Montgomery v. Mayor & City Council of Balt.

CHASE MONTGOMERY v. MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL OF BALTIMORE

No. 136-2020

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

September 15, 2021

UNREPORTED

Circuit Court for Baltimore City Case No. 24-C-19-03384

Nazarian, ^[**] Gould, Wright, Alexander, Jr. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

OPINION ^[*]

Nazarian, J.

Chase Montgomery, a Baltimore City police officer, filed a claim with the Workers' Compensation Commission seeking compensation for an injury he sustained when he stepped out of his patrol vehicle, lost his balance, and hit his head on the vehicle. In its response to the claim, the City did not contest that Officer Montgomery's injury had arisen out of and in the course of his employment. The Commission issued an order finding that Officer Montgomery's injury was connected causally to his employment.

About seven weeks later, the City filed issues contesting Officer Montgomery's claim. The Commission held a hearing on May 13, 2019, at which the City asserted for the first time that Officer Montgomery's injury arose from vertigo, a condition from which Officer Montgomery allegedly suffered before the accident, and not in the course of his employment. The Commission issued an order construing the City's issues as a request to reopen under § 9-736(b) of the Labor & Employment Article and, in the same order, denied that request.

The City filed a petition for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City and moved to remand the matter to the Commission. The circuit court granted the City's motion to remand and ordered the Commission to hold a hearing on the City's issues. After the circuit court denied his motion for reconsideration, Officer Montgomery appealed. We hold that the Commission's decision denying the City's request to reopen the case was not subject to judicial review by the circuit court. We vacate the judgment and remand to the circuit court with instructions to dismiss the petition for judicial review.

I. BACKGROUND

Officer Montgomery filed his claim on December 13, 2018, and on December 18, 2018, the City's adjuster responded using a standard form. The adjuster checked the box next to "no compensable lost time" but did not check any other boxes, including the one under the heading "Contested Issues," next to the question "Did the employee sustain an accidental personal injury or occupational disease arising out of and in the course of employment?" Having received no objection from the City, the Commission issued an order on January 15, 2019 finding that Officer Montgomery's injury arose out of his employment. The order also deferred the determination of the nature and extent of Officer Montgomery's disability.

About seven weeks later, on March 7, 2019, the City filed issues contesting Officer Montgomery's claim. On May 13, 2019, the Commission held a hearing at which the City asserted for the first time that vertigo, an idiopathic condition from which he had suffered before, caused Officer Montgomery's injury.^[1] The City represented that although its adjuster had Officer Montgomery's medical records in January, City attorneys did not have them in their possession until March, and they filed the issues immediately upon receiving them. The City did not explain to the Commission, the circuit court, or this Court the reason for the delay in transmitting the records. But the City argued that the medical records were "in the nature of newly discovered evidence" and that the City was entitled to raise the defense of idiopathic condition. Without citing to the specific statute, the City referenced a provision of the Labor and Employment Article that allows a request for rehearing on the basis of newly discovered evidence during the fifteen-day period after the Commission's decision; we assume this is Maryland Code (1991, 2016 Repl. Vol.) § 9-726 of the Labor and Employment Article ("LE"). Section 9-726(a) provides that a party may file with the Commission a motion for rehearing "[w]ithin 15 days after the date of a decision by the Commission." See generally Frederick Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs. v. Sautter, 123 Md.App. 440, 447-48 (1998) (observing that motions for rehearing under LE § 9-726 must be grounded on either an error of law or newly discovered evidence). But although it appeared to reference LE § 9-726, the City did not argue that it had filed a request for rehearing-or even that it filed its issues-within that fifteen-day period.

Officer Montgomery's counsel disputed the characterization of the evidence as "new" and argued that "it would be wrong to allow" the City "to go forward on contesting issues well after automatic award was passed and no appeal has been filed." He argued that "there was no rehearing request filed, there was no [] appeal filed, and now the City is, at this point, saying they want to contest the claim." He contended that "if that were to be allowed, then there's no validity to this automatic award, there's no reason to have an appeal, no reason to ever file a rehearing; we could just file for another hearing whenever we see fit." In response, the Commission stated that it "agree[d]." Several times during the hearing, the commissioner stated that the City's attempt to contest causality was too late:

● on page 36: "But if you're contending that the fall, itself, was caused by an idiopathic condition, they're out of luck. They filed too late."

● on page 43: "But, you know, if the Mayor and City Council is simply saying this is idiopathic condition that caused the accident, it's too late, I'm afraid."

● on page 45: "Procedurally, the Claimant's correct, that the time to contest this case and the way it was contested is not proper."

But ultimately, the commissioner concluded the hearing by stating that it would take the matter under consideration and make a decision later:

All right. So I'm going to take a look and decide how I'm going to handle it, as far as that's concerned one way or another - whether it's just going to be a continuance is, probably, the way that I can see it, that there's no, no issues ripe for, for a decision at this point. Okay?

On May 31, 2019, the Commission issued a written order construing the City's March 7 issues as a request for reopening under LE § 9-736(b) and stating that it "refuse[d] to reopen this matter":

Hearing was held in the above claim at Baltimore, Maryland on May 13, 2019 on the employer and insurer's Petition to Reopen filed on March 7, 2019. The Mayor &City [sic] Council of Baltimore, having not requested a rehearing on or filed an appeal concerning the Commission's Award dated January 15, 2019, the Issues filed on March 7, 2019 must be considered a request for modification or reopening under Labor & Employment Article, Section 9-736(b). The Commission refuses to reopen this matter and will deny the employer and insurer's Petition to Reopen.

On June 18, 2019, the City filed a petition for judicial review in the circuit court. On December 16, 2019, the City filed a motion for remand, asking the circuit court to remand the matter to the Commission with directions to consider the City's evidence that Officer Montgomery's alleged vertigo caused his injury. Officer Montgomery opposed the motion, and on February 3, 2020, the circuit court held a hearing. The City argued that the Commission should have considered the merits of the City's issues, specifically that Officer Montgomery's vertigo was an idiopathic condition that could serve as a defense to his compensation claim. The City argued that the circuit court had the "equitable" authority to remand the matter to the Commission. Officer Montgomery countered that the case should not be remanded because the City missed the deadlines to challenge the Commission's January 15 decision by way of a request for rehearing or filing a petition for judicial review.

The circuit court ruled from the bench. It recognized that the City "had within [its] power [and] resources to have learned of [the vertigo]" and that the City "argues through Counsel today that it simply did not know until the date it did." Even so, the court remanded the matter to the Commission based on its equitable powers, reasoning that the City "should have been given the opportunity to make a factual defense," even if it would not have succeeded:

What the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore is therefore doing today is seeking relief from this Court of an equitable nature, ordering a remand, and frankly requiring the Commission to merely allow the petitioner the opportunity, meaning the insurer, to present evidence to be considered by the Commission.

And I don't believe that's inappropriate, notwithstanding the tardy discovery of the symptomology and the diagnosis. I don't believe it's inappropriate for the Commission to, frankly, have the information that it should have had long ago, had it [] permitted the petitioner herein to present the evidence that it wanted to present.

This Court does believe, notwithstanding the time based arguments of the claimant respondent herein, Officer Montgomery, that Mayor and City Council of Baltimore should have been given the opportunity to make a factual defense []. Not - and I'm not suggesting that it would have succeeded, but to at least have had an opportunity to have made an effort on the issue of causation. And the Commission needs to make ultimately a factual finding determining that, given the parties['] dispute.

Officer Montgomery moved to reconsider the remand decision and the circuit court denied the motion. Officer Montgomery filed a timely notice of appeal. We supply additional facts as necessary below.

II. DISCUSSION

The parties identify a single question presented that we rephrase: Did the circuit court err in granting the City's motion for a remand instructing the...