Monolith Cos. v. Hunter Douglas Hospitality, Inc.

333 Ga.App. 898

777 S.E.2d 726

MONOLITH COMPANIES, LLC

v.HUNTER DOUGLAS HOSPITALITY, INC.

No. A15A1096.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Sept. 24, 2015.

David Harrison Wood, Atlanta, for Appellant.

Howe & Associates, Scott McKenzie Stevens, Alpharetta, Karl J. Howe Jr., for Appellee.

Opinion

Andrews, Presiding Judge.

In this action on a commercial account, the plaintiff, Hunter Douglas Hospitality, Inc. (“Hunter Douglas”), filed a motion for summary judgment after the defendant, Monolith Companies, LLC (“Monolith”), failed to respond to requests for admission. The trial court granted Hunter Douglas' motion, and Monolith now appeals, arguing that the requests for admission were not timely under Uniform Superior Court Rule 5.1 and that the order granting summary judgment in Hunter Douglas' favor contravened that rule. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

“On appeal from the grant of summary judgment, we conduct a de novo review of the record and construe all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.” Jackson v. Nemdegelt, Inc., 302 Ga.App. 767, 768, 691 S.E.2d 653 (2010). So viewed, the record shows that Hunter Douglas filed its complaint against Monolith on May 6, 2013 alleging that Monolith was indebted to it in the sum of $23,860.13 in principal, plus interest, on a commercial account. Following service of the summons and complaint, Monolith filed its answer on or about July 13, 2013. More than six months later, on January 21, 2014, Hunter Douglas served requests for admission, interrogatories, and requests for production on Monolith.

On March 28, 2014, Hunter Douglas filed its motion for summary judgment arguing that it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because Monolith failed to respond to Hunter Douglas' requests for admission, one of which requested that Monolith admit that it was “indebted to [Hunter Douglas] for the sum set forth in [Hunter Douglas'] Complaint.” In its response to Hunter Douglas' motion, Monolith asserted that Hunter Douglas served the requests for admission after the discovery period ended, it was not required to answer them, and the trial court could not require it to do so consistent with Uniform Superior Court Rule 5.1. Monolith also stated that in an abundance of caution it was filing a motion to withdraw admissions. The record on appeal, however, does not include any such motion, and Monolith does not assert on appeal that it filed a motion to withdraw. The trial court subsequently entered an order granting Hunter Douglas' motion and entering a judgment against Monolith for $23,860.13 in principal, accrued interest of $6,706.99, and court costs and post judgment interest.

Monolith argues on appeal that the trial court's order granting Hunter Douglas' motion was tantamount to requiring or compelling it to answer the requests for admission in violation of Uniform Superior Court Rule 5.1. We disagree.

Uniform Superior Court Rule 5.1 states in relevant part:

In order for a party to utilize the court's compulsory process to compel discovery, any desired discovery procedures must first be commenced promptly, pursued diligently and completed without unnecessary delay and within 6 months after the filing of the answer.... At any time, the court, in its discretion, may open, extend, reopen or shorten the time to utilize the court's compulsory process to compel discovery.

It is undisputed that Hunter Douglas served its requests for admission and other discovery requests shortly after the expiration of the six-month period following the filing of the answer. As such, Hunter Douglas was foreclosed from utilizing the trial court's compulsory process to compel Monolith to respond to the discovery requests. Contrary to Monolith's argument, Hunter Douglas' motion for summary judgment did not seek to compel answers to the requests for admission, nor did the order on appeal purport to require any answers to the requests.

Requests for admission are governed by OCGA § 9–11–36, which provides:

A party may serve upon any other party a written request for the admission, for purposes of the pending action only, of the truth of any matters within the scope of subsection (b) of Code Section 9–11–26 which are set forth in the request and that relate to statements or opinions of fact or of the application of law to fact, including the genuineness of any documents described in the request. ...

OCGA § 9–11–36(a)(1). Under OCGA § 9–11–36(a)(3), a party who has requested admissions may file a motion to determine the sufficiency of the answers or objections. That subsection further provides:

... Unless the court determines that an objection is justified, it shall order that an answer be served. If the court determines that an answer does not comply with the requirements of this subsection, it may order either that the matter is admitted or that an amended answer be served.

Id. To the extent that a motion under OCGA § 9–11–36(a)(3) constitutes utilizing a court's compulsory process within the meaning of Uniform Superior Court Rule 5.1, Hunter Douglas never invoked OCGA § 9–11–36(a)(3) here, and, indeed, it could not do so given that Monolith never served responses or objections to the requests for admission.

Pertinent here is OCGA § 9–11–36(a)(2), which addresses the obligations of a party served with requests for admission and provides in relevant part:

... The matter is admitted unless, within 30 days after service of the request or within such shorter or longer time as the court may allow, the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a written answer or objection addressed to the matter, signed by the party or by his attorney[.]¹

The admission that arises from a failure to respond to a request for admission in the required time frame arises by operation of law, without the necessity of court action. Brougham Casket & Vault Co. v. DeLoach, 323 Ga.App. 701, 703(1), 747 S.E.2d 707 (2013) (“Unless a response to requests for admission is timely and properly served upon the party requesting the admission, the requests are deemed admitted as a matter of law.”).

In its order granting Hunter Douglas' motion for summary judgment, the trial court simply gave effect to the admission that resulted from Monolith's failure to object or respond to the requests for admission. Acknowledging Monolith's admission was not tantamount to compelling compliance with discovery contrary to Uniform Superior Court Rule 5.1, and the trial court was bound to recognize the admission under the express terms of OCGA § 9–11–36. Once an admission has been made for purposes of OCGA § 9–11–36, the matter is “conclusively established unless the court, on motion, permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission.” OCGA § 9–11–36(b). A trial court “may permit withdrawal or amendment when the presentation of the merits of the action will be...