Monitoring the Youth: The Collision of Rights and Rehabilitation

Monitoring Youth: The Collision of Rights and Rehabilitation Kate Weisburd ABSTRACT: A monumental shift in juvenile justice is underway, inspired by the wide recognition that incarceration is not the solution to youth crime In its place, “electronic monitoring” has gained widespread support as a new form of judicial control over youth offenders. Supporters herald it as “jail-togo”: a cost-efficient alternative to incarceration that allows youth to be home while furthering rehabilitative and deterrent goals. But despite electronic monitoring’s intuitive appeal, virtually no empirical evidence suggests its effectiveness. Instead, given the realities of adolescent development, electronic monitoring may lead to more harm than good. This Article is the first to examine the routine, and troubling, use of electronic monitoring in juvenile courts. After describing the realities of the practice and its proffered justifications, this Article refutes three key misperceptions about the practice: (1) that it lowers incarceration rates because it is used only on youth who would otherwise be detained; (2) that it effectively rehabilitates youth; and (3) that it is cost-effective. Yet because of the deference afforded to judges in crafting terms of probation and pretrial release, the rehabilitative rhetoric of juvenile court, and the perception of electronic monitoring as non-punitive, electronic monitoring is subject to virtually no judicial oversight or scrutiny. The result is that the practice exists in a legal and policy netherworld: wielded and expanded with almost no limits. This Article concludes by arguing that electronic monitoring should be categorized as a form of punishment, warranting a new doctrinal framework that more rigorously evaluates and circumscribes monitoring and other forms of non-carceral control. Until that happens, electronic monitoring  Director & Clinical Instructor, Youth Defender Clinic, East Bay Community Law Center, UC Berkeley School of Law. I am grateful for helpful conversations, support, and comments from: Ty Alper, Easha Anand, Laurel Arroyo, Rosa Bay, Richard Braucher, Tony Cheng, Cameron Clark, Catherine Crump, Fanna Gamal, Michael Harris, Cory Isaacson, Hannah McElhinny, Sarafina Midzik, Saira Mohamed, Andrea Roth, Jonathan Simon, Jeff Selbin, Ned Smock, JiSeon Song, and Tirien Steinbach. I am also grateful to Randy Hertz and the participants of the Clinical Law Review Writers’ Workshop at NYU Law School: Samantha Buckingham, Eve Hanan, Nicole Smith, and Michael Pinard. Special and sincere thanks to the editors of the Iowa Law Review. 297 298 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:297 risks making worse the exact problem it seeks to address, namely, to rehabilitate youth. I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 299 II. ELECTRONIC MONITORING AS THE NEW NORMAL........................ 306 A. THE HISTORY AND USE OF ELECTRONIC MONITORING IN JUVENILE COURT.................................................................................... 306 B. PROFFERED POLICY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ELECTRONIC MONITORING IN JUVENILE COURT ................................................................. 308 C. PROFFERED LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR ELECTRONIC MONITORING IN JUVENILE COURT ................................................................. 312 1. The Vast Discretion of Juvenile Courts to Impose Conditions of Release and Probation .......................... 312 2. The Constitutional Leeway Given to Juvenile Courts Acting as “Parens Patriae” .............................................. 314 III. ELECTRONIC MONITORING: AN EMPTY PROMISE? ........................ 317 A. ELECTRONIC MONITORING AND INCARCERATION RATES............ 317 B. ELECTRONIC MONITORING AND YOUTH OFFENDERS .................. 323 1. The Adolescent Brain on Electronic Monitoring ....... 324 2. The Rehabilitative and Deterrent Effects of Electronic Monitoring with Youth.................................................. 327 C. THE ECONOMICS OF ELECTRONIC MONITORING ........................ 332 IV. BEYOND ELECTRONIC MONITORING ............................................. 334 A. REEXAMINING THE USE OF ELECTRONIC MONITORING .............. 334 B. REFRAMING ELECTRONIC MONITORING AS PUNISHMENT........... 336 C. THE NEED FOR A NEW JUVENILE RIGHTS FRAMEWORK ............... 339 V. CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 340 2015] MONITORING YOUTH I. 299 INTRODUCTION R.V.’s story is a typical one in American juvenile justice: when he was 16, he admitted to vandalism and receiving stolen property—a stereo taken from a local high school. R.V. was placed on probation. One month later, R.V. violated his probation when he left home overnight. He was sentenced to 22 days of detention, followed by 90 days on an electronic ankle monitor. Referring to the ankle monitor, the juvenile court judge told him that the monitoring did him “a favor because it’s going to be a reminder to you that every moment that you are out . . . you have this device on you that it keeps track of you.”1 R.V. could be any young person charged with a crime. Although spared physical detention, youth on electronic monitoring are in jails without walls. They are often on house arrest, unable to leave even when living space may be tight and family tensions run high. Unauthorized movement or the failure to properly charge the device results in youth cycling in and out of juvenile hall for minor monitoring violations. Every day, American juvenile court judges order youths like R.V. to wear electronic ankle monitors—small devices that rely on the Global Positioning System (“GPS”) to monitor people’s movements. The monitors maintain records of the devices’ movements “moment-by-moment for days, weeks, or even years.”2 Every state except New Hampshire has some form of electronic monitoring for juvenile defendants.3 In Los Angeles County, for example, 1. In re R.V., 89 Cal. Rptr. 3d 702, 706 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009). 2. United States v. Berry, 300 F. Supp. 2d 366, 368 (D. Md. 2004). 3. See ALA. CODE § 12-15-209 (2012); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-352; ARK. CODE ANN. § 1617-133 (2014); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1960 (West Supp. 2015); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-307 (2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-141a (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4121 (2007); FLA. STAT. § 985.27 (2013); IDAHO CODE § 20-219 (Supp. 2015); 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/5-7A-120 (2014); IND. CODE § 31-37-6-6 (West 2008 & Supp. 2014); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 441-151.33(232) (2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-2330 (Supp. 2014); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.020 (West Supp. 2014); LA. STAT. ANN. 46:2600 (2010); 03-201-12 ME. CODE R. § 15.4 VI (LexisNexis 2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 780.798 (2012 & Supp. 2015); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 43-21-605 (Supp. 2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-1001 (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-288 (2008); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:92-5.4 (Supp. 2011); N.M. CODE R. § 8.14.2.10 (LexisNexis 2009); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 320.5(3)(c) (McKinney Supp. 2015); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7B-2510 (West 2004 & Supp. 2014); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 12-67-02 (2012); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2152.19(A)(4)(k) (LexisNexis 2011 & Supp. 2015); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 57, § 510.9 (2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 169.078 (2013); 37 PA. CODE § 200.3 (2007); 14-1 R.I. CODE R. § 800.0036 (LexisNexis 2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-3-540 (2007 & Supp. 2014); 6 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 35-150-355 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 13.40.020(10) (2014); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-1-206 (LexisNexis Supp. 2015); WIS. STAT. § 302.425 (2013–14); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-309 (2015); MINN. R. JUV. DEL. P. 5.02; see also In re Ryan S., 797 A.2d 39, 54 (Md. 2002); Commonwealth v. Hector H., 865 N.E.2d 1178, 1180 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007); In re J.O., 247 S.W.3d 422, 423–25 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008); ALASKA JUVENILE JUSTICE ADVISORY COMM., 1998 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (1998), http://dhss.alaska.gov/djj/Documents/ReportsAnd Publications/AJJAC/AJJAC98AnnualReport.pdf; 21A NANCY A. GARRIS & JACK COCHRAN, MISSOURI PRACTICE SERIES § 19:20, at 13 (3d ed. 2008); STACY JOLLES, JUVENILE JUSTICE COMM’N, REPORT TO THE VERMONT LEGISLATURE: JUVENILE JUSTICE COMMISSION REPORT 11 (2009), 300 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:297 there are roughly 450–500 youth on monitors on any given day.4 Despite statutory and case law authority for the use of electronic monitoring in juvenile court, little is known about the precise way that it is used, or the extent it is used.5 A range of unlikely allies, from sheriffs to police to public defenders, advocate for the increased use of electronic monitoring as a successful alternative to incarceration.6 The American Bar Association has urged juvenile courts to use electronic monitoring as an alternative to secure http://dcf.vermont.gov/sites/dcf/files/pdf/reports/FSD_JJC_Report.pdf; STATE OF TENN. DEP’T OF CHILDREN’S SERVS., ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES: 13.5 (2011), http://www.state.tn.us/youth/dcsguide/policies/chap13/13.5.pdf; WASHOE CTY. DEP’T OF JUVENILE SERVS., “PROBATION MANUAL”: ELECTRONIC MONITORING, http://www.jdaihelpdesk. org/aftermodelec/Washoe%20County%20NV%20House%20Arrest%20and%20Electronic%2 0Monitoring.pdf (describing the electronic monitoring process for Washoe County, Nevada); Intensive Supervision Juvenile Probation Program, HAW. HEALTH MATTERS, http://www.hawaiihealth matters.org/index.php?controller=index&module=PromisePractice&action=view&pid=1017 (last visited Sept. 19, 2015); Juvenile Justice Terms/Definitions: Definitions of Terms Used in the Department of Juvenile Justice, GA. DEP’T JUV. JUST., http://www.djj.state.ga.us/Resource Library/resFactSheetsGlossary.shtml#Electronic%20Monitoring (last visited Sept. 19, 2015); S.D. Second Circuit Court, Welcome to Court Services, UJS.SD.GOV, http://ujs.sd.gov/Second_ Circuit/Probation/ (last visited Sept. 19, 2015); Second District Juvenile Court – FAQ’s, UTAH CTS., http://www.utcourts.gov/courts/juv/juvsites/2nd/faq.html (last modified July 16, 2015); Wash. D.C....