Monclure v. Crane

Alexander P. Monclure v. Anne E. Crane

No. DBDCV186028651S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Danbury, Danbury

May 16, 2019

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Judge (with first initial, no space for Sullivan, Dorsey, and Walsh): Krumeich, Edward T., J.

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

Krumeich, J.

Plaintiff Alexander P. Monclure has moved for permission to redact certain allegations in the filed second amended complaint and to seal his unredacted complaint in this action that alleges he was defamed and the victim of tortious conduct by defendant Anne E. Crane. Plaintiff seeks to keep confidential certain accusations allegedly made against him by defendant relating to plaintiff’s character and conduct. Defendant has stated she does not object to the request. For the reasons stated below, the motion is denied.

Practice Book § 11-20A provides, in pertinent part:

"(a) Except as otherwise provided by law, there shall be a presumption that documents filed with the court shall be available to the public.

(b) Except as provided in this section and except as otherwise provided by law, including Section 13-5, the judicial authority shall not order that any files affidavits, documents, or other materials on file with the court or filed in connection with a court proceeding be sealed or their disclosure limited.

(c) Upon written motion of any party, or upon its own motion, the judicial authority may order that files affidavits, documents, or other materials on file or lodged with the court or in connection with a court proceeding be sealed or their disclosure limited only if the judicial authority concludes that such order is necessary to preserve an interest which is determined to override the public’s interest in viewing such materials. The judicial authority shall first consider reasonable alternatives to any such order and any such order shall be no broader than necessary to protect such overriding interest. An agreement of the parties to seal or limit the disclosure of documents on file with the court or filed in connection with a court proceeding shall not constitute a sufficient basis for the issuance of such an order."

In Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 292 Conn. 1, 34-35 (2009), the Supreme Court traced the history of the open courts policy at common law and observed: "This tradition of open trials made its way to colonial America and evolved into a presumption of public access to court proceedings and records that remains a fundamental part of our judicial system today ... The rationale underlying the presumption is straightforward: Public monitoring of the judicial process through open court proceedings and records enhances confidence in the judicial system by ensuring that justice is administered equitably and in accordance with established procedures ... ‘[T]he bright light cast upon the judicial process by public observation diminishes the possibilities for injustice, incompetence, perjury and fraud. Furthermore, the very openness of the process should provide the public with a more complete understanding of the judicial system and a better perception of its fairness.’ " (Citations omitted.)

Under our law a complaint filed with the clerk is a "judicial document" to which the open-courts policy applies: "[t]he vindication of this interest supports public access, not only to the proceedings themselves, but to any materials upon which a court may rely in reaching a decision. Accordingly, we hold that judicial documents are those filed with a court upon which the court reasonably could rely in the performance of its adjudicatory function, including discovery related motions and their associated exhibits." Rosado, 292 Conn. at 47-48. "While in the court’s possession, judicial documents remain part of the court’s records and are subject to the presumption of public access pursuant to Practice Book § 11-20A(a)." Id. at 54.

The presumption is not irrebutable and may be overcome "if the judicial authority concludes that such order is necessary to preserve an interest which is determined to override the public’s interest in viewing such materials." P.B. § 11-20A(c). In Doe v. Rackliffe, 173 Conn.App. 389 397 (2017), a decision concerning a party’s application to proceed anonymously, the Appellate Court discussed the showing needed to overcome the presumption in favor of disclosure: " ‘The question the court first must address when considering such an application is whether, given the presumption of openness in all judicial proceedings, the [party] has a substantial privacy right which outweighs the customary ... presumption of openness in judicial proceedings ... Furthermore, not all substantial privacy interests are sufficient to outweigh the public’s interest in open judicial proceedings. The ultimate test for permitting a [party] to proceed anonymously is whether the [party] has a substantial privacy right which outweighs the customary and constitutionally-embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings ... A [party’s] desire to avoid economic and social harm as well as embarrassment and humiliation in his professional and social community is normally insufficient to permit him to appear without disclosing his identity ... The most compelling...