Monsanto v. Rhode Island

LIONEL MONSANTO Plaintiff, v. STATE OF RHODE ISLAND, et al., Defendants.

C.A. No. 16-cv-147-JJM-PAS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND

May 21, 2019

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOHN J. MCCONNELL, JR., United States District Judge.

The Third-Party Defendants¹ ("Defendants") move to dismiss the Amended Third-Party Complaint brought against them by former Rhode Island State Trooper James Donnelly-Taylor. ECF No. 88. The Court sets forth below its reasons for GRANTING the Motion to Dismiss.

Factual Background

Trooper Donnelly-Taylor arrested Lionel Monsanto after a traffic stop and brought him to the State Police cell block. According to Trooper Donnelly-Taylor,² Mr. Monsanto was "belligerent and verbally abusive throughout the traffic stop andwhile he was being transported to the barracks for booking." ECF No. 86 at ¶ 81. Mr. Monsanto's "behavior continued throughout the booking process." Id. at ¶ 82. "After booking, Trooper Donnelly-Taylor escorted [Mr.] Monsanto to a cell" during which Mr. Monsanto "repeatedly pulled his arm and body away from the trooper and repeatedly stated that he would not go into a cell willingly." Id. at ¶ 83-84. Mr. Monsanto "exhibited multiple behaviors over a prolonged period of time that escalated the level of threat he posed to the trooper and others." Id. at ¶ 87. "Upon passing through the cell door, Monsanto . . . slammed his elbow into the trooper's upper-arm, just below the shoulder, in an apparent attempt to strike the trooper's face with his elbow." Id. at ¶ 88. The trooper then "subdue[d Mr.] Monsanto, who was not handcuffed or otherwise restrained in any way, [to] prevent any further threat of harm." Id. at ¶ 90. Trooper Donnelly-Taylor then close-fist punched Mr. Monsanto six times. All the relevant conduct was caught on video-tape.

Trooper Donnelly-Taylor filed charges against Mr. Monsanto including for assault. Id. at ¶ 92. A month later, the Rhode Island Attorney General's office dismissed the charges against Mr. Monsanto. Id. at ¶ 96.

A state grand jury indicted Trooper Donnelly-Taylor for assaulting Mr. Monsanto. Trooper Donnelly-Taylor pleaded nolo contendere to the assault, admitting to the indictment's underlying facts and the use of excessive force. ECF No. 88-2 at 2-3. The judge "place[d] the case on file . . . [and ordered the Trooper to perform] 25 hours of community service." Id. at 6.

Mr. Monsanto filed this suit against the State and Trooper Donnelly-Taylor for violating his federal civil rights by using excessive force and for state law claims. Rhode Island Attorney General Peter Kilmartin refused to defend or indemnify Trooper Donnelly-Taylor individually for this incident, relying on Rhode Island Gen. Laws § 9-31-9, which states that "[t]he attorney general may refuse to defend an action referred to in § 9-31-8 if he or she determines that: (1) The act or omission was not within the scope of employment; (2) The act or the failure to act was because of actual fraud, willful misconduct, or actual malice. . . ."

The Rhode Island Troopers' Association filed a grievance and for arbitration, alleging that Attorney General Kilmartin violated the Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA") with the Troopers' Association by not supplying Trooper Donnelly-Taylor with a defense and indemnity. Attorney General Kilmartin, in response to the grievance and arbitration request, filed a declaratory and injunctive relief complaint in the Rhode Island Superior Court seeking a determination that his decision to deny Trooper Donnelly-Taylor a defense and indemnification was proper and not an arbitrable matter. The Rhode Island Superior Court granted Attorney General Kilmartin's relief, and the Rhode Island Supreme Court affirmed.

Procedural Background

Mr. Monsanto sued the State, the State Treasurer (in his official capacity only), Trooper Donnelly-Taylor (individually and officially), Trooper Gregory Palmer (individually and officially), and Colonel Steven G. O'Donnell (individually and officially). ECF No. 26. Trooper Donnelly-Taylor answered the complaint and fileda Third-Party Complaint and cross-claims against his co-Defendants and adding claims against Governor Gina M. Raimondo (officially) and Attorney General Kilmartin (individually and officially). ECF No. 86.

Mr. Monsanto dismissed his claims with prejudice against all the Defendants. ECF No. 81. The Defendants have now moved to dismiss Trooper Donnelly-Taylor's claims against them. ECF No. 88.

Standard of Review

To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), Trooper Donnelly-Taylor must present facts that make his claim plausible on its face. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). To determine plausibility, the court must first review the complaint and separate conclusory legal allegations from allegations of fact. See Rodriguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 2013). Next, the court must consider whether the remaining factual allegations give rise to a plausible claim of relief. See id.

To state a plausible claim, a complaint need not detail factual allegations, but must recite facts enough at least to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level...." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. A pleading that offers "labels and conclusions" or "a formulative recitation of the elements of a cause of action" will not suffice. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders "naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement." Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557); see also Soto-Torres v. Fraticelli, 654 F.2d 153, 159 (1st Cir. 2011)(holding that combined allegations, taken as true, "must state a plausible, not a merely conceivable, case for relief.").

Analysis

The Defendants move to dismiss the Third-Party Complaint under collateral estoppel, claiming that five of the eight counts were resolved by the Rhode Island Supreme Court's opinion in R.I. Troopers' Association. They also move for dismissal based on absolute and qualified immunity; that defamation is not properly pleaded; and that the complaint fails to state a prima facie case of a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2).

1. Resolution by R.I. Troopers' Association-Counts III, IV, V, VII, and VIII

The Defendants assert that the Court should dismiss each of the following counts based on the Rhode Island Supreme Court ruling in R.I. Troopers' Association:

• Count III (Tortious Interference with Contract-ECF No. 86 at ¶ 152) alleges that Attorney General Kilmartin and Colonel O'Donnell "tortiously prevented Trooper Donnelly-Taylor from enjoying the benefits of. . . the CBA" when Attorney General Kilmartin refused to supply him with a defense or indemnification;

• Count IV (Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Against Defendant O'Donnell-Id. at ¶ 157) is based on a property right "on the terms of the CBA;"

• Count V (Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) Against Defendant O'Donnell-Id. at¶ 164) alleges a denial of indemnification "to which he is entitled;" • Count VII (Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Against Defendant Kilmartin-Id. at ¶ 176) alleges that Trooper Donnelly-Taylor, "by virtue of the terms of the CBA . . . has a property right in his contractual employment," and

• Count VIII (Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) against Defendant Kilmartin-Id. at ¶ 183) alleges that Attorney General Kilmartin inappropriately "den[ied him] indemnification to which he is entitled."

In R.I. Troopers' Association, the Rhode Island Supreme Court spoke definitively about both the powers of the Attorney General under Rhode Island Gen. Laws § 9-31-9 and the application of those powers in Trooper Donnelly-Taylor's case. Under that section, "the Attorney General is vested with the authority to refuse to defend an action on behalf of a state employee if the Attorney General determines that (1) the state employee's conduct was not within the scope of employment; or (2) the state employee engaged in willful misconduct or actual malice." R.I. Troopers' Ass'n, 187 A.3d at 1103. The court looked at the language of the Governmental Tort Liability Act vesting discretion in the Attorney General as to matters of defense and indemnity along with the CBA provision under which the Troopers' Association brought the grievance. Id. at 1101. Deferring to his discretion and after reviewing "the record [that] include[s] a video recording that captured Trooper [Donnelly-]Taylor's assault upon [Mr.] Monsanto," id. at 1104, the court stated that it was "of the opinion that the information before the Attorney General supports the decision that Trooper [Donnelly-]Taylor's conduct fell outside the scope of his employment asa Rhode Island State Trooper and that a jury could conclude that he acted willfully." Id.

The Rhode Island Supreme Court made clear that Attorney General Kilmartin was within his discretionary authority to determine that Trooper Donnelly-Taylor acted willfully in using excessive force on Mr. Monsanto and thus was not entitled to a defense and or to indemnification. The court also ruled that the CBA gave no rights to the Trooper that would override Attorney General Kilmartin's statutory authority to make this decision.

Collateral estoppel

The Defendants argue that collateral estoppel bars the relitigation of Counts III, IV, V, VII, and VIII because the Rhode Island Supreme Court decided the underlining bases for these same claims against Trooper Donnelly-Taylor. "Collateral estoppel makes conclusive in a subsequent action on a different claim the determination of particular issues actually litigated in a prior action as long as [1] the issues are identical, [2] the prior judgment was final, and [3] the individual who is the subject of the estoppel was a party or in privity with a party in the prior action." Cole v. Charron, 477 A.2d 959, 961 (R.I. 1984); Foster-Glocester Reg'l Sch. Comm. v. Bd. of Review, 854 A.2d 1008, 1014 (R.I. 2004).³

All three elements of...