Montemuro v. Jim Thorpe Area Sch. Dist.

99 F.4th 639

Paul MONTEMURO v. JIM THORPE AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT; Glenn Confer,individually and as School Board Member;Dennis McGinley, individually and as School Board Member;Raniero Marciante, individually and as School Board Member;Pearl Downs-Sheckler individually and as School Board Member;Gerald Strubinger, individually and as School Board Member, Appellants

No. 22-1866

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit

Argued January 18, 2024

Filed: May 1, 2024

On Appeal from the United States District Court For the Middle District of Pennsylvania (D.C. No. 3-20-cv-00208), District Judge: Honorable Robert D. Mariani

David W. Brown, Michael I. Levin [ARGUED], Levin Legal Group, 1800 Byberry Road, 1301 Masons Mill Business Park, Huntingdon Valley, PA 19006, Counsel for Appellants

William E. Vinsko, Jr. [ARGUED], 37 N. River Street, Wilkes-Barre, PA 18702, Counsel for Appellee

Before: JORDAN, BIBAS, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges

OPINION OF THE COURT

JORDAN, Circuit Judge.

Paul Montemuro was elected President of the Jim Thorpe Area School Board (the "School Board" or "Board"). But then, a week later, the Board elected someone else. Montemuro received no notice of the change beforehand, so he sued the Board members who voted to oust him, along with the Jim Thorpe Area School District (the "District") for depriving him of property without due process, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment. The defendant Board members and District (collectively, the "Defendants") asserted qualified immunity, but the District Court held that Montemuro had a clearly established property right in his employment and had been deprived of that right without due process. Because Pennsylvania law clearly establishes that Montemuro had a property interest in his job as the Board President, and because we must accept as true his allegation that he was removed from office without notice, we will affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The Jim Thorpe Area School District is located in Carbon County, Pennsylvania. Paul Montemuro served with Glenn Confer, Dennis McGinley, Pearl Downs-Sheckler, Raniero Marciante, and Gerald Strubinger as members of the School Board. On December 4, 2019, a majority of the Board elected Montemuro to be President of the Board. For reasons not apparent on the record, a week later, the Board elected a new president. Montemuro claims that the Board did not notify him of its plan to reorganize, nor did it provide him a hearing before his ouster. He responded by suing the District and the Board members who voted against him for depriving him of his property interest in the position of Board President without due process and in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment. He raised other federal and state claims, none of which are relevant at this point.

The Defendants moved to dismiss, asserting, among other things, qualified immunity as an affirmative defense. A Magistrate Judge recommended that the District Court deny the motion to dismiss for qualified immunity because Montemuro had a "clearly established" property right and was fired without due process. (J.A. at 26.) The Court adopted the Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation and denied the motion to dismiss for qualified immunity. The Defendants filed the interlocutory appeal on the qualified immunity question that is before us now.

II. DISCUSSION¹

Qualified immunity "shields governmental officials from suit and from liability if their conduct 'does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.' " Mack v. Yost, 63 F.4th 211, 221 (3d Cir. 2023) (quoting Peroza-Benitez v. Smith, 994 F.3d 157, 164-65 (3d Cir. 2021)). Only the defendant Board members are eligible for qualified immunity; the District is not. See Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 145 (3d Cir. 2017) (noting that a municipal entity is not eligible for qualified immunity). There is a well-settled two-part test to determine whether government officials should receive qualified immunity. Anglemeyer v. Ammons, 92 F.4th 184, 188 (3d Cir. 2024). We ask whether the plaintiff has alleged the violation of any constitutional or statutory rights, and we further ask whether those rights were clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct, such that a reasonable official would have known that the conduct violated the plaintiff's rights. Id. We are free to address those questions in the order we choose. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236, 129 S.Ct. 808, 172 L.Ed.2d 565 (2009).

A. The Board violated Montemuro's constitutional right to due process.

The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in part: "No State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law[.]" U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Montemuro claims that he was deprived of property, his job as School Board President, without the requisite legal process. To succeed, he must demonstrate, first, that he was deprived of a property interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and, second, that the procedures available to him "did not provide due process of law." Thompson v. Delaware Dep't of Servs. for Child., Youth & Their Fams., 44 F.4th 188, 194 (3d Cir. 2022).

1. Montemuro had a property interest in his job as School Board President.

A state employee has a constitutionally protected property interest in his job if he can only be terminated for cause. Id. We look to "state law and rules" to determine whether an employee can be fired only for cause, id., and, in this instance, an answer is there: Pennsylvania law establishes that a school board president can be fired only for cause. The Pennsylvania Constitution, in § 7 of Article VI, declares, "[a]ll civil officers shall hold their offices on the condition that they behave themselves well while in office, and shall be removed on conviction of misbehavior in office or of any infamous crime." It goes on to say that "[a]ppointed civil officers . . . may be removed at the pleasure of the power by which they shall have been appointed." Id. In a case from the mid-twentieth century, Buell v. Union Township School District, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania applied the text of § 7 and determined that school officials (in that case, a school district secretary and treasurer) are appointed civil officers. 395 Pa. 567, 150 A.2d 852, 854-55 (1959). Further, the Court concluded that such civil officers "could be removed at the pleasure of the body which appointed [them]." Id. at 855. The Defendants lay heavy emphasis on that latter point to argue that Montemuro was terminable at will and so had no property interest in his position. But they ignore how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has since interpreted the entirety of § 7.

In a 2007 case, Burger v. School Board of McGuffey School District, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized the superintendent of a school board as a "civil officer" under Article VI, § 7 of the Commonwealth's constitution but then determined that he was not removable at will. 592 Pa. 194, 923 A.2d 1155, 1157, 1163 (2007). It began by summarizing the trial court's analysis, saying, "[t]he trial court found that the constitutional grant of authority conferred upon the appointing power to remove an appointed civil officer . . . is absolute, thereby permitting no limitations on that authority." Id. at 1161-62. The Supreme Court then made clear its disagreement with the trial court - and, indeed, with Buell - by rejecting the idea that § 7 creates an at-will removal power over all appointed civil officers. The Court looked to the first sentence of that section and said, "[t]he provision that such civil officers shall hold their offices on the condition that they 'behave themselves well while in office,' and that they shall (not may) be removed 'on conviction of misbehavior in office or of any infamous crime' contemplates an affirmative limitation (good behavior) upon removal." Id. at 1162. Hence, the Court concluded, such officers are not removable at will. Id. ("We therefore hold that, as a matter of plain meaning, the Constitution does not vest in the appointing power unfettered discretion to remove. Instead, valid removal depends upon the officer behaving in a manner not befitting the trust placed in him by the appointing authority.") The upshot is that Montemuro, as Board President, while being an "[a]ppointed civil officer" under Article VI, § 7, see Buell, 150 A.2d at 854, was not subject to at-will removal but only to removal for cause. He thus had a property interest in the Board Presidency.

Pennsylvania statutes further support that Montemuro had a property interest in his position. Section 5-514 of the Public School Code states:

The board of school directors in any school district, except as herein otherwise provided, shall after due notice, giving the reasons therefor, and after hearing if demanded, have the right at any time to remove any of its officers, employe[e]s, or appointees for incompetency, intemperance, neglect of duty, violation of any of the school laws of this Commonwealth, or other improper conduct.

24 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 5-514 (emphasis added). And the school board president is an "officer" of the school board, as is evident from § 4-404 of the Public School Code, which creates the office and is entitled "election of officers."² See Buell, 150 A.2d at 854 (assuming school secretary and treasurer qualify as "officers" under § 5-514). Thus, by its terms, § 5-514 provides that school district officers can only be fired for cause.

The analysis, however, is complicated by Buell, which held § 5-514 unconstitutional "[t]o the extent that [it] is in conflict with . . . the Constitution[.]" 150 A.2d at 855. The Buell court followed much the same logic pressed by the Defendants here, namely that the constitutional provision just discussed allows a civil officer to be terminated without cause. But once again Burger comes to...