Montgomery Cnty. v. Gang

MONTGOMERY COUNTY, MARYLAND v. PETER GANG

No. 00768

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

September Term, 2017

August 9, 2018

Circuit Court for Montgomery County

Case No. 423509V

UNREPORTED

Eyler, Deborah S., Shaw Geter, Raker, Irma, S. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Opinion by Shaw Geter, J.

*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.

In 2012, the Maryland Workers' Compensation Commission awarded Peter Gang, appellee, compensation for an injury he sustained while employed with appellant, Montgomery County. The rate of compensation, however, was incorrectly calculated, as it failed to recognize Mr. Gang's status as a "public safety officer," which entitled him to higher compensation. Four years later appellee filed a "Request for Document Correction," whereupon the Commission issued an amended award that retroactively increased his rate of compensation. On judicial review, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County affirmed the Commission's decision. Appellant timely appealed and presents us with the following question, which we have rephrased¹:

Did the Commission err in retroactively modifying appellee's award of workers' compensation?

For the reasons stated below, we shall reverse the judgment of the circuit court.

BACKGROUND

Appellee Peter Gang was a correctional officer employed by Montgomery County, appellant. On September 17, 2011, Gang was accidentally injured at a facility and thereafter filed a workers' compensation claim. Following a hearing on April 26, 2012, the Workers' Compensation Commission issued a decision on May 2, 2012, which found appellee suffered a permanent partial disability and awarded Gang compensation at the rate of $157 a week, for 70 weeks.

The order, however, failed to recognize Gang's status as a "public safety officer," under § 9-628 of the Labor and Employment Article, which entitled him to a higher rate of compensation. Both parties agree the May 2, 2012 Order was error and that Gang initially received compensation at the incorrect rate.² Neither party filed a motion for rehearing³ or appeal to the circuit court.⁴

Almost four years later, on March 22, 2016, a "Request for Document Correction" was filed by appellee's counsel regarding the 2012 case.⁵ The request alleged that Gang was paid at an incorrect rate. The Commission, on March 25, 2016, issued an amended award, retroactively modifying his compensation to $314 a week. Appellant objected to the Commission's actions because it had not been notified and filed a "Request for Rehearing" on April 6, 2016. Appellee then filed a request, on April 13, asking that the Commission "withdraw the Document Correction filed on 3/22/16, strike the Order issued on 3/25/16 and set this case in for hearing on the issue of the correct weekly permanent partial disability rate in the 5/2/12 Order."

The Commission denied the County's "Request for Rehearing." They filed a second "Request for Rehearing" on April 21, 2016, and argued that in light of appellee's withdrawal of his initial Document Correction, the Commission should "rescind the order dated 3/25/16 that implemented that document correction and the denial of the rehearing request dated April 19, 2016."

Subsequently a hearing was held, on June 27, 2016, where the Commission heard argument of counsel. Following the hearing an order was issued, whereby the Commission affirmed the March 25, 2016 Order and found it was a proper use of the Commission's "continuing jurisdiction" under Labor and Employment Section 9-736(b) of the Maryland Code.

Appellant filed a petition for an on the record judicial review in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, on July 26, 2016,⁶ and appellee filed a cross-appeal for a de novo review on August 9. Appellee also filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Judicial Review on October 18, 2016, which was opposed by appellant and denied by the court at a hearing on December 13, 2016. An on the record review of the Commission's findings was held on April 19, 2017, where counsel presented argument. The circuit court affirmed the decision of the Commission, memorialized in an order entered May 25, 2017. Appellant then brought this timely appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

With an "appeal on the record of the Commission...no new evidence is taken nor is any fresh fact-finding engaged in. The determination of whether the decision of the Commission was free from error will entail only an examination of the record of the proceedings before the Commission." Simmons v. Comfort Suites Hotel, 185 Md. App. 203, 224-25 (2009) (internal citation and quotation omitted). The reviewing court is "limited to determining if there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole to support the agency's findings and conclusions, and to determine if the administrative decision is premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law." W.M. Schlosser Co. v. Uninsured Employers' Fund, 414 Md. 195, 204 (2010) (internal citation and quotation omitted). We examine the agency's decision "in the light most favorable to it" and "the agency's decision is prima facie correct and presumed valid." Id. at 205 (internal citation and quotation omitted). While an administrative agency's interpretation of a statute should "ordinarily be given considerable weight by reviewing courts," id., "[m]istaken interpretation of law, however honestly arrived at, are held not to be within the exercise of sound administrative discretion." Subsequent Injury Fund v. Baker, 40 Md. App. 339, 343 (1978) (internal citation and quotation omitted).

ANALYSIS

When interpreting the language of a statute, the primary goal is to "ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature." Walzer v. Osborne, 395 Md. 563, 571 (2006) (internal citation and quotation omitted). We first look to the statute's plain language, "giving it its natural and ordinary meaning" and "[w]e neither add nor delete words to a clear and unambiguous statute to give it a meaning not reflected by the words." Id. at 571-72 (internal citation and quotation omitted). If the statutory provisions are "clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written." Md. Div. of Labor and Indus. v. Triangle Gen. Contractors, Inc., 366 Md. 407, 420 (2001) (internal citation and quotations omitted). In such circumstances, "no construction or clarification is needed or permitted, it being the rule that a plainly worded statute must be construed without forced or subtle interpretations designed to extend or limit the scope of its operation." Id. at 420-21 (citing Giant Food, Inc. v. Dept. of Labor, 356 Md. 180, 189 (1999) (internal quotations omitted)).

Section 9-736 of the Labor and Employment Article addresses the Workers' Compensation Commission's revisory power and states:

(a). - Readjustment of rate of compensation

If aggravation, diminution, or termination of disability takes place or is discovered after the rate of compensation is set or compensation is terminated, the Commission, on the application of any party in interest or on its own motion, may:

(1) readjust for future application the rate of compensation; or

(2) if appropriate, terminate the payments.

(b). - Continuing powers and jurisdiction; modification

(1) The Commission has continuing powers and jurisdiction over each claim under this title.

(2) Subject to paragraph (3) of this subsection, the Commission may modify any finding or order as the Commission considers justified.

(3) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, the Commission may not modify an award unless the modification is applied for within 5 years after the latter of:

(i) the date of the accident;

(ii) the date of disablement; or

(iii) the last compensation payment.

Appellant argues the Commission's retroactive award was in violation of its authority, relying in part on the language of the statute and Sealy Furniture of Maryland v. Miller, 356 Md. 462 (1999). Appellee, on the other hand, argues the modification was properly within the Commission's broad revisory power and, in support of his position, cites Subsequent Injury Fund v. Baker, 40 Md. App. 339 (1978) and Waters v. Pleasant Manor Nursing Home, 127 Md. App. 587 (1999). He claims the Commission "did not change a past rate of compensation," but rather "merely corrected a clerical mistake in the original Order."

In Sealy Furniture of Maryland v. Miller, the Court of Appeals addressed the limits of the Commission's revisory power. 356 Md. 462 (1999). There, the Commission ordered Employer to pay permanent partial disability benefits and granted Employer's request for a credit reimbursing them for six months of mistaken payments to Employee, "the effect of which was to excuse any further payments."⁷ Id. at 465.

On review, the Court of Appeals concluded the Commission did not have the authority to credit the overpayment against a new award. Id. at 467-68. "[A]lthough the revisory power of the Commission under § 9-736 is broad, it is not unlimited." Id. at 468. "The Commission may not disregard other legislative directives, Jung v. Southland Corp., 351 Md. 165 [] (1998), or, indeed, the construction of the workers' compensation law by this Court." Id. The Court then stated that "if [overpayments are] to be corrected by allowing a recovery, either directly or in the form of a credit against another award, the Legislature will have to provide that correction." Id. at 470 (emphasis added).

In Subsequent Injury Fund v. Baker, employee Baker was injured in the course of his employment and, while in the hospital, discovered he had a form of bone cancer that predated the injury. Baker, 40 Md. App. at 340. As a result of the pre-existing condition, the Subsequent Injury Fund (SIF)⁸ was impleaded. At a hearing, the Commission found Baker was "permanently and...