is irrelevant, speculative, and/or argumentative, or that it constitutes an improper legal conclusion are all duplicative of the summary judgment standard itself.”).

The court also overrules the objections on the grounds of hearsay, lacking foundation, authentication or personal knowledge. Generally, the admissibility of evidence at summary judgment is governed by different rules and different motivations than at trial. At summary judgment, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 allows objections to evidence when “the material cited . . . cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2). As this language suggests, at summary judgment, the propriety of evidence depends not on its form, but on its content. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). Additionally, an objection's context is crucial. A party who opposes summary judgment can prevail by demonstrating “a question of fact remains for trial,” so courts commonly “treat[] the opposing party's papers more indulgently than the moving party's papers.” Burch, 433 F.Supp.2d at 1121 (quoting Lew v. Kona Hosp., 754 F.2d 1420, 1423 (9th Cir. 1985)). District courts have discretion “to be somewhat lenient” if the opposing party's evidence falls short of the “formalities of Rule 56.” Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty., Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1261 (9th Cir. 1993); see also Scharf v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 597 F.2d 1240, 1243 (9th Cir. 1979) (“[C]ourts generally are much more lenient with the affidavits of a party opposing a summary judgment motion.”). For example, on review of summary judgment, the Ninth Circuit has considered the hearsay contents of a diary whose substance could be admissible in another form at trial. See Fraser v. Goodale, 342 F.3d 1032, 1037 (9th Cir. 2003). Authenticity problems may also be excused if those problems could likely be cured. See, e.g., Welenco, Inc. v. Corbell, 126 F.Supp.3d 1154, 1163-64 (E.D. Cal. 2015).

The court finds the contents in the medical records, journal, emails and grievance forms may be admissible in another form at trial. For example, the contents may fall under hearsay exclusions and exceptions under Federal Rules of Evidence 801 and 803, including then-existing mental, emotional, or physical condition, opposing party statements, statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment, records of regularly conducted activity and recorded recollection. See, e.g., Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2), 803(3)-(6). These documents could also be properly authenticated at trial. See Fed.R.Evid. 901. Moreover, defendants have not given the court any specific reason to doubt the authenticity of the documents they challenge. See Objs.; see also Del Campo v. Am. Corrective Counseling Serv., Inc., 718 F.Supp.2d 1116, 1123 n.10 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“Since Defendants do not specify any reason to doubt the authenticity of documents that they themselves produced in discovery, the Court finds the documents properly authenticated under Fed.R.Evid. 901.”). Accordingly, defendants' objections are overruled.

II. MOTION TO STRIKE

Defendants move to strike plaintiff's Exhibits N, O and P for violating a discovery only Protective Order and potentially violating third parties' privacy rights. Mot. Strike at 3, ECF No. 85-3.^[1] Defendants also move to strike the declaration of Edward Marin for plaintiffs' failure to disclose during initial disclosures. Id. The court already has ordered plaintiff to file a redacted version of Exhibit O, see Mins. Mot. Hr'g, ECF No. 88; Ex. O, ECF No. 89, and has stricken Exhibits N and P from the record. See Order Strike, ECF No. 90; Min. Order, ECF No. 92. Additionally, the court does not rely on the Marin declaration in deciding this motion. See In re Clark, 662 Fed.Appx. 544, 548 n.3 (9th Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (denying party's request to strike declaration as moot because court did not rely on it). Accordingly, the motion to strike these documents is denied as moot.

III. BACKGROUND

The court finds the following facts are supported by the record and construes them in the light most favorable to plaintiff as required. On May 4, 2019, plaintiff was arrested for violating the terms and conditions of the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department's work release program. First Amended Complaint (FAC) ¶ 13, ECF No. 20; Defs.' Reply to Pl.'s Resp. to Statement of Undisp. Facts (SUF) ¶ 2, ECF No. 85-2; Defs.' Resp. to Pl.'s Statement of Disp. Facts (SDF) ¶ 1, ECF No. 85-1. On May 8, 2019, while plaintiff was incarcerated at Sacramento County Main Jail, plaintiff fell from her bunk and injured her foot. SUF ¶¶ 3-4; see Arrest Docs. at 8, Merin Decl. Ex. A, ECF No. 91; Medical Records at 59, Merin Decl. Ex. B. An orthopedic technician placed plaintiff in a splint and fitted her with crutches. Medical Records at 59. The next day, a radiologist x-rayed plaintiff's foot and a doctor who inspected the x-ray, documented “[p]robable calcaneal fracture,” and ordered “Orthopedic Surgery Consult.” Id. at 57. On May 13, 2019, plaintiff was transferred to the Rio Cosumnes Correctional Center (RCCC). SUF ¶ 5.

Between May 10 and May 15, plaintiff submitted various kites, or inmate message requests, and grievance forms noting her pain and requesting medical attention and accommodations. See generally Medical Records; Journal, Merin Decl. Ex. G; Grievance Forms, Merin Decl. Exs. H & I. She reported severe pain, discoloring in her foot, and increased swelling. See, e.g., Medical Records at 49, 55. Medical staff who treated plaintiff recorded she had a swollen and bruised foot, Medical Records at 49, and had “ortho surgery consult pending,” id. at 51. One doctor observed “significant swelling and diffuse dark ecchymosis^[2] throughout bottom of foot, and upward,” and noted there were “mult discussions with CM” to discuss whether to wait for referral to “ortho.” Id. at 46.

During this time, plaintiff requested an ADA (Americans with Disabilities Act) accessible shower.^[3] Id. at 54. A nurse recorded plaintiff “slipped and fell during shower” and needs “medical shower accommodation and Splint wrap due to safety reason[s].” Id. at 53. However, when plaintiff asked an officer to use the medical shower, the officer informed her she could use a shower chair in the regular shower instead. Journal at 191-92. Plaintiff also reported she fell “twice because [she had] been told to hurry up,” Grievance Forms at 238, and was disciplined for creating straps on her shower bag to help her carry her belongings, see id. at 239; Mollica Dep. 33:9-17, Merin Decl. Ex. F.^[4] While plaintiff was in the County's custody, defendant Tammy Morin was the medical director for Correctional Health Services for County Department of Health Services. SUF ¶ 1; Morin Dep. 11:11-16; 22:14-19.^[5] Her duties included organizing physician medical care for the inmate patient population. Morin Dep. 16:17-22. She was plaintiff's “authorizing provider,” SDF ¶ 48; Medical Records at 68, and in her deposition, Dr. Morin recollected signing an order for plaintiff “[t]o get a repair of the left calcaneal fracture.” Morin Dep. 28:15-29:7.

Defendant Nancy Gallagher, a nurse, was plaintiff's case manager. SUF ¶ 7; Medical Records at 91. Case managers help inmates obtain specialty care services. Morin Dep. 23:16-21, 24:9-23. As a case manager, Nurse Gallagher's duties included facilitating an appointment between plaintiff and an orthopedic specialist at San Joaquin General Hospital (SJGH). Gallagher Dep. 15:13-19.^[6] Sacramento County has a contract with SJGH to “use their clinics like orthopedics, and that's where all of [their] patients go.” Id. 37:3-6. The County does not have contracts with any other facility for orthopedic care. Id. 37:7-10. SJGH provides appointment dates and coordinates with the case manager to schedule appointments. Morin Dep. 41:7-18. In other words, the County cannot schedule patients for surgery unless SJGH provides appointments. Id. 41:14-18; see Gallagher Dep. 23:6-25. Although Nurse Gallagher was plaintiff's case manager, she never saw plaintiff. Gallagher Dep. 21:14-15. However, she was plaintiff's “signing provider,” Medical Records at 68, and knew “Ms. Mollica was sitting almost every single day in sick call or whatever and she was asking about [her medical treatment],” Gallagher Dep. 29:14-20.

On May 15, 2019, Dr. Morin and Nurse Gallagher authorized plaintiff to be seen by the Emergency Department at SJGH. See SUF ¶ 13, SDF ¶ 38; Medical Records at 44; Morin Dep. 30:1-6. At the hospital, plaintiff was x-rayed again and the radiologist observed an impression of a calcaneal fracture and soft tissue swelling. Medical Records at 73. A doctor...